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Abstract. 
This dissertation is mainly concerned with political parties that usually cluster 
inside the area of right-wing radicalism. Major changes concerning Western 
European party systems represent the background of analysis. The study is 
underpinned on the recognition that, after the emergence of ecology and left-
libertarian parties, the rise of right-wing parties is the most relevant and debated 
transformation in the configuration of party systems. Fourteen EU-member states 
are included in the set of inquiry and life-span analysis ranges from1990 to 2009. 
Firstly, the examination focuses on the identification of parties at stakes with the 
purpose of elaborating a suitable label. By exploring the right deviancy on value 
and cultural topics through expert survey datasets, the final label for those actors is 
Exclusionist Right Parties (ERPs). Secondly, the research takes into account factors 
that potentially affected the electoral performances of ERPs. The related framework 
is two-fold, composed of demand and supply sides. On the one hand, for the 
demand side, individual-level data are inspected; on the other hand, for the supply 
side, expert judgments have been employed to plot party positions along a couple 
of domains, i.e. economy and immigration. In conclusion, the aim of the final 
chapter is to shed light on the different ERPs’ electoral fortunes by pinpointing 
patterns of multiple combinations of conditions and constructing a weighted 
additive index. 
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SAP Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti) 
SDI Italian Democratic Socialists (Socialisti Democratici Italiani) 
SDP Social Democratic Party of Finland (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue) 
SEGNI Segni Pact (Patto Segni) 
SF Sinn Féin 
SFP Swedish People’s Party (Svenska folkpartiet i Finland) 
SGP Reformed Political Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij) 
SKL/KD Christian League of Finland (Suomen Kristillinen Liitto) — current name: 
Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit) 
SMP/PS Finnish Rural Party (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue) — True Finns 
(Perussuomalaiset) 
SNP Scottish National Party (Pàrtaidh Nàiseanta na h-Alba) 
SP Socialist Party (Páirtí Sóisialach) [Ireland] 
SP Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij) [Netherlands] 
SP.A. Socialist Party Different (Socialistische Partij Anders) 
SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) 
SPÖ Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs) 
SVP South Tyrolean People’s Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei — Partito Popolare 
Sudtirolese 
SYN Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology (Synaspismós tīs Aristerás tōn 
Kinīmátōn kai tīs Oikologías) 
UD Democratic Union (Unione Democratica) 
UDC Unione of the Centre (Unione di Centro) 
UDEUR Populars of the South (Popolari per il Sud) 
UDF Union for the French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française) 
UDP Popular Democratic Union (Uniao Democrática Popular) 
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party 
UMP Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) 
UV Valencian Union (Unió Valenciana) 
V Left, Liberal Party of Denmark (Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti)  
VAS Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto) 
VB Flemish Bloc (Vlaams Blok) — current name: Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) 
VERDE Green Party (Partido Verde) 
VERDI Federation of the Greens (Federazione dei Verdi) 
VERTS The Greens (Les Verts) 
VIHR Green League (Vihreä Liitto) 
VS Left Socialists (Venstresocialisterne) 
VSL Alliance for a Free Finland(Vapaan Suomen Liitto) 
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VU/N-VA People’s Union (Volksunie) — current name: New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-
Vlaamse Alliantie) 
VVD People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie) 
WP Workers’ Party (Páirtí na nOibrithe) 
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AN INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Political parties of contemporary West European democracies lay at the heart 
of the present research. An important preliminary question is: why political parties? 
The simplest answer would be: because they matter, and their role is still a crucial 
one in politics. On the one hand, contemporary politics is characterised by features 
overshooting political parties: the increasing importance of charismatic leaders able 
to strongly personalise the political arena; the mounting spread of globalisation and 
the long-debated loss of relevance of both the State and domestic politics; the 
revolution in technology and information which is fostering autonomy and 
involvement of mass publics; the weakening of ideologies and values which is 
often connected to the diminishing percentage of turnout at the polls, and also to the 
supposed enlarging rift between voters and elected officials. Moreover after the end 
of the Cold War, with the breakdown of the USSR and Eastern European 
communist regimes, and the alleged definite triumph of liberal democracies 
(Fukuyama 1992) several changes in politics may have undermined the legitimacy 
and strength of both the state and political parties. On the other hand, parties are 
still able to exercise fundamental functions in society: they shape values and public 
opinion, channel preferences and requests, and give institutional representation to 
organised groups and citizens. Besides, configuration and dynamic of party system 
in a country is fundamental in determining the performance of political regime at 
stake, especially in parliamentary ones where parties form coalitions and support 
governments. Sartori highlighted how parties belong «first and foremost, to the 
means of representation» since they are «an instrument or an agency, for 
representing the people by expressing their demands» (Sartori 1976, 27). Besides, 
they «have found their essential raison d'être and their nonreplaceable role in 
implementing representative and responsive government» and this democratic 
responsiveness is provided since parties «supplied the channels for articulating, 
communicating, and implementing the demands of the governed» (Sartori 1976, 
27). Along with that instrumental function, one cannot neglect that political parties 
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bring with them a set of cultural and ideological principles affecting society in 
many respects, so that they are active actors in the political realm. 
Although party systems are extensively examined, with special regards to 
dimensions of party competitions, a specific area within them plays the central role 
in this inquiry. Indeed, analysis revolves around those political parties that are 
usually located along the right wing side of the political spectrum. This already 
provides some hints on the scientific relevance of the topic. After the rise of 
ecology and left-libertarian parties, the upsurge of the variously called “new right” 
represents the most important change in party systems of the last three decades. 
Indeed, in terms of party system analysis, the (re-)emergence of the “right” and its 
power of affecting West European politics is the uppermost change in the last two 
decades. This is further proven since the forerunner Kitschelt’s study (1995) has 
been followed by a large proliferation of researches about the radical right. 
Although exponents of the right-wing radicalism were actually active also in early 
periods of time, the phenomenon acquired a major status by the end of the 1980s 
spreading all over Europe. In fact, nowadays very few countries do not present 
parties belonging to the radical right or on the border between that and the 
mainstream centre-right. 
The framework of analysis is firmly settled on comparative politics, so that the 
main purpose is to identify, describe and (whenever possible) explain similarities 
and difference among cases (Caramani 2009). The “backbone” of the research is 
constituted by a rigorous comparison among cases and properties. In particular, the 
framework is based on the comparison of scores held by the units of analysis on 
different selected properties (Marradi 1981). To that purpose, the best technique is 
the Qualitiative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a method based on Boolean algebra 
that was initially put forth by the influential works of Charles Ragin (1987). The 
main intention was to make quantitative and qualitative techniques interact by 
framing a middle range approach able to take profit of strong points from both 
sides. Furthermore, the number of cases (see note 1) is too small to make statistical 
analysis viable and the current research does not aim at explaining how variations 
of independent variables carry out variation in the dependent variable. On the other 
side, QCA is deeply rooted in case oriented knowledge, though it combines also an 
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accurate match between cases through binary or fuzzy values. This last distinction 
is at the origins of two different QCA versions, respectively, the crisp-set QCA 
(csQCA) grounded on dichotomized scores and fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) based on 
calibrated scores ranging from 0 to 1 (Wagemann 2007). Given the composite 
nature of data here employed — descriptive statistics from mass surveys, expert 
survey scale data, and others —crisp-set QCA appeared as the most appropriate 
tool for cross-country comparison. Although the use of binary values may carry out 
loss of information, it brings also simplicity and clarity in data elaboration and 
avoids the complexity of fuzzy values that need at least two cut-off points to 
transform raw data into fine-grained scores. 
With special attention to cases here included in the set of investigation, a so-
called “Most Similar, Different Outcome” (MSDO) strategy has been employed. 
The basic tenet is that cases are selected because of their similarity on some 
properties, thought they differ on results on a certain point. In other words, cases 
share a high degree of similarity, though are dissimilar on the outcome, so that 
investigation has to focus on their idiosyncrasies «in which the reasons for the 
different outcomes may lie» (Rihoux and Ragin 2008, 22). Thus, the fourteen 
countries here included1 are currently members of the European Union and none of 
them was embedded into the USSR sphere of influence during the Cold War. Sure 
enough, every single country is featured by its own social and political 
peculiarities, though the large majority of them are fully democratic since the end 
of WWII. The only exception to this argument are Greece, Portugal, and Spain, 
which can be classified as “late comers” since they evolved in the mid-1970s 
towards a democratic regime. However, given their adherence to the Western camp 
and their rapid evolution into democracy, they are considered part of the set under 
investigation. Of course, the research design bears in mind Lijphart’s suggestion 
(1971) of limiting comparison to those cases that are actually similar and, thus, 
comparable. Although assumed as a main guideline, that principle is just slightly 
relaxed in order to include three more cases. This brings profits to the entire 
                                                
1 The number increases of one unit when Belgium is split into its two main regions. The complete 
list is as follows: Austria, Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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analysis because description is richer and more extended, and final results are more 
robust since based on a large set of cases2. On the other hand, they do not share the 
same outcome, namely, their radical right parties performed in a very different way 
at the polls. Whether this work had been based on quantitative methods, the aim 
would have been the inspection of variance of a dependent variable. However, 
since the present context is definitely more qualitative, the term outcome is 
preferred than dependent variable. The core of scientific investigation is essentially 
based onto the verification of regular associations between factors and outputs. 
More precisely, several hypotheses stemming from theoretical assumptions are to 
be tested empirically «about the association of presence or absence of phenomena 
(a qualitative or categorical/discrete level of measurement)» (Caramani 2010, 36). 
In analogy of what has been said above, quantitative independent variables that are 
assumed as factors affecting the outcome are called conditions in this inquiry. In a 
nutshell, the purpose is testing whether some conditions are able, and eventually in 
what ways, to produce a given outcome. 
Even though various topics are treated in the next chapters, the crucial point of 
the investigation is sure enough related to the outcome to be explained. Thus, (i) 
having identified a suitable label for those political parties located in the radical 
right area and (ii) singled out theoretical hypotheses on the outcome, then the main 
research question is: do exist common configurations of conditions able to shed 
light on the divergent electoral performances of Exclusionist Right Parties (ERPs)3? 
In other words, the purpose is to single out combinations of causal factors that are 
associated to ERPs’ electoral performances in all countries here included and, by 
consequence, to describe and reason about commonalities and differences. 
By consequence, this work is conveniently divided into two essential branches. 
The first part in mainly consecrated to the object of analysis. Indeed, every 
scientific inquiry needs to clarify a priori the meaning of its concepts and labels, 
and associate theoretical-abstract constructs to existent-real objects (i.e., political 
                                                
2 As Caramani highlighted, «establishing what is similar and what is different is a matter of choice» 
(2009, 38) because it depends on the “distance” between researcher and object, that is the quantity 
and quality of properties that are taken into account when comparing cases. 
3 The construction of that label and the identification of parties of that kind are provided by Chapter 
2. 
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parties). Part 1 is split into two chapters. Chapter 1 investigates the meaning of the 
label “right” in politics and put forth a cultural framework to interpret the 
contemporary evolution of West European party systems. Chapter 2 has the main 
purpose of identifying those parties that are usually associated to right-wing 
radicalism and provides a new grouping label (i.e., Exclusionist Right Parties, 
ERPs). The second part encompasses a theoretical and empirical analysis. Its 
lifespan covers on the whole the 1990-2009 interval and the leading perspective 
relies on the assumption that party electoral scores are essentially affected in two 
main ways: the demand side regards those societal values able to influence voting 
behaviour; on the other hand, the supply side deals with the political context, i.e., 
the institutional settings and competition among parties themselves. Therefore, the 
main goal is exploring whether demand-side and/or supply-side factors affected 
ERPs electoral performances, and how they combine in each country. Hence, Part 2 
is made up of three chapters. Chapter 3 investigates demand-side factors, i.e. 
societal conditions creating a fertile ground for ERPs to prosper in the first decade 
of the XXIst century. Chapter 4 explores supply-side factors, i.e. institutional 
arrangements and party system configurations that can favour/discourage the 
settlement of ERPs. Finally, Chapter 5 will try to put together those conclusions 
reached by the two previous chapters, in order to find out whether some common 
configurations of conditions can be associated to ERPs different electoral fortunes. 
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PART 1 – THE OBJECT OF ANALYSIS 
 20 
I. PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE 
1. THE OPENING DILEMMA 
The focus of this investigation is primarily on political parties generally 
qualified as radical rightist4, hence my field of investigation does not concern 
established mainstream centre-right parties belonging to the Christian democratic or 
conservative familles spirituelles (Knutsen 1998) and generally affiliated to the 
European People's Party. The literature identifies non-moderate right-wing parties 
by a plethora of terms: extreme right, far right, radical right, right-wing populism, 
neo and post-fascism, just to give a hint of a terminological chaos that can be 
considered as a «consequence of a lack of clear definitions» (Mudde 2007, 12). 
Such a setback is particularly critical for a comparative study that should be 
underpinned on concepts able to travel across temporal and spatial contexts, indeed 
«the wider the world under investigation, the more we need conceptual tools that 
are able to travel» (Sartori 1970, 1034). Besides, what we grasp about external 
world is necessarily filtered through those concepts we resort to: we are able to 
know what we conceptualize and conceptualization itself affects our understanding 
of reality, in a sort of circular feedback. Therefore, a key issue is determining an 
appropriate label to qualify political parties at stakes, a task that is not 
straightforward at all, taking into account drawbacks of conceptual stretching 
(Sartori 1970). The main questions can be formulated this way: how can we 
catalogue those parties perceived as part of the radical right? Which label can be 
used and why? The crucial dilemma is well stressed by Cas Mudde when he faces 
the challenge of circularity: «we have to decide on the basis of which post facto 
criteria we should use to define the various parties, while we need a priori criteria 
to select the parties that we want to define» (Mudde 2007, 13). Furthermore, these 
parties generally do not proclaim to be radical or rightist in their official labels, 
whereas Green and Socialist parties generally do. Following the indication of the 
                                                
4 I will use “radical right” as a general label in the first part of the paper, until a new one will be 
provided in the empirical section (see §4.3). 
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German Office for the Protection of the Constitution, it is possible to distinguish 
between “radical” and “extreme”: while the first type of party is tolerated since is 
not against democracy, the second one is banned from party competition as being 
extremist implies also the eventual resort to violence to achieve political goals.  
2. THE RIGHT THROUGH AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1. Left-right duality 
The popular dyad stemmed from revolutionary France in 1789: as stated by 
Roger Eatwell, «a seating pattern emerged in the new National Assembly in which 
most of the nobility and clergy could be seen to take up positions on the right, 
whereas the Third Estate, which demanded a constitution and limitation of the 
King’s power, occupied the left» (Eatwell 1989a, 33). This configuration could also 
explain why in Christian culture the right is associated to God, authority, and 
tradition. Whether nowadays left and right are by now empty boxes is open to 
debate; however, a preliminary task is trying to distinguish between these two 
opposite poles used by researchers, politicians, and citizens to interpret politics. 
Several authors tried to supply a definite answer: e.g., the Canadian psychologist 
Jean A. Laponce (1981) argued that the distinction between right and left is parallel 
to sacred and profane respectively; Dino Cofrancesco (1984) claimed that the right 
can be associated to tradition, authority and order, while the left fights privileges 
and strives to emancipate human beings; Giovanni Sartori (Bosetti and Bobbio 
1993) argued that the left let morality and justice enter politics, whereas Michele 
Salvati (1995) stressed that the left's perspective is more prone to see society as 
modifiable by human projects, while the right does not believe in that possibility. 
Besides, Marcello Veneziani (1995) spelled out five different concepts on which 
left and right diverge: liberty, difference, pluralism, democracy, and history, while 
Norberto Bobbio (1994) singled out equality as the key element to discriminate 
between left and right, since the former pursues equality and progress, and it is 
driven on by ideals, whereas the latter is mainly motivated by interests and has 
tendencies to inequality and conservatism. Although the quest is far from complete, 
the left-right dualism still plays a primary role: indeed, that scheme is «a taxonomic 
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system, an efficient way to understand, order and store political information» and 
this continuum keeps its importance as «a central dimension of political conflict in 
advanced industrial society» (Knutsen 1998, 63-64). Furthermore, Kenneth Benoit 
and Michael Laver pinpointed that a universal way to portray «policy positions of 
political actors has been to describe these as being to the “left” or to the “right” of 
the political spectrum» (2006, 188). A reason for its widespread usage lays on its 
simplicity and ability to depict a comprehensive picture of what is going on in a 
given party system, avoiding the construction of more complex multidimensional 
spaces (2006). An interesting point is that a left-right mono-dimensional scale can 
be built up by considering a number of factors, «each part having a more precise 
substantive meaning than the more general underlying notions of left and right» 
(Benoit and Laver 2006, 189), hence it can be related to economic policy, social 
policy, European policy, and so on, in relation to its content.  
Historically, the physical split between left and right became commonplace in 
France by assuming a threefold significance: in the political domain, the post-1789 
royalist right was generally associated with the defence of the absolute monarchy, 
whereas the republican left claimed for a representative body elected by a universal 
suffrage; secondly, in economy, the right defended feudal relations and government 
monopolies, whereas the left was more oriented to stimulate the market and to 
accept the governmental intervention to protect the poor; thirdly, in the social 
domain, the right supported customs, traditional habits, and the role of the Catholic 
Church, whereas the left – especially its more extreme wing – was secular and even 
atheistic, emphasizing the primary importance of reason and self-expression. 
In the late nineteenth century, several right-wing groups had emerged in 
France, clustered by René Rémond (1966) in three specific strands: the Legitimists 
defending the interests of the old aristocracy, and considering the Monarchy and the 
Church as inalienable points of reference in society; the Orléanists who stood for 
the new middle class, sympathetic with liberal freedoms and constitutional rules in 
a parliamentary democracy; thirdly, the Bonapartists supporting a charismatic 
appeal joining lower classes, the peasantry and the working class, along with a 
conception of humanity as motivated by “myths and visions”. Besides, the language 
of left and right had become common denominator in most continental Europe, 
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whilst it was less adopted in Britain and the United States where the dyad “liberals 
versus conservatives” is still nowadays widely referred to represent the two poles of 
the political arena. In Europe, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the rising 
industrial working class brought about the mounting of socialist ideologies, mainly 
linked to Marxism.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, many changes affected the left-right 
spectrum: economic laissez-faire assumed a more rightist-conservative bent in the 
interests of the growing business class, while the Marxist left became more 
fascinated with the idea of a strong state as an instrument to promote economic and 
social equality. After World War I, a major split occurred within the left between 
its moderate wing supporting the project of moving gradually towards socialism in 
the democratic arena and its radical branch arguing the necessity for a revolution to 
overthrown the bourgeois state. Communism is generally located at the extreme-
left, whereas fascism became its chief opponent on the opposite side. Despite of 
this common usage, the placement of the latter poses considerable problems to the 
logic of the left-right space, especially regarding economy: even though fascism 
defended private property as the basis of society, such ownership «was always to be 
subjected to the ultimate needs of the nation rather than the individual» (Eatwell 
1989a, 36). Therefore, this justified economic public intervention, whereas 
liberalism – always on the right side – stands for a minimal state to booster free 
markets. However, this implies a contradiction since the supposed extreme right 
prototype (i.e., fascism) is not extreme rightist in economy, namely, by conceiving 
the left-right axis as a continuum from a maximum economic intervention of the 
state (extreme left) to the strongest pro-market stances (extreme right). Besides, 
considering the contrast between collectivism and individualism, the position of 
fascism is still troublesome with its attempt «to find a middle way between 
capitalism and communism» (Eatwell 1989a, 37). The importance of emphasizing 
fascism’ stances is due to the possible association with right-wing extremism, 
thereby the former could be considered as a litmus paper for all political parties 
located on the right side. Eatwell as well (Eatwell 1989b, 49-61) tried to identify 
the essential philosophical core of the right by testing several concepts: change, 
capitalism and private property; authority and authoritarianism; freedom and 
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liberty; equality, egalitarianism and elitism; nationalism, racism and militarism; 
human nature. However, none of those concepts is always and unambiguously able 
to discriminate the right from the left. His conclusions states that it is easier to 
identify the left since it frequently presents its ideology more overtly and generally 
centred on change; besides, the radical left is concerned with the rejection of 
capitalism, the importance of equality and a belief in the perfectibility of human 
nature. Ex adverso, there is not any form of right-wing thought encompassing all 
these three features at the same time. 
2.2. What is right? 
A second step is trying to identify some of the typical rightist traits: for 
instance, William Pickels (1964) listed three aspects, i.e. the stress on established 
authority, the acceptance of just evolved institutions, and the emphasis on 
individual rights except when they interact with the state or Church. An important 
member of the British new right, Roger Scruton (1982, 408) has identified nine 
features to interpret the right: civil society is conceived from a conservative and 
authoritarian point of view, stressing the importance of customs, tradition and 
social bonds; political obligations are elaborated in terms of obedience, legitimacy 
and piety; reluctance versus a too sharp separation between law and morality; a 
conservative bent about culture; belief in hereditary principles and prescriptive 
rights; strong defence of private property; belief in individual rights and freedoms; 
belief in capitalist economy and free economic initiative; finally, a conviction in 
human imperfection and scepticism about the possibility to modify human nature 
and society by a rational and political plan of action. Moreover, the Italian political 
philosopher Dino Cofrancesco (1984) argued that, apart from the exact policy 
implementation, rightist political platforms generally are instruments to strengthen 
tradition that can be decoded in six different ways: the first meaning is linked to the 
word of God that is transmitted through generations and represents the primitive 
archetypal value order; the second one is represented by the nostalgia for a “golden 
era” of a given society, symbolizing an exemplum that still represents a source of 
inspiration; the third is directly linked to the nation, its components and its ultimate 
indivisibility; the fourth one is bind to a somewhat mythical vision of a far-off 
society that is revitalized because of its glory (like the Roman Empire for fascist 
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rhetoric); the fifth is connected to the community of destiny to whom the single 
member must abandon himself and consecrate an absolute loyalty, exalting 
ancestral binding relationships; the sixth has a legacy with conservatism since it 
preaches the dangers of reconstructing reality since the real beginning, so that any 
reform should be cautious and moderate without any dogmatic belief. 
Furthermore, plentiful of adjectives have been used to clarify and distinguish 
several historical experiences. Eatwell (Eatwell 1989c) gave an important 
contribution, delineating five rightist styles of thought, i.e. reactionary, moderate, 
radical, extreme, and new right. The first two of that list can be considered as 
responses to the prominence attributed to individualism and freedom by liberalism 
in the eighteenth century; the third and fourth are replies to the outburst of Socialist 
movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with the emergence 
of a mass electorate. Finally, the fifth is the most recent strand and represents a 
counteraction to Socialist governments, and «especially their problems in solving 
questions of both economic growth and the distribution of wealth, problems which 
have helped undermine the authority of the state» (Eatwell 1989c, 63). We can 
analyze Eatwell’s prospectus more in detail. 
The reactionary right supports a strong nostalgia for the so-called ancien 
régime. Besides aristocrats and monarchists – tenacious opponents of both the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution5 – major political theorists belong to this 
political strand, such as Louis de Bonald and Joseph De Maistre in the nineteenth 
century, and Charles Maurras in the twentieth century: a widespread claiming is the 
rejection of 1789 French revolution, considered guilty of having ruled out its 
traditional rulers (the Monarch and aristocracy). Maurras (1973) asserted that the 
nation is the only community that matters and the republican regime was alien to 
the nation since it was imported from abroad, and any type of non-monarchical 
regime was meant to become the regime of just one faction. Founded in 1899 by 
Henri Vaugeois and Maurice Pujo, the Action Française review became in a few 
years a daily newspaper characterized by an integral nationalism and claiming the 
restoration of the monarchy to secure a stable and strong state. 
                                                
5 For an important examination of the values stemming from the French Revolution, in terms of 
contemporary influence, see (Martinelli, Salvati, and Veca 2009). 
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In common with the reactionary right, the moderate right shared the conviction 
that the world cannot be better reshaped by human reason. Its major philosophical 
source can be traced to Edmund Burke, deemed as the father of the modern British 
conservatism. That right is not a priori adverse to change: the core principle stands 
in the balance between the respect for tradition and a sense of inevitable progress. 
One of the most important features is the “limited government” as a middle-ground 
solution between absolutist government, on the one hand, and mass activism, on the 
other. The moderate right also sought to limit the strong support of liberalism to 
rationalism and its utilitarian principles, as well as to balance individualism with a 
temperate collectivist perspective, stressing the key role played by intermediate 
units such as the nation, religion and family. 
The term “radical” is more tricky: Eatwell claimed that there is no common 
agreement about its use, since it has been employed to identify very different 
phenomena like the McCarthyism in the United States or the Republikaner Party in 
Germany (Eatwell 1989c, 68) even though a sharp diversity exists among them. As 
previously stated, a radical right strand emerged at the turn of the nineteenth 
century to counter the rise of Socialist parties and movements. It differentiated from 
the moderate or reactionary right as it preached a vigorous activism and put forth an 
ideology that did not seek to justify the present or the past. Its chief manifestation 
emerged in Germany after World War I, in particular, «an aggressive and romantic 
vision of nationalism was vital to what is described here as the radical right» 
(Eatwell 1989c, 69). Major examples of its style of thought can be found in the 
writings of Oswald Spengler and Ernst Jünger. Key elements are given by: the idea 
of salvation for humanity through politics; a strong emphasis on activism to 
rediscover the true nature of man, and the downplaying of political programs 
because of the difficulties to find a third way between capitalism and socialism; the 
decadence of present, hence the refusal of conservatism; the yearning of a strong 
leader able to unify the nation as the true community; a tough anti-leftism, 
especially against its rationalism and prominence given to class struggle, as the 
latter would constitute a threat to the unity of the “true” community. It is worth 
noting that anti-Semitism was never a focus point in the political thought of the 
radical right: since the former had been essentially a feature in society in the inter-
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war period, some anti-Semitic references were usual in many political movements 
of that epoch. Eatwell reinforced this point stressing that «the radical right had little 
tendency to engage in conspiracy theory» (Eatwell 1989c, 70). 
The extreme right category presents as well some problems of ambiguity, since 
through this label many phenomena have been classified whenever they did not 
conform to the mainstream right. A weak aspect is the paucity of the intellectual 
tradition of the extreme right, since it produced propagandist materials despite the 
lack of an original theoretical elaboration of its ideology. Some of its key traits are 
in common with the radical right like its strong opposition to the leftist 
internationalism and class-based society, and also to communist ideas both in 
domestic and international context. Economy is not, however, a main issue in its 
program: economic policies have tended to follow a quite statist bent, even though 
there is not a rejection of neither private property or the market. One of the 
prominent attributes is the paranoid stress on conspiracy theory: this can be 
ultimately traced back to conflict between opposite forces — mirroring a 
Schmittian friend-foe scheme (Schmitt 1998) — and portrays the world as a 
struggle between in-groups and out-groups.  A well-known example of conspiracy 
theory is the threatened Jew plot to dominate the planet and undermine society’s 
bonds. 
In the end, “new right” is a catchphrase encompassing different forms of 
thought, but its criticisms to high public spending programs of leftist governments 
represent a shared stance, as demonstrated by the American and British experience 
through Reagan and Thatcher. By the way, another important instance is given by 
the French Nouvelle Droite of Alain De Benoist, whose three core factors are 
(Eatwell 1989c): a rejection of the Judeo-Christian tradition concerning 
egalitarianism since nature would clearly show that men are not equal to each other, 
but rather differences must be preserved and not conceived in a hierarchic way; a 
sharp attack against social and political systems of both the United States and the 
former Soviet Union: that rejection aims, in the first case, to the obsessive pursuit 
of money and, in the second case, to an egalitarianism based on coercion; the third 
point is a quest for identity, i.e. a European community grounded on a common 
culture and, to this purpose, De Benoist sought to the Gramscian cultural hegemony 
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strategy (Gruppi 1972). Inside this context, some have heard echoes of fascism or 
extreme right, but the Nouvelle Droite’s aim is more intellectual than mass 
mobilizing. In the wide set of the new right, some have suggested a twofold 
division between an individualist and laissez-faire strand, and an authoritarian-
traditionalist one. Nevertheless, Eatwell put forth a more elaborate and meaningful 
fourfold division (Eatwell 1989d): a libertarian strand supporting a minimal state; a 
laissez-faire component preaching a strong pro-market environment; a more 
traditionalist wing aiming at counter the spread of individualism, highlighting the 
vital importance of religion and family; finally, a mythical wing linked to ideas 
such as nation, race, will of the people. Therefore, the last two groups are 
respectively close to the moderate right and radical or extreme right, as previously 
defined, confirming that ideological divisions are still somewhat blurred. 
3. THE FORMATION OF PARTY SYSTEMS 
3.1. Introduction 
Hitherto, I highlighted prominent features and concepts generally associated 
with the broad centre-right area, though my field of inquiry is not represented by all 
parties that are simply not left wing. As I previously stated, I am not concerned 
with Christian Democratic parties, since the majority of them are mainstream 
conservative actors. On the contrary, my interest rests on the investigation of 
political parties that are, first of all, “new” parties, i.e. they were established more 
recently and whose instances can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s; secondly, 
they are perceived as marginal actors that have increasingly gained a central role, 
therefore it is important to identify the margin, that is to say, the dimension that we 
need to set them out; thirdly, these parties are not viable partners in the national 
governments in almost all cases, with only few exceptions (like in Austria and 
Italy). Briefly, we are seeking for “pariah” parties representing, after the emergence 
of the Ecologists, the most important change in Western European party systems 
since the end of World War II. This is even more striking whether we take into 
account that the radical right has been excluded from the set of acceptable political 
actors after the tragic experience of fascist and authoritarian regimes in the inter-
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war period. Moreover, given its more consistent electoral success than the Greens 
and other post-materialist movements, the relevance of this change acquires a huge 
importance. 
Frequently, these parties are labelled radical or extremist by mass media and 
their political competitors, thus stressing the higher intensity and also the 
differentiation of their political appeal. A conceptual premise is necessary: I will 
use radicalism instead of extremism, since I consider the latter one linked to the 
possible use of violence in politics and suitable for those parties or movements 
seeking to overthrown democracy, both from the inside (contesting elections to 
change the political regime) and the outside (extra-parliamentary groupuscules). 
Once clarified this aspect, a crucial point is choosing the best tool to give account 
of this radicalism, i.e. the spatial representation of politics through dimensions of 
party competition. 
In their outstanding research, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identified two 
uppermost historical events that occurred in Europe at the end of the nineteenth 
century: the National and Industrial Revolutions. The process of nation building 
and the establishment of modern nation-states constituted the former, while the 
latter changed the configuration of economic and commercial interests in society. 
Both revolutions gave rise to a couple of cleavages each, thereby affecting party 
system outcome. A related fundamental concept is that of cleavage: this is 
«considered to be a division of individuals, groups or organizations among whom 
conflict may arise» (Lane and Ersson 1999). Hence, the National Revolution gave 
rise to two cleavages: the first is the State-Church conflict whose main issue was 
the management of mass education, historically belonging to the various churches, 
but at that time advocated as a new competence of the state in virtue of its claiming 
to shape loyalty of its citizens; the second one can be called Centre-Periphery 
because of the intention of the central state to establish an official language and a 
common culture, therefore suppressing local customs and traditions not conforming 
to the mounting new national paradigm. On the other hand, the Industrial 
Revolution induced two important cleavages: the first one is the well-known 
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Capital-Labour6 conflict, i.e. the opposition between entrepreneurs and manual 
workers; the second one is the Urban-Rural conflict based on frictions between 
bourgeois business and agricultural interests. Given that four-fold division, as the 
two scholars argued (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), the pre-eminent cleavage was the 
contention between capitalists and workers over the redistribution of resources, as a 
consequence of the increasing profits generated by the Industrial revolution all over 
Europe. The primacy of this competitive dimension is further confirmed since left 
and right are often conceived in terms of related economic policies: the left-wing 
pole usually strives to strengthen the active role of the state in economy, in order to 
collect resources through taxation and redistribute them to the poor, thereby 
reducing the gap in wealth among social classes; on the other hand, the right-wing 
pole considers free market as a priority to which people resort to freely buy and sell 
goods, so as to increase their well-being. That said, the left is prone to increase 
taxes to sustain social spending, while the right does not generally concede an 
increase in taxation, even though this would imply a reduction in public services. In 
few words, economic left-wing policies defend state interventionism, whereas 
right-wing policies enhance free market competition. Of course, this is not the only 
issue at stake, since the extent of privatisation and degree of decentralisation in the 
decision-making process are extremely important too. Actually, economic systems 
have been at the heart of the struggle between two opposite Weltanschauung during 
the Cold War — i.e., the capitalist versus the communist world— and this played a 
crucial role in shaping European political systems, divided between Socialist and 
Communist parties, on the one hand, and capitalist and conservative parties, on the 
other hand. A crucial observation regards the presence of the capital-work cleavage 
in every West European party systems, as pointed out also by Lijphart (2001) 
which highlighted that the socio-economical cleavage is always present in his set of 
36 democracies, regardless of their majoritarian or consensual model as well as the 
degree of social pluralism. 
                                                
6 That dyad is also labelled as Capitalists-Workers or, more recently, Market-State. 
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3.2. Preliminary considerations on transformations of party systems 
At the end of the 1980s, major historical events provoked an uppermost change 
in both domestic and international politics: with the breakdown of the USSR and 
the demise of the Soviet bloc, Western world had defeated its main rival, thereby 
democracy and its liberal-representative model was meant to become the standard 
for all countries aiming at reaching prosperity. One expected consequence in 
national party systems was the need for a renewal in the communist left, like the 
Italian Communist Party that dissolved so that the majority of its former members 
established the new Democratic Party of the Left. In general, old Communist 
parties lose their strategic importance, even though the erosion of their electoral 
constituencies had already started a couple of decades before. Insofar, the setback 
of planned economy brought about the decline of radical state-interventionist 
economic policies, so that Socialist and Social Democratic parties moved towards 
more centrist stances, trying to balance the defence of moderate state 
interventionism in economy with free markets. Therefore, along the state-market 
dimension parties can differentiate in a decreasing marginal way because of that 
centripetal tendency, reinforcing the tradition of Keynesian mixed economy in 
continental Europe.  
In a complementary way, the pronounced acceleration given to the process of 
European integration, since the 1986 Single European Act, contributed to stabilize 
and harmonize economic policies of state-members, especially by Maastricht 
parameters and the introduction of the common currency under the supervision of 
the European Central Bank some years later. The European Union holds an 
exclusive competence on some important policies like the set-up of competition 
rules to regulate internal markets, the monetary policy for those countries in the 
Euro-zone, and the common commercial policy. Furthermore, national 
governments in the Euro-zone have lost the possibility to undervalue their currency 
to support the export of their goods, and also they cannot resort to customs duties to 
protect internal markets from the external concurrence. Hence, the possibility for 
mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties to distinguish on the economic axis 
is steadily narrower, producing a sort of non-discrimination in the political supply 
(Bartolini 1996), and this explains why economic platforms of the two main parties 
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tend to overlap. Although the capital-labour cleavage is far from being irrelevant, 
its electoral feedback in terms of ballots is decreasing, i.e. it has partially lost its 
strength to distribute votes among political competitors, therefore it seems very 
likely that new challengers will try to collect votes with special attention to other 
dimensions of political competition. Usually, scholars resort to a bi-dimensional 
spatial representation: even though there are several axis along which parties can be 
located concerning several issues — for instance, the relationships in regards of the 
European Union, foreign policy, and so on — a plot diagram of two dimensions has 
the advantage to be easily represented. The assumption here is that, since the end of 
the Golden Age period (i.e., Les Trentes Glorieuses) and especially by the end of 
1970s, a silent revolution has taken place (Inglehart 1977) in the West European 
affluent post-industrial democracies. 
3.3. De-freezing, post-materialism, and the new politics 
The party system configuration described above was so deeply rooted in West 
European countries that, as Lipset and Rokkan pointed out (1967), still in 1960s 
party systems kept on mirroring the same cleavages of the 1920s, so that citizens 
had to choice among parties that had already been existing for about half a century. 
Furthermore, an electoral research (Rose and Urwin 1970) related to 19 countries 
between 1945 and 1969 revealed that, after the end of World War II, the electoral 
strength of parties had marginal changes between elections as well as within a 
generation of citizens, thus reinforcing the thesis of low volatility and steady 
electoral stability. This is the reason why many argued about the freezing of the 
structural cleavages of party systems: Bartolini and Mair (1990) found that, despite 
of a relative volatility within the right and the left, since the 1920s there is an 
incessant reduction of voters passing from the right to the left and vice versa. That 
freezing lasted also because political parties had the interest in reproducing those 
conflicts to consolidate their power and role in society. This implied also a positive 
consequence onto the stability of regimes as it favoured the containment of political 
expressions and protests within the channels of democratic frameworks, by limiting 
divisions and tensions with standardized rules and procedures providing greater 
benefits than those obtainable by other means. This stability is even more explicit 
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whether considering the tumultuous events occurred in Europe during World War 
II. 
At the beginning of the 1980s some scholars carried out studies about party 
system evolution (Dalton, S Flanagan, and Beck 1984; Crewe and Denver 1985) 
and researches on this issue continued (Franklin, TT Mackie, and Valen 1992) at 
the turn of the decade along the end of the Cold War. The aim was to check 
whether a de-freezing process of party systems was actually taking place. Two 
trends were singled out: the first one concerns the increasing electoral volatility as a 
consequence of the declining loyalty of partisanship and membership of parties7. 
Considering electoral results from 1940 to 2000 in advanced industrialized 
democracies, Wren and McElwain (2007) unveiled that «electoral volatility has 
increased over time at a fairly steady rate» (2007, 558). Secondly, Christian 
Democratic and Socialist parties diminished their consensus at the polls: indeed, the 
total vote percentage of parties established before 1960 has increasingly declined 
since the 1960s «indicating the stronger electoral presence of relatively new 
parties» (Wren and McElwain 2007, 557). Also Ignazi (1992, 3) pointed out that 
«at the electoral level, intraparty volatility has progressively accelerated in the 
1980s», and the traditional ties between voters and established parties are 
progressively weakening as showed by the lessening of party membership and 
identification (Ignazi 1992; Mair 1984). 
As said above, the distributional conflict lose its pre-eminence in post-
industrialized affluent economies of the Western World, in regards to their 
orientation towards the production of services as well as their connection in 
international networks, so that left and right cannot be understood (only) in their 
traditional meanings. Furthermore, an interesting analogy with Maslow’s hierarchy 
of needs can be built up: this American psychologist posited (Maslow 1970) that 
human beings’ needs can be hierarchically classified because every man or woman 
would satisfy first those at a lower stage before passing to the higher one. More 
specifically, at the very basic level there are physiological needs, i.e. food, water, 
                                                
7 «Growing access to higher education, an overabundance of information, and the disintegration of 
traditional subcultures have contributed to a progressive dissolution of traditional party loyalties» 
(Betz, 1993b, p. 663). 
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breathing, and the like, hence all those factors required to survive. After this, the 
other steps are represented respectively by: safety, love and belonging, esteem, and 
finally self-actualization. The last one plays a crucial role as it implies that an 
individual will try to realize his full potential, i.e. self-fulfilment, only once all the 
other needs were previously satisfied. This schema helps us construct an analogy 
with societies conceived as a whole: if human beings hold a hierarchy of needs to 
fulfil, it seems reasonable to posit that they project them onto society as well. In 
this vein, post-industrialized countries have solved the problem of physiological 
needs for their population, except for the layer of poverty-stricken people that, in 
any case, hopefully represent a minority bracket in West European countries. A 
proof of this achievement is reflected by the passage to a service-oriented economic 
system, where large and heavy industry labour-force is increasingly shrinking. 
Since the end of World War II, the long period of peace and prosperity has secured 
a sense of safety for West European citizens, along with a higher degree in the level 
of mass education, thereby enhancing a sense of self-esteem and confidence of 
individuals. As a consequence, we can hypothesize that there exists a part of the 
electorate having fulfilled those needs placed at the lower steps in the Maslowian 
scale, hence their voting behaviour will be oriented towards those political forces 
that underscore the importance of self-expression, freedom in life styles, acceptance 
of multiculturalism, expanded personal liberties against moral dogmas, and so on.  
Thus, the emergence of ecology and left-libertarian parties is backed by their 
ability to seize new issues linked to raising social demands in affluent post-
industrialized democracies. Together with the weakening of traditional alignments, 
casting a ballot acquired a different meaning: this was not anymore an expression 
of belonging to a given party or ideology, but a choice expressing self-affirmation 
(Ignazi 1992). Moreover, as noted by Ignazi (1992), the freezing thesis claim about 
ballot switching among related parties (Bartolini and Mair 1990) does not hold true 
as radical right parties are to be considered members a different party family, 
despite of an internal and puzzling heterogeneity, and not just as simple variants in 
the conservative area. Indeed, they have «a peculiar distinctiveness and they cannot 
merely be assimilated to other neighbouring political families» (Ignazi 1992, 5). 
Agreeing with Inglehart’s intuition (1977) that the spread of new values linked to 
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quality of life and self-affirmation has given rise to the so-called New Politics, a 
critical point is whether this affected only the leftist side of voters and parties or the 
rightist side as well. Drawing upon Ignazi, one can ask why «in an era of mounting 
post-materialism and economic growth, do we find an increasing number of 
rightwing voters?» (1992, 5). Furthermore, it does not seem that post-materialism 
created a bulk of issues exclusively related to the left-wing pole since, if that holds 
true, we should find a competition between post-materialist left-libertarian parties 
and materialist right-wing parties. One reason for this asymmetry is that post-
materialist issues enhance the request for a change of the status quo, namely, 
represent the protest of citizens asking for improvements and “progress” in 
qualitative aspects of social life. This has a link with the left since the latter 
generally supports disadvantaged groups in society, even though the new left 
rejected a clear-cut class-based politics and stood for «participatory and 
decentralized forms of party membership» (Cole 2005, 206). The assumption here 
is that on the right-wing pole as well new kinds of parties entered the political 
system and do not define their core ideology in economic and materialist terms. 
Cole asked herself whether, after the challenge of the new left toward both the old 
right and left «would there be a second challenge from the right, creating a politics 
of the ‘new right’?» (Cole 2005, 206). Therefore, since the 1980s in Western 
Europe a sort of counterbalancing cultural and political sentiment has been growing 
to set against the green libertarian agenda, competing along the new value 
dimension, and related political forces put forth a set of «new priorities and issues, 
not treated by the established parties, a disillusionment towards parties in general, a 
growing lack of confidence in the political system and its institutions, and a general 
pessimism in the future», so that they promoted a sort of «‘a silent counter-
revolution’» (Ignazi 1992, 6). Hence, the upcoming of a New Politics is linked to 
the raise of a new cleavage on which parties divide and compete, and this a product 
of two main historical processes: the advent of a post-industrial society (Bell 1973) 
since the 1970s and, more recently, the spread of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006). 
The ‘newness’ is justified since new political divisions are related to values, rather 
than social classes, so that «it does mean that post-materialist issues may occupy 
the political arena concurrently with materialist issues» (Cole 2005, 206). As 
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highlighted again by Cole (2005, 204) «these parties may represent a ‘new right’ 
that has developed to challenge the ‘new left’ on issues non-economic in nature, 
such as nationalism and law and order». Even though, this new competition is 
acknowledge by many scholars8, we can argue that the declining party 
identification of voters and «the perceived inability of established parties to address 
political issues have created openings in the arenas of party competition for 
entrepreneurial parties to exploit» (Cole 2005, 204). My argument is that the 
libertarian universalism preached by the New Left has naturally given rise to a 
counter-offensive reaction by the New Right enhancing an authoritarian and 
communitarian tide (Kriesi et al. 2006). 
4. THE NEW CONFIGURATION OF PARTY SYSTEMS  
4.1. Authoritarians versus libertarians 
To give a substantial content to the authoritarian-libertarian divide, Flanagan 
and Lee (2003) tried to inspect societal components of that «A/L value cleavage» 
(2003, 250). They assume this cleavage to represent a directional change that «has 
been from a premodern theistic worldview in the Judeo-Christian tradition» (2003, 
235) towards a modernist and, finally, a post-modernist Weltanschauung. 
Moreover, in their research, the two scholars have identified «a continuous linear 
movement form theism to modernism and to postmodernism», so that «those at the 
authoritarian end of the A/L continuum tend to have a theistic worldview and those 
at the libertarian end a postmodern worldview, with modernists falling somewhere 
in the middle of the A/L scale» (2003, 236). Transitions from one stage to the 
following one represent a demand for greater individual autonomy (Bell 1973; SC 
Flanagan and Lee 2003, 250), indeed authority had shifted from the outside (God) 
to the inside (single individual). The emergence of the authoritarian-libertarian axis 
is of particular importance as this greatly affected the political agenda in post-
industrial democracies since the end of the 1960s. Therefore, the old materialist 
politics diminished its importance (R Flanagan and Inglehart 1987; SC Flanagan 
and Lee 2003) as well as harsh conflicts around distributive issues, taking into 
                                                
8 For a critical argument see: (Harris 1994). 
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account also that welfare state services demanded increasingly higher funds to be 
sustained. Flanagan and Lee’s intuition is that economic issues have shifted from 
position issues — either on the right, or on the left — toward salient issues — 
either highlighted by a party, or neglected — so that electoral consensus for 
mainstream parties comes and leaves at intervals linked to the economic cycle 
(2003). 
A crucial event is the emergence of a post-modern sentiment in mass public 
that was less internally consistent since it did not imply one coherent schema to 
interpret and shape reality, but rather a «an open-minded entertainment of a 
plurality of worldviews» (2003, 251). This had a strong impact on political 
demands coming from society like «legalisation of drugs, for free sex, abortion, no-
fault divorce, […], women’s liberation, minority rights, environmental protection», 
in a nutshell, freedom to adopt new lifestyles and new kinds of personal choices. It 
seems quite plausible to expect a counter-reaction by those holding authoritarian 
(theists) values, and as «a result of the mobilization and counter-mobilization 
around this new politics issues agenda, social issues began to replace economic 
issues as the most divisive position issues in the advanced industrial democracies» 
(2003, 251). Thus, Flanagan and Lee selected seven issues generally related to the 
competition between old left versus old right9: as demonstrated, correlations 
between those old issues and the A/L scale «are very low to insignificant. One’s 
value position on the A/L scale will not predict a respondent’s position on the old 
politics issues» (2003, 252), so that we can imagine to construct a bi-dimensional 
space where pro-state and pro-market issues are represented by an horizontal axis, 
and the authoritarian-libertarian divide along an orthogonal one. 
4.2. Party systems at the dawn of the new millennium 
For a concrete representation of the relationship between the libertarian-
authoritarian and the state-market axis, one solution is resorting to expert surveys. 
These are very useful collection of data about political parties and have been 
conducted in different periods (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; 
Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006). Scholars and political experts 
                                                
9 See (SC Flanagan and Lee 2003, 252). 
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of party politics in their own country are asked to position parties at stakes along a 
series of dimensions that are assessed to be relevant in that context, often 
estimating also the saliency of each given issue for each party. This represents just 
one way of collecting data, as party surveys can be conducted as well at mass-
public level, i.e. asking voters to place their preferred party along a series of 
dimensions, or elite-level, i.e. asking politicians to locate spatially their own party. 
As noted above, expert surveys are available along a 20-year time period, though 
unfortunately they are not always directly comparable since parties included in the 
surveys are not always the same, and furthermore the dimensions taken into 
account differ among surveys. This also reflects the changing relevance of the 
issues in the political debate: for instance, immigration was only recently included 
(Lubbers 2000). 
Since my aim is to emphasize the relationship between the economic divide 
with the new cultural one, I shall resort to expert surveys conducted by Chapel Hill 
University of North Carolina (Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Hooghe et al. 2010). 
The choice is mainly motivated because this research group has always embodied a 
GAL/TAN dimension in all the three waves of data collection (namely, 1999, 2002, 
2006), in addition to the economic pro-state/pro-market divide, and also a general 
left-right dimension on which parties are placed taking into account all the aspects 
of their ideology. 
Positions are estimated on an 11-point scale where the extreme leftist position 
is 0, the central position is 5, and the extreme rightist position is 10. One major 
stumbling block in social science is the concrete measurement of a concept, hence 
it is fundamental to focus on the meaning of the GAL/TAN divide whose acronym 
stands for: Green Alternative Libertarian versus Traditionalist Authoritarian 
Nationalist. Political experts were asked10 to classify parties concerning their 
stances on freedoms, democracy, and rights, so that the more a party has a lower 
score, the more supports gay rights, euthanasia, wider democratic participation; on 
the other hand, the more a party has a greater score, the more it emphasizes the 
importance of law and order, and wants government to play an active role as moral 
                                                
10 See Codebook in (Hooghe et al. 2010). 
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authority. With regards to the economic dimension, the more a party has a lower 
score, the more supports government spending and an active role of state in the 
economy; on the other hand, the more a party has a higher score, the more it 
emphasizes the importance of lower taxes, less regulation, free economic initiative, 
and reduced spending for welfare state services. 
As a first step, I dealt with 1999 survey data where a total of 116 experts 
assessed positions of 143 political parties in the 14 largest EU member states11. I 
considered then the economic and GAL/TAN dimensions and I estimated statistical 
correlation between them to test to what extent the European political space could 
be conceived as a bi-dimensional one. Of course, the more correlation is close to 
zero, the more the political space is two-dimensional since the more correlation is 
weak, the more we cannot predict the position of a party along a given dimension 
knowing the position on the other one. To make just a very simple example, if 
correlation is 0.3, this means that the position of party X along dimension A does 
not help us in predicting the positioning of the same party along the other 
dimension B (and vice versa). In 1999, the correlation is highly significant12 and is 
equal to 0.616, hence positive and moderately high.  
Indeed, observing Figure 1.A, where party positions are plotted on the bi-
dimensional space13, they mostly occupy the first (market and authoritarian) and the 
third quadrant (state and libertarian), and this is line with Kitschelt’s argument 
(1995) that new radical right parties combined market economy and authoritarian 
values, and vice versa for left-libertarians. Exceptions to that diagonal trend are 
predominantly on the fourth quadrant, i.e. Liberal parties merging market economy 
and libertarian values. 
                                                
11 A relevant drawback is that Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland are never taken into account. 
The following 14 countries compose my sample: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 
12 At the level of 0.01. 
13 The horizontal axis is the economic divide, while the vertical one is related to the cultural 
dimension. Note that, unless otherwise specified, figures and graphs are produces by SPSS Statistics 
17.0 (17.0.0 version). 
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Figure 1.A. West European bi-dimensional space in 1999. 
 
Afterwards, I replicated the same logic with 2002 and 2006 data: in the first 
case, 250 experts evaluated 171 parties in the same 14 European countries, while in 
the second one 235 experts provided spatial locations for 227 parties in all 24 
European members states, excluding Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Malta14. In both 
cases, correlation is always highly significant15 and equal to 0.570 in 2002 and 
0.556 in 2006. This decreasing trend shows that at the beginning of the new 
millennium, parties are shaping their ideology so that their economic recipes are not 
strongly correlated with their value orientation. Therefore, the libertarian-
authoritarian (GAL/TAN) dimension is enhancing its importance, unleashing its 
ties with the economic divide. 
Finally, I calculated the variance to estimate the dispersion of party positions 
along both the state-market and GAL/TAN dimensions. In the former case, the 
variance is equal to 4.893 (1999), 4.449 (2002), and 5.173 (2006), while in the 
latter case is 5.123 (1999), 4.970 (2002), and 6.442 (2006). Therefore, results show 
that the variance along the value dimension is increasingly higher than on the 
                                                
14 My sample is always composed by those fourteen countries listed before (check note 1). 
15 At the level of 0.01. 
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economic divide, proving that party stances on values are becoming more and more 
differentiated, while the contrary holds true for the classic economic dimension. 
Figure 1.B. West European bi-dimensional space in 2002. 
 
Figure 1.C. West European bi-dimensional space in 2006. 
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II. CASE SELECTION 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW ON CRITERIA TO SELECT PARTIES 
Several attempts have been made to inspect and solve the problem of defining 
and identifying radical right parties, since the selection outcome greatly affects 
analysis, especially when focusing on the causes underpinning electoral 
performances. The selection issue is particularly critical when dealing with 
borderline cases, so that it becomes important to set labels and criteria. For 
instance, Seiler (1980) considered radical right parties as deviant cases from the 
bourgeois parties, while Lane and Ersson (1987) identified ultra-right parties by an 
ideological tie with fascism and discontent parties as qualified by a threefold factor: 
protest-attitude, populism and charismatic leadership. Moreover, Hans-Georg Betz 
(1993) pointed out radical right-wing populist parties featured by: a radical 
rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system; a strong 
support for individual achievement and drastic restrictions of the role of the state; a 
resolute refusal of individual and social equality, along with an instrumental and 
populist use of public sentiments of envy, anxiety and resentment. This few 
instances supply a proof about the difficulties in finding common criteria and a 
shared label to select parties. 
An important framework was designed by Herbert Kitschelt (1995) who 
shaped a new axis for a better interpretation of modern party competition, i.e. new 
politics: changes in values in Western societies have increased the attractiveness of 
appeals, on the one hand, for economic rightist principles – free market and 
liberalism – together with, on the other hand, for authoritarian and paternalist 
exhortations in the decision-making process of the state, corporation and family. In 
line with what I said above about post-materialism, the affluent post-industrial 
societies of Western Europe are characterized by a foremost important cleavage 
dividing left-libertarians from right-authoritarians. Hence, the so-called New 
Radical Right supports free market economics and an authoritarian organizing 
pattern to govern social complexity, thereby limiting diversity and individual 
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autonomy in cultural expressions. Hence, Kitschelt identified his objects of analysis 
by a bi-dimensional typology: authoritarianism (made of social conservatism, “law 
and order” and a xenophobic attitude) and economic neo-liberalism, namely, a pro-
market economic guideline. Three ideal-types are designed: the new radical-right 
parties (authoritarian plus xenophobic, and neo-liberal), the welfare-chauvinist 
parties (authoritarian plus xenophobic, but defending welfare state programs) and 
the populist anti-statist parties (weakly authoritarian-xenophobic, but strongly neo-
liberal). 
Another crucial contribution was provided by Ignazi (1992, 2000) who did 
start from parties to put forth an alternative method grounded on three distinct 
criteria: placement in the political spectrum (spatial criterion); declared party 
ideology combined with an ideal and symbolic legacy with fascism (ideological and 
historical criterion); attitude towards the political system (attitudinal and systemic 
criterion). The first measure regards the placement of the parties along the left-right 
continuum (Laver and Hunt 1992); a party belonging to the extreme right is the one 
occupying the rightist extreme position by itself or with others belonging to the 
same area. A critical aspect is that there is not a fixed point – a precise number on 
that scale – after which all parties would fall into the extreme right category. 
Hence, it is fundamental to introduce a twofold ideological criterion: whether a 
party holds a fascist heritage and/or shows an anti-systemic attitude; when one of 
the two conditions is true, then a party has an extreme right ideology. By the first 
one, it become possible to split old far-right parties from new far-right parties, by 
their tie with the fascist imprint in their ideology, value system or aesthetics (Ignazi 
1992). By the second one, Ignazi (2000) focused on those parties’ values and 
preferences aiming at weakening the legitimacy of democracy. Moreover, as Sartori 
put forth, with respect to a loose definition «a party can be defined as being anti-
system whenever it undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes»; while, by 
a strict definition, the anti-system parties represent «an extraneous ideology thereby 
indicating a polity confronted with a maximal ideological distance» (Sartori 1976, 
133), so that their aim is to pursue a delegitimizing impact opposing “alien” values 
in comparison with those of the regime. Furthermore, Kirchheimer (1966) identifies 
two types of opposition: the first is an opposition of principle whose aims mismatch 
 44 
with rules and values drawn from the Constitution, and a second one that is a loyal 
opposition where goals are different but not incompatible. 
Lately, Elizabeth Carter (2005) tried to set apart extreme right parties by three 
criteria: a blend of nationalist-xenophobic attitudes, a conformist-racist cultural 
profile, a rejection of democracy or a request for an institutional change. 
Furthermore, politics is conceived as constituted by a boundary line dividing 
friends and foes, i.e. separating inside from outside on culture homogeneity, 
welfare benefits, job opportunities, criminality and so on; moreover, these parties 
stress as well the necessity of rules in society and the primacy of national 
homogeneity within national boundaries. Using a one-dimensional space, Norris 
(2005) refers to a ten-point left-right scale and an anti-immigration policy scale: 
those parties with an expert score at 8.0 or higher are consider as radical right 
parties, but the inconvenient is that the right-left axis obviously can be also 
interpreted in economic terms so that a party, maybe racist and authoritarian, but 
with a redistributive leftist economic agenda, could be excluded. 
2. INVESTIGATING CORE IDEOLOGY 
Recently, Mudde (2007) inspected in greater details the ideology of right-wing 
parties and put forth the new brand populist radical right parties, building a rigorous 
conceptual framework as pre-requisite of his study. First of all, he assessed 
different techniques: the Wittgensteinian concept of “family resemblance” (Collier 
and Mahon Jr. 1993) by which «none of the parties are exactly the same, but each 
family member will have some feature in common with all other members» 
(Mudde 2007, 13); a second approach refers to the classical Weberian ideal-type, 
which is the pivot of a given party family: all members belonging to that family 
look like the ideal-type, though none of them overlap exactly with it; a third 
solution is to assume an existing party as “prototype” able to exemplify the overall 
family: the evident drawback is how to select that party serving as a model. The 
fourth and fifth approaches are centred first and foremost on ideology of political 
parties, trying to single out which is, respectively, the lowest common denominator 
and the greatest common denominator: the former is the most difficult research as it 
implies to identify those feature shared by all parties leading to a minimum 
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definition, i.e. «similarities among a selection of party family members from 
backgrounds as dissimilar as possible» (Mudde, 2007, p. 14); the latter works in the 
opposite direction since it seeks a maximum definition, i.e. «the greatest possible 
number of similarities within (part of) the family», namely, «similarities among a 
selection of party family members from backgrounds as similar as possible» 
(Mudde 2007, 14-15). In his work, the scholar developed both a minimal and a 
maximum denominator, though these cannot be employed interchangeably since 
they can affect case selection. 
When talking about a minimum definition, it is unavoidable referring to core 
concepts: following the insight of Micheal Freeden (1996) and Terence Ball (1999) 
a core concept in one that is central and constitutive of a given ideology like, for 
instance, “class” in Marxism and “freedom” in liberalism. Hence, as a first step, 
Mudde identified in nationalism the core ideological feature of right-wing parties: 
this is treated as a political doctrine that «strives for the congruence of the cultural 
and political unit, i.e. the nation and the state, respectively» (Mudde 2007, 16), by 
internal homogenisation and external exclusiveness. Nevertheless, this definition of 
nationalism is too broad and not useful to discriminate between moderate and 
radical nationalists, hence he resorted to nativism, interpreted as a combination of 
both xenophobia and nationalism: «an ideology, which holds that states should be 
inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-
native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the 
homogenous nation-state» (Mudde 2007, 17). This definition makes possible to 
keep out liberal form of nationalism, in addition to stressing the importance of 
xenophobia and opposition to mass immigration by nativist parties. 
When the aim is to investigate on the causes of the electoral success of political 
parties, then it is worthwhile to seek for a maximum definition, i.e. starting from a 
most similar system design and attempting to identify the greatest common 
denominator about the ideology of parties under consideration. In an earlier work, 
Mudde (2000) considered five parties of Western Europe and pinpointed four core 
ideological features in common: nationalism, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, and 
law and order. In an attempt to refine this study, the author recognizes the necessity 
to set an internal hierarchy among ideological feature and he states that «the 
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maximum definition should be revised into a combination of three core ideological 
features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism» (Mudde 2007, 22). The first 
one is the most important, in accordance with the minimum definition, and nativism 
is considered as a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. The second feature 
is defined in different ways in several fields of study: a crucial reference stands in 
the study of Theodor Adorno and his collaborators involved in the setting of the 
operationalization of that concept (Adorno et al. 1969) while Bob Altemeyer has 
singled out three characteristics of right-wing authoritarianism in his notorious F-
scale: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism 
(Altemeyer 1981). Two more definitions are necessary: authoritarianism such as a 
«belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be 
punished severely» (Mudde 2007, 23); secondly, populism such as an ideological 
feature (and not a mere political style) by which society is ultimately divided «into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the “pure people” versus “the corrupt 
elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale (general will) of the people» (Mudde 2007, 23). Once the three terms has 
been defined, the author seeks the best term fitting the maximum definition, and to 
do this he resorts to the Sartorian ladder of abstraction: the basis of the conceptual 
framework is nativism (minimum definition) and, by adding supplementary key 
features, he reaches the extreme right as «a combination of nativism, 
authoritarianism, and anti-democracy» (Mudde 2007, 23). The final case selection 
of the scholar falls on the populist subset of radical right parties, composed of both 
nativist, authoritarian, and populist parties, though not anti-democratic. 
3. GAL/TAN RIGHT-DEVIANCY 
The previous section has supplied a brief outlook of the efforts that have been 
carried out to cluster those parties flowing within the wide area of right-wing 
radicalism. All attempts made by scholars have to cop with scarcity of data and 
with difficulties too in measuring concepts like authoritarianism, leadership, 
nativism, and the like. Furthermore, there is lack of longitudinal data measuring 
party features by shared standards and able to provide comparable information 
through time. Aware of these limitations, the present section resorted again to 
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Chapel Hill’s expert surveys where the GAL/TAN dimension is assessed for three 
points in time along seven years, though unfortunately parties included are not 
always the same (Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Hooghe et al. 2010). In line with 
early analysis, parties that are generally classified by the literature with the generic 
label of right-wing radicalism are expected to be located at the extreme right side of 
the GAL/TAN axis, in opposition to green and left-libertarian parties on the other 
extremity. 
As already specified earlier, the GAL/TAN dimension measures party’s 
stances on freedoms, rights, and values, although not explicitly concerned with 
immigration. However, the 2006 survey gathered a bulk of further information — 
unfortunately in the two previous collections of data — and some of them are 
directly related to value issues. These 2006 new items are: civil liberties regarding 
party position on civil liberties versus law and order; lifestyle about pros and cons 
on liberal policy like gay rights; religion about the opposition or support to 
religious principle in politics; immigration, namely, opposition or support towards 
tough policies; multiculturalism, regarding the integration of foreigners and asylum 
seekers by favouring multiculturalism or assimilation; cosmopolitanism where 
parties are located regarding whether they are in favour of cosmopolitanism or 
advocate nationalism; finally, minorities about opposition or support to the 
expansion of their rights. The direction of each scale is coherent with the overall 
survey design, i.e. the more scores are close to 10, the more the related party is on 
the right-wing side of the political spectrum, and vice versa. All those seven items 
are taken into account and five of them are merged by their affinity in measuring 
related concepts: lifestyle and religion are coalesced into traditionalism; 
immigration, multiculturalism, and minorities blended into xenophobia; civil 
liberties are per se a proxy of authoritarianism and cosmopolitism approximates 
nationalism. To determine party scores on traditionalism and xenophobia an 
arithmetic mean of related item raw scores has been calculated. The crucial step is 
the assessment of correlation between these four new issues with GAL/TAN scores: 
the more correlation is strong and significant, the more the GAL/TAN dimension 
can be assumed to be a good proxy of these four issues, with a particular interest in 
xenophobia since this is not directly mentioned in the survey GAL/TAN question. 
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Table 2.1. Correlation coefficients between GAL/TAN and other 4 dimensions. 
 GAL/TAN TRADITION AUTHORIT NATION XENOPH 
GAL/TAN 1 0.938** 0.896** 0.791** 0.874** 
TRADITION 0.938** 1 0.818** 0.704** 0.770** 
AUTHORIT 0.896** 0.818** 1 0.725** 0.918** 
NATION 0.791** 0.704** 0.725** 1 0.824** 
XENOPH 0.874** 0.770** 0.918** 0.824** 1 
**p<0.01. Data source: (Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Hooghe et al. 2010). 
 
As showed in the table above, in 2006 all correlations are both positive and 
significant. In particular, the correlation between scores on GAL/TAN and 
xenophobia is enough robust to argue that right-wing parties on the former 
dimension hold a xenophobic attitude too. By unfolding the xenophobic issue into 
its three original components, correlations with GAL/TAN are still positive and 
significant. 
Table 2.2. Correlation coefficients between GAL/TAN and 3 items. 
 GAL/TAN IMMIGRATION MULTI/ASSIM ETHNIC MIN 
GAL/TAN 1 0.830** 0.871** 0.855** 
IMMIGRATION 0.830** 1 0.922** 0.908** 
MULTI/ASSIM 0.871** 0.922** 1 0.898** 
ETHNIC MIN 0.855** 0.908** 0.898** 1 
**p<0.01. Data source: (Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Hooghe et al. 2010). 
 
On the other hand, a measure of exclusionism can be easily determined by 
computing the mean score of traditionalism, xenophobia, authoritarianism, and 
nationalism for each political party. It is plain to verify that the correlation between 
GAL/TAN and exclusionist scores is almost close to a perfect positive correlation16. 
Thus, political parties that are strongly deviant on the rightist side of the GAL/TAN 
dimension will be labelled as Exclusionist Right Parties (ERPs), i.e. parties that 
traditionalist on religious values, xenophobic on immigration, authoritarian on 
social order, and nationalist on societal homogeneity. 
In the aftermath, the GAL/TAN dimension is examined through a diachronic 
and country-by-country perspective; to make a fruitful comparison, z-scores 
standard values has been computed within each party system, taking into account 
                                                
16 Namely: Pearson’s correlation coefficient is equal to 0.953 (p<0.01). Since data on single value 
issues were collected only for the 2006 survey, these findings are assumed to hold true also for 1999 
and 2002. 
 49 
all three Chapel Hill’s surveys17. The aim is to identify the most deviant party (-ies) 
inside each fourteen West European party systems. Furthermore, a threshold of 1 
standard deviation has been fixed to identify the most deviant actor(s) on both 
extremities of the GAL/TAN dimension. Thus, if a party has a score less than or at 
least equal to -1, then it is an instance of the GAL cluster; on the other side, if a 
party has a score more than or at least equal to 1, then it is a instance of the TAN 
cluster, namely, that party turned out to be strongly traditionalist, authoritarian, 
nationalist, and xenophobic as proved earlier. In a nutshell, when a party satisfied 
the positive 1-standard deviation threshold is identified as an ERP. The concept of 
exclusionism has been forged since these parties support a conception of society as 
internally homogenous and based on traditional values and customs, and reject 
multiculturalism along with alternative life-styles, i.e. they are exclusionist in 
regards of what they perceive as being “diverse” and conceive “the Other” as the 
enemy. Their ideology is framed though a friend/foe scheme and their final aim is 
to protect the “inside”, defined as legitimate and pure, from the “outside”, 
perceived as a threat. Statistics are presented in the following table. 
Table 2.3. GAL/TAN party deviancy in fourteen countries. 
YEAR COUNTRY PARTY Z-GAL PARTY Z-TAN 
1999 Austria LIF -1.01 FPO 1.14 
2002 Austria Grünen -1.00 FPO 1.18 
2006 Austria Grünen -1.16 FPO 1.28 
2006 Austria LIF -1.01 BZO 1.05 
1999 Belgium Ecolo -1.57 VB 1.76 
1999 Belgium Agalev -1.57 FN 1.76 
2002 Belgium Agalev -1.28 VB 1,85 
2002 Belgium Ecolo -1.26 - - 
2006 Belgium Groen -1.31 VB 1.57 
2006 Belgium Ecolo - N-VA 1.27 
1999 Denmark EL -1.29 DF 1.62 
1999 Denmark SF -1.15 FP 1.41 
2002 Denmark SF -1.08 DF 1.48 
2006 Denmark EL -1.27 DF 1.59 
2006 Denmark RV -1.10 KF 1.17 
2006 Denmark SF -1.03 - - 
1999 Finland VIHR -1.22 PS 1.16 
1999 Finland KIPU -1.13 EKA 1.13 
1999 Finland VAS -1.10 SKL 1.04 
1999 Finland - - KESK 1.04 
2002 Finland VIHR -1.34 SKL 1.44 
2002 Finland - - KESK 1.07 
                                                
17 The standardisation of values implies that the mean of all party z-scores is equal to 0 and standard 
deviation (σ) is equal to 1. 
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2006 Finland VIHR -1.42 KD 1.41 
2006 Finland - - PS 1.07 
1999 France Verts -1.86 MN 1.46 
1999 France MEI -1.43 D 1.15 
1999 France PS -1.14 FN 1.02 
2002 France Verts -1.45 FN 1.79 
2006 France Verts -1.28 FN 1.41 
2006 France - - MPF 1.27 
1999 Germany Grünen -1.35 DVU 1.30 
1999 Germany - - REP 1.20 
2002 Germany Grünen -1.37 CSU 1.38 
2006 Germany Grünen -1.26 CSU 1.43 
1999 Greece SYN -1.16 ND 1.26 
2002 Greece SYN -1.24 - - 
2006 Greece Syriza -1.42 Laos 1.43 
1999 Ireland GP -1.08 FF 1.49 
2002 Ireland GP -1.46 FF 1.20 
2006 Ireland GP -1.24 FF 1.28 
2006 Ireland - - FG 1.09 
1999 Italy LB -1.99 MS 1.85 
1999 Italy Verdi -1.68 AN 1.45 
1999 Italy PDS -1.04 CDU 1.03 
2002 Italy DS -1.69 AN 1.31 
2002 Italy RC -1.66 LN 1.07 
2006 Italy Rad -1.45 AN 1.34 
2006 Italy Verdi -1.29 LN 1.29 
2006 Italy RC -1.25 PP 1.06 
2006 Italy PdCI -1.21 - - 
2006 Italy SDI -1.05 - - 
1999 Netherlands GL -1.43 SGP 1.16 
1999 Netherlands D66 -1.31 CD 1.12 
2002 Netherlands D66 -1.23 SGP 1.48 
2002 Netherlands GL -1.23 CU 1.27 
2006 Netherlands GL -1.26 CU 1.56 
2006 Netherlands D66 -1.21 - - 
1999 Portugal - - CDS/PP 1.37 
2002 Portugal - - CDS/PP 1.17 
2006 Portugal BE -1.13 CDS/PP 1.31 
1999 Spain Verde -1.70 PP 1.47 
1999 Spain IU -1.26 PNV 1.19 
2002 Spain IU -1.54 PP 1.59 
2006 Spain IU -1.19 PP 1.69 
1999 Sweden V -1.25 KD 1.43 
1999 Sweden MP -1.13 - - 
2002 Sweden MP -1.12 KD 1.59 
2006 Sweden V -1.14 KD 1.73 
2006 Sweden MP -1.14 - - 
1999 UK Greens -1.23 UKIP 1.46 
1999 UK - - Cons 1.23 
2002 UK LibDems -1.13 Cons 1.61 
2006 UK Greens -1.06 UKIP 1.79 
Data source: (Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Hooghe et al. 2010). 
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In Austria, all three surveys reveal that the most right-deviant party is, as 
expected, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Furthermore, the Alliance for the 
Future of Austria (BZÖ) appeared in 2006 as the second most right-deviant actor: 
after harsh quarrels against Strache over FPÖ leadership, Haider quit the FPÖ and 
founded the BZÖ in 2005. This party became a political actor mainly rooted in 
Carinthia, a Land where Haider was elected as Governor in two occasions. On the 
other side, the two most left-deviant parties are the Greens (Grünen) and the 
Liberals (LIF): the latter is a party composed of those who abandoned the FPÖ in 
the early 1990s when the Haider right-wing and national influence over the party 
had become too marked. Briefly, the analysis of right-deviancy is in line with the 
literature.  
In Belgium18 the party configuration is as expected since in all three surveys 
the most right-deviant actor is the overtly xenophobic and separatist Flemish 
Interest (VB). In 1999, the greatest right-deviant position is shared with the 
francophone National Front (FN), unfortunately discarded in the two subsequent 
inquiries. Yet, its membership in the ERP set can be assumed with certainty since 
this party established in Wallonia such as the Belgian “twin” of the French National 
Front. In 2006, a second Flemish actor appeared on the rightist side, namely, the 
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), a party striving for the independence of Flanders, 
but with a less radical agenda on social and cultural issues than the VB. Their 
position in 2006 is not that unexpected, even if they are usually considered such as 
part of the right-wing radicalism since the N-VA does not appear strongly 
concerned with xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments. This is further 
substantiated by the usually electoral cartel between N-VA and the Flemish 
Christian Democrats into the CD&V alliance19. On the libertarian side, the two 
most deviant actors are the Ecology parties belonging respectively to the French- 
and Dutch-speaking part of the country. 
                                                
18 Excluding the bi-lingual Region of Brussels, in Belgium there are actually two separate party 
systems in accordance with the two big linguistic communities in the country: e.g. the Flemish 
Interest (VB) contest elections only in Flanders, whereas the National Front (FN) only in Wallonia. 
The same holds true for the parties of the three traditional major political families — socialists, 
Christian Democrats, and Liberals — and more recently for the Ecologists too. 
19 The electoral agreement between the two parties was then dissolved before the 2010 federal 
elections when the N-VA contested election with its own political symbol. 
 52 
In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party (DF) is always the most right-deviant 
party, prevailing over both the Progress Party (FP) — that strongly suffered 
competition from the Pia Kjærsgaard’s party20 — and the Conservative People’s 
Party (KF) that assumed in 2006 a rather radical stance, still more moderate than 
the DF. The FP is generally branded as right-wing radical party and actually stands 
at the second position in 1999; hence, its collocation in the exclusionist right group 
appears motivated. In the 2006 survey, the KF holds the second placing, but the 
party leaded by Lars Barfoed is a full member of the European People’s Party 
(EPP) since 1993. On the other hand, the libertarian side is contented between the 
anti-capitalist red-green United List (EL) and the Socialist People’s Party (SF).  
In Finland, the configuration is more complex since the True Finns (PS) 
contends with the Finnish Christian League (SKL), which changed its name into 
Christian Democrats (KD) in 2001, for the position of most right-deviant party21. 
The latter has never been considered a part of the right-wing radicalism as it holds 
the usual tenets of Christian democracy and is actually an observer member in the 
EPP. Yet, its stance along the GAL/TAN axis appears more coherent when 
considering that the KD and PS formed an electoral cartel in the 2009 European 
Parliament elections. The PS was founded in 1995 after the dissolution of the 
Finnish Rural Party (SMP), clearly originated from the Urban-Rural cleavage; 
because of its claims against immigration from non-European countries and its 
Euro-sceptic stance on the EU threat against national welfare state, the PS is at least 
a borderline case between conservatism and right-wing radicalism. On the opposite 
side, the Left Alliance (VAS) and the Ecologists (VIHR) are the most left-deviant 
parties. 
France is a crucial country since the National Front (FN) has often been 
considered almost a prototype of the post-industrial radical right. Data corroborate 
its reputation since the FN is the most right-deviant party both in 2002 and 2006. In 
1999, the FN occupied the third place in the ranking, while the most right-deviant 
                                                
20 In 2001, the Progress Party gathered only 0.6 per cent of the vote and did not contest legislative 
elections neither in 2005 nor in 2007. Its major inroads were made in the 1970s (e.g., in 1973 
landslide election it collected 15.9% of the vote), whereas in the second half of the 1990s its 
electoral performances dropped dramatically. 
21 The PS was not part of the 2002 survey. 
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one is the Republican National Movement (MNR), a splinter party from the FN 
leaded by Bruno Mégret, and the second one is The Right (La Droite, D), a very 
small party founded in 1998 by Charles Millon after his expulsion from the Union 
for French Democracy (UDF). Both Mégret and Millon’s parties are strictly minor 
actors compared to the FN that holds a real blackmail power (Sartori 1976) at least 
in the electoral competition. In fact, Le Pen’s party has exerted an unchallengeable 
supremacy over the right-wing radicalism. On the leftist side, the most libertarian 
stance is always expressed by the Greens (Verts).  
In Germany, a significant lack of data limits the analysis: indeed, in 1999 the 
two more right-deviant parties are respectively the German People’s Union (DVU) 
and the Republicans (REP). Nevertheless, they are not anymore included into the 
two later surveys, so that the Christian Social Union (CSU) holds the most rightist 
stance, though the Bavarian partner of the CDU has never been considered as a 
member of the radical right group. Furthermore, the National-democratic Party of 
Germany (NPD) has never been included, thus identification of ERPs in Germany 
is rather problematic. 
In Greece, the absence of right-wing radical parties was filled by the Popular 
Orthodox Rally (LAOS) founded in 2000 and included only in the 2006 survey 
where it stand at the most right-deviant position. In the 1999 survey, the most right-
deviant party was the New Democracy (ND) that is by all means a traditional 
mainstream conservative party, whilst in 2002 no party was over the threshold of 
right-deviancy. Other minor radical right-wing parties in the 1990s, like the 
National Party (EK) or National Political Union (EPEN), have never been 
investigated by Chapel Hill’s surveys probably because of their very minor 
consensus at the polls. Along the opposite side, the Coalition of the Left and 
Progress (SYN), then renamed into Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), is the 
most left-libertarian actor.  
In Ireland, the same configuration is constantly reproduced in all three surveys: 
the Republican Party (Fianna Fáil22, FF) is always the most right-deviant party, 
while the Green Party (GP) is the most left-deviant one. Nevertheless, the FF is a 
                                                
22 Literally: “Soldiers of Destiny”. 
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liberal-conservative party and member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in 
the European Parliament, thus very far from the radical right-wing area. 
Furthermore, in the 2006 survey, the United Ireland Party (Fine Gael23, FG) turned 
out as second right-deviant party: also in this case, the FG is a member of the EPP 
and is generally acknowledged such as truly representative of usual Christian 
democratic instances. Thus, the Irish party system appears as devoid of ERPs and 
the extreme right in generally has never play any significant political role thus far.  
Italy represents a case where party system configuration is somewhat complex, 
due also to a rather strong party fragmentation. Certainly, dealing with the right has 
to cop with the cumbersome fascist legacy. In 1999, the most right-deviant party is 
the Social Movement-Tricolour Flame (MS-FT), namely, one of the heirs of the 
Italian Social Movement (MSI) that has represented the cornerstone of the old-style 
Italian right (Ignazi 2000). Notwithstanding, the MS-FT is included just in the first 
survey, while in the 2002 and 2006 surveys the most right-deviant position is hold 
by the National Alliance (AN), the moderate counterpart that originated too from 
the dissolution of the MSI and was established precisely to quit the Fascist 
imprinting and embrace fully democratic values. A further key actor in Italian 
politics is the Northern League (LN) that turned out to be right-deviant only in the 
2002 survey. Certainly, federalism represents its core ideological tenet and, in fact, 
the LN was not forged on the usual right-wing ground, but to give political voice to 
the anti-statist resentment of the Northern part of the country.  On the other hand, 
the LN has adopted a rather xenophobic and social-conservative agenda since the 
mid-1990s advocating the typical right-wing “law&order” appeal against mass-
immigration. Finally, two parties, namely, the CDU (United Centre Democrats) in 
1999 and the PP (Popular Party) in 2006 are right-deviant too, and this is quite 
unexpected in relation to the literature on right-wing radicalism that usually do not 
take into account those two Christian democratic political actors. Thus, the choice 
of parties entering the exclusionist right group is rather complicated. On the 
opposite wing, the extreme position along the libertarian side is expressed in two 
                                                
23 Literally: “Family of the Irish”. 
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surveys (1999 and 2006) by the Bonino List-Radical Party (Rad, LB) and in 2002 
by the Left Democrats (DS).  
In the Netherlands, parties occupying the most right-deviant position are both 
strictly protestant parties, i.e. the Reformed Political Party (SGP) in 1999 and 2002, 
then the Christian Union (CU) in 2006. It is important to note that in the first survey 
the SGP scored higher than the Centre Democrats (CD) that is usually considered 
as being a truly right-wing extremist party. A second major observation regards the 
List Pim Fortuyn (LPF): this is included in the 2002 survey but it did not result24 as 
right-deviant. The same holds true for its ideological successor25, the Party for 
Freedom (PVV) leaded by Geert Wilders that, in 2006, scored only a right-
deviancy equal to 0.70. It is useful to specify that the PVV’s stances need further 
investigation, since the party was established only recently — i.e., in 2004 — and 
its evolutions has to be monitored strictly, even more since it entered the coalition 
(but not the executive) supporting the new Liberal and Christian Democratic 
government in 2010.  It is plain to see that the selection of ERPs in the Netherlands 
in one of the most complicated. The SGP is the oldest political party since it was 
established in 1918 and its role is eminently to testimony Calvinist values in 
Parliament. Thus, the SGP is not a governing party, i.e. a party open to enter a 
governing coalition or cabinet. Indeed, it has been always in opposition and its 
ideology is mainly linked to Biblical values and principles. On the one hand, it is a 
firmly traditional, whereas on the other hand it is not a strong anti-immigrant party 
as showed by its ancient founding. Its membership in the exclusionist right group is 
open to debate. Secondly, the Christian Union sometimes allied with the SGP and 
the main difference between them is that the CU is open to participate in 
government as proved in 2006 when it entered the fourth Balkenende cabinet 
together with the CDA and PvdA. Moreover, compared to the SGP, the CU is a 
very recently established party as it issued from a merger in 2000 between the 
Reformed Political Alliance and the Reformatory Political Federation and contested 
elections for the first time in 2002. The CU is Christian social-conservative party 
and its ideology is mainly inspired by principle of the Bible; on the other hand, the 
                                                
24 Its score was just 0.13 above the mean in 2002 on the GAL/TAN dimension. 
25 This is argued in terms of its political struggle against Islamic values. 
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CU has a somewhat moderate left-wing attitude towards asylum seekers and 
persecuted for religious reasons. Despite of its moderate denomination, the 
Centrum Democrats is truly xenophobic and authoritarian party. This is confirmed 
in Carter’s analysis (2005) where the CD is classified as a party attaching a central 
importance to contrasting immigration in Western societies (2005, 30) and also 
supporting new culturism (2005, 36), hence distinguishing from traditional white 
supremacy claims. Therefore, its membership in the exclusionist right group is well 
explained. Finally, on the other hand, the more libertarian parties are, as 
predictable, the Green Left (GL) and the Democrats 66 (D66).   
In Portugal, the most right-deviant position is always expressed by the Social-
Democratic Centre/Popular Party (CDS/PP), a firmly Christian and social-
conservative party, member of the EPP, which across the literature is not generally 
included in the right-wing radicalism. Instead, the party is considered as 
ideologically close to the German CSU. On the other side, no party overcame the 
threshold on the left, save the Left Bloc (BE) in 2006. Thus, in 1999 and 2002 the 
Portuguese party system appear not to be particularly polarised.  
In Spain, various Falangistas groupuscules are unable to play, so far, any 
influential role at the electoral level. In all three surveys, the most right-deviant 
party is the Popular Party (PP) with a marked right-deviant score. Probably, this 
might be due to its legacy with Alianza Popular (AP)26, the party leaded by Manuel 
Fraga that, moving from the right to the centre of the political spectrum, merged 
with other small Christian Democratic and Liberal parties and re-found with the 
name of Partido Popular in 1989. On the other hand, in line with the same remarks 
made early, this party too is full member of the EPP and is not embedded into right-
wing radicalism in the literature. The same conclusion holds true for the Basque 
Nationalist Party (PNV) whose pattern is clearly into the Christian democratic 
tradition and in the European Parliament it has only one MP seating with the ALDE 
group. On the libertarian side, as predictable, the Ecology party (Verde) and the 
United Left (IU) are the most left-deviant parties. 
                                                
26 Between 1979 and 1982 general elections, the AP established its supremacy over the centre-right, 
taking profit of the drop of vote share (from 34.8 to 6.8 per cent) of Suarez’s Social and Democratic 
Union.  
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In Sweden, once again, a party member of the EPP, namely, the Christian 
Democrats (KD), expresses the most right-deviant stance. Moreover, the New 
Democracy party (NyD) has frequently been embedded in the right-wing 
radicalism, even though its right-deviant score in the 1999 survey27 was evidently 
under the threshold (i.e., 0.42). Furthermore, the exclusion of the Sweden 
Democrats and the National Democrats represents a strong limitation to the scope 
of the research. On the other extremity, the libertarian side is presided over by the 
Left Party (V) and the Environment Party-The Greens (MP). 
Finally, in both 1999 and 2006 the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) is the most right-deviant party and the same for the Tories (Cons) in 2002: 
the former is a borderline case in the literature since that party has been considered 
a single-issue party, i.e. preserving British sovereignty from European interferences 
and maintaining the UK out of the Euro-zone. That said, the party appears to have 
acquired also some ideological traits linked to social-conservatism and anti-
immigrant reluctance. Thus, its collocation into the ERP group is problematic. On 
the other hand, the Conservative Party is without any doubt a historical mainstream 
party in British politics, never associated with the radical right, excepting the neo-
liberal economic policies under the Thatcher’s leadership. Unfortunately, the 
British National Party (BNP) is not considered in any of the surveys and the same 
could be argued for the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland (DUP). 
Conversely, the most the left-deviant parties are the Greens in 1999 and 2006, and 
the Liberal Democrats in 2002 when the Greens where not included.  
4. A COUNTER-ANALYSIS WITH BENOIT AND LAVER’S DATA 
In lots of instances, the previous analysis has carried out an output in line with 
the literature, i.e. many parties identified as exclusionist right are the same parties 
that, in the literature, are defined as belonging to the right-wing radicalism. 
However, some borderline or debatable cases persist and a further investigation, 
through different data, may be useful: the aim is to shed light on those parties 
whose collocation, or omission, in the exclusionist right group is critical. 
                                                
27 The party quickly dissolved in 1994, suffering the lack of a solid organisation. 
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In line with the type of data employed early, this section will make use of 
expert surveys, in particular those collected by Benoit and Laver (2006) during the 
period 2002-2004. Resorting to a different data source than Chapel Hill’s expert 
judgments boosts the comparison of results and helps verify whether they are 
sufficiently robust. Yet, Benoit and Laver’s survey structure does not provide an 
encompassing GAL/TAN dimension. Therefore, the focus has been concentrated on 
the only two issues dealing directly with values: social policies and immigration. 
The former is a dimension where parties are positioned concerning their 
support/opposition of liberal policies on abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. 
The latter is a dimension where parties are positioned whether they favour policies 
helping immigrants to integrate into society or, on the contrary, support repatriation 
of immigrants in their country of origin. This issue is treated from a very specific 
point of view, since respondents has to assess a particular aspect of party ideology 
and program, i.e. repatriation or integration28. Moreover, it can be argued that a 
party striving for repatriation will probably support also tough policies on 
immigration and hold strict view on that domain. As previously seen, the 
GAL/TAN scores were strongly correlated with traditionalism, authoritarianism, 
and xenophobia, whilst to a lesser extent with nationalism. Given the couple of 
issues here are at stakes — i.e., social policies and immigration — they do 
represent a good proxy of traditionalism and xenophobia, but not of 
authoritarianism and, even less, of nationalism. Despite this limitation, a counter-
analysis is actually worthwhile, since social conservatism and xenophobia are 
exactly two main features of ERPs. 
The investigation in conducted within each party system, taking into account 
party scores along the two topics mentioned earlier. In order to be as accurate as 
possible, the salience of each dimension is used as weight to obtain a weighted 
average score for each party: in this manner, the final mean is affected by the 
salience that the party attributes to the two single issues. Once all means are 
calculated, in analogy with what have been done before, standard values are 
computed within each party system. The goal is to sort out those parties that are 
                                                
28 The same dimension will be employed also in Chapter III to estimate the spatial positions of 
parties.  
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right-deviant along the “new dimension” composed of social policies and 
immigration, keeping the threshold of at least one standard deviation above the 
mean. Results are compared with those of the precedent section. 
With Benoit and Laver data, the configuration of the Austrian party system 
reinforces the FPÖ as the most right-deviant party. Yet, its deviancy is just slightly 
above one standard deviation since the FPÖ has an extreme position on 
immigration, while on social policies its stance is a bit more moderate. However, 
salience is the key difference, since immigration is a much relevant topic than 
social policies. That said, the standardized weighted mean is over the threshold and 
this support the inclusion of FPÖ into the exclusionist right group. Since the BZÖ 
was founded in 2005 and the majority of Benoit and Laver surveys were collected 
in 2003, this party is not included. By the way, since the BZÖ issued from the FPÖ 
and, on the base of what has been specified on the previous section, it appears 
appropriate to label also the Alliance for the Future of Austria as an ERP. 
In Belgium, the two most deviant parties on the right are again the VB and FN. 
In particular, their standardized weighted means are very far from the third party in 
the ranking, i.e. the CD&V. Thus, results reveals the extent to which this parties are 
ideologically divergent from all others. In fact, the deviancy of all Ecology parties 
on the left is less pronounced. A difference from the analysis of the previous 
section is that the Flemish N-VA has moderate right score (i.e., 0.48), hence 
markedly below the threshold. This implies that, in the end, the VB and FN are the 
only parties that can be considered as ERPs. 
In Denmark, the most right-deviant party is the DF, followed by the FP, so that 
results confirm the conclusions drawn before. Both are strongly concerned with 
immigration and to a very less extent with social policies. The Conservative 
People’s Party (KF), that turned out to be right-deviant in the 2006 Chapel Hill’s 
survey, has a standardized weighted mean of 0.74, thus under the fixed threshold. 
The saliency attributed by the KF to immigration is less pronounced than those 
attributed by both DF and FP. This justifies the inclusion of them into the 
exclusionist right group. 
The Finnish party system’s structure is still complex. Firstly, the True Finns 
(PS) party is the most right-deviant with a standardized weighted mean of 1.44. As 
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said above, the PS represents a debated case since it is considered a borderline case 
since when the party started to radicalise its political platform, shifting towards the 
right by the end of last century. As already mentioned, the PS was founded on the 
ruins of the old agrarian party that represented the right wing of the KESK, and this 
left the party in the 1950s. Its scores on expert judgments confirm the argument: 
both on social policies and especially on immigration, the PS is a rightist party. 
Although its membership in the right-wing radicalism can always be questioned, on 
the basis of data available it appears possible to argue that the True Finns are 
members of the exclusionist right group. Concerning the SKL-KD, i.e. the Christian 
Democrats, this resulted to be right-deviant in all three Chapel Hill surveys and the 
same with Benoit and Laver data (2006). The party was established in 1958 when a 
dissident faction of the National Coalition Party (KOK) decided to split and 
founded the Finnish Christian League and, in 2001, the party’s name was changed. 
As already said, it is affiliated to the EPP as an observer member, and its ideology 
is mainly implanted in the defence of traditional values such as demonstrated by 
party score and salience — i.e., respectively 18.58 and 17.97 — on social matters. 
On the contrary, the salience of immigration for the SKL-KD is much lower and the 
position is just slightly on the centre-right. Summing up, given its European 
connection in the mainstream centre-right group and the minor importance 
attributed to immigration, the SKL-KD is closer to radical social-conservative 
parties rather than exclusionist right actors. Therefore, it will not be considered as 
an ERP. About the Pensioner party (EKA), this resulted right-deviant in the 1999 
Chapel Hill’s survey, but no more data are available in all other surveys, since it 
represents a minor extra-Parliament party in Finland, so that it can be discarded 
from present analysis. Finally, in the 1992 and 2002 Chapel Hill’s surveys the 
former agrarian and now liberal-conservative KESK turned out to be right-deviant. 
However, with Benoit and Laver data (2006), the KESK resulted rather below the 
threshold: both topics are not that relevant for the party that, on the one hand, is 
rather social-conservative but, on the other hand, holds a left to the centre stance on 
immigration. In particular, the last argument allows for ruling out the KESK from 
the exclusionist right group. 
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France is the homeland of the prototype radical right-wing party, i.e. Le Pen’s 
Front National (FN), at present leaded by his daughter Marine Le Pen who has 
recently appointed as President of the party. With both datasets, the FN is right-
deviant and attaches a higher salience to immigration, even though in both domains 
it holds a radical right-wing stance as epitomized by its standardised average mean 
greater than 19.0. By consequence, the FN has a full membership in the 
exclusionist right group. The other three parties mentioned in the table below are 
minor parties that, in spatial terms, tried to insert between the FN and the 
mainstream Gaullist right. As already specified early, the Charles Millon’s Droite 
represented just a flash party and, indeed, was not included in Benoit and Laver 
inquiry (2006), hence that party can be ruled out from the set under investigation. 
On the other hand, the National Republican Movement (MNR) and the Movement 
for France (MPF) played a more important role. The first one is a splinter party 
issued from the FN at the end of the 1990s. The former FN cadre — second only to 
Le Pen’s leadership — Bruno Megrét founded it after contesting Le Pen’s project 
of entrusting the party to her daughter for the upcoming 1999 European elections. 
Yet, the fight between Le Pen and Mégret was not only a question of personal party 
leadership, but concerned also party strategy, since Mégret was more moderate than 
his rival and prone to elaborate closer relationships with the Gaullist republican 
right to bargain a political agreement. At the beginning, Mégret was able to seize 
the top of the party through a party congress, which nominated him as leader and 
added the denomination “National Movement”, to that of FN, to highlight the new 
political line. In the aftermath, Le Pen reacted strongly and went to court where he 
obtained the reversal of all decisions made by that Congress that was judged to 
have been illegally convened. Therefore, Mégret was forced to leave the FN and 
founded the MNR with certain former FN regional cadres. With regards to MPF, 
Philippe de Villiers, a Euro-sceptic political leader who fought against the approval 
of the Maastricht Treaty, established it in 1994. He fought against the approval of 
the Maastricht Treaty and the MPF has always been characterised by a strong 
appeal to the defence of national identity and independence from Europe. On the 
other hand, de Villiers’ political line has been oriented towards a non-antagonist 
relation with the Gaullist right, as demonstrated by numerous alliances with 
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Gaullist candidates at the local level, whilst keeping distance from Le Pen’s party 
and ideology. Summing up, the MNR can be considered as member of the 
exclusionist right group, and it is included in the set of extreme right parties by 
Carter (2005, 4) too, while MPF is considered as a borderline case. 
The literature usually identifies three German parties in the area of right-wing 
radicalism: the German People’s Union (DVU), the Republicans (REP), and the 
National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP). With regards to the first two 
political actors in this list, DVU and REP were right-deviant in the 1999 Chapel 
Hill’s survey and this is underpinned also by Benoit and Laver data (2006). On the 
other hand, the NPD was included only in the latter survey: examining its 
standardised weighted score, along with that of DVU and REP, reveals that those 
three parties resulted more rightist than the French FN. Therefore, the inclusion of 
all of them in the exclusionist right group is rather straightforward. Another very 
important aspect concerns the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) that in the 
2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill’s surveys turned out to be the most right-deviant party 
along the GAL/TAN dimension in Germany. It has already been previously pointed 
out the caveat linked to the exclusion of the other three parties from the surveys. In 
Benoit and Laver inquiry (2006), the CDU and CSU are considered as a unique unit 
of analysis and its deviancy is right-wing, though clearly under the fixed threshold. 
Moreover, as the CSU is full member of the EPP, it can be doubtless ruled out from 
the exclusionist right group. A last observation is about the Law and Order 
Offensive Party (Schil) that, despite of its considerable standardised weighted score 
of 17.81, has a right-deviancy under the threshold given the extreme high scores of 
the other three ERPs. Furthermore, this party has been a flash party without 
gathering significant electoral results, hence it can be discarded without affecting 
the present analysis. Indeed, the party founded by Ronald Schill in 2000 was then 
dissolved in 2007 due to financial problems and loss of many leading figures, 
among which the founder that had been expelled in 2003 due to judicial problems. 
The Greek party system is based on two major parties, one on the centre-left — 
the Socialist Party (PASOK) — and the other on the centre-right — the New 
Democracy party (ND). Since the latter is one of two columns supporting the Greek 
two-party system, the resulted right-deviancy in the 1999 Chapel Hill’s survey has 
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been to be interpreted with caution. Actually, with Benoit and Laver data (2006) 
too the ND holds a right-deviancy above the threshold. However, the ND is not an 
ERP on the base of three motivations. Firstly, the ND is a truly executive-oriented 
government and it has been in power in several occasions. Secondly, the ND is a 
member of the EPP and, thirdly, its standardised weighted score is only 14.35, so 
much lower than the usual level reached by ERPs, and the same holds true in 
relation to salience attributed to both dimensions. On the other hand, the focus has 
to be shifted over the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), a party whose ideological 
platforms appears to be located in the exclusionist right area. It was founded by the 
journalist Georgios Karatzaferis, an ND former member. The LAOS contested its 
first national elections in 2004, but failed to satisfy the 3 per cent national 
threshold; the second tentative was much more electorally successful since the 
party, that in 2005 absorbed the Hellenic Front, entered Parliament in 2007 
receiving 3.8 per cent of the vote. The LAOS was included in the 2006 Chapel 
Hill’s survey and resulted significantly right-deviant as expected. Even tough it was 
not included in Benoit and Laver survey, the LAOS in the set of ERPs appears to be 
appropriate in line with what has been said before about the Austrian BZÖ, 
In Ireland as well, one of two mainstream parties — the Fianna Fáil (FF) — 
turned out to be the most right-deviant on the GAL/TAN dimension in all three 
Chapel Hill’s survey. The same result is obtained with Benoit and Laver data, since 
the FF has standardised weighted mean of 1.44. Similar remarks that have been put 
forth before can be repeated here to highlight that, despite of its right-deviancy, this 
party has never been included by the literature in the right-wing radicalism. Firstly, 
the FF is part of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), a 
group whose political ideals are markedly far than those usually supported by right-
wing groups. Secondly, by examining its weighted mean score over social policies 
and immigrations stance in Benoit and Laver data, the score of 14.75 is lower than 
that of other ERPs. For these reasons, the Republican Party of Ireland is not 
member of the exclusionist right set. 
Given its high degree of fractionalisation, the Italian party system is one of the 
most complex to inspect. The Italian Social Movement-Tricolour Flame (MSI, MS-
FT) and National Alliance (AN) resulted as right-deviant also in Benoit and Laver 
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data. With special regards to National Alliance, this is an important result given its 
status of borderline case. In Benoit and Laver data, its weighted average score on 
the two topics is just above 17 and its standardised weighted mean is right-deviant 
over the fixed threshold. Therefore, the inclusion of both parties in the exclusionist 
right group is justified. On the other hand, the United Christian Democrats (CDU) 
and the Italian Popular Party (PP) turned out to be right-deviant, respectively, in the 
1999 and in 2006 Chapel Hill’s surveys. In Benoit and Laver inquiry, those parties 
were not included with the same acronym: the heir of CDU is at present the Union 
of the Centre (UDC) and that of the PP is the Margherita29 (MARG): in both 
instances, these parties were not right-deviant and, therefore, can be ruled from the 
exclusionist right group. The Northern League (LN) represents the trickier case: 
with Chapel Hill’s data, it turned out to be right-deviant only in 2002. Yet, with 
Benoit and Laver data, it is the most right-deviant party with a significant weighted 
average over 18 and a standardised weighted mean of 1.51, greatly over the fixed 
threshold. In the literature, the collocation of LN inside the right-wing radicalism is 
troublesome and disputed, mainly because of the main ideological tenet of Bossi’s 
party, i.e. federalism and autonomy of the Northern regions of the country. 
Moreover, the LN itself denies any linkage with the “right” in political terms, 
especially because of the shadows of fascism that inevitably surrounds every party 
moving too further on the right of the political spectrum. Another important point is 
the active participation in the executive in 1994 and then again in 2001 and 2008 
with the centre-right coalition leaded by Berlusconi. In several instances, there has 
been tensions between AN and LN, since the former support national unity, while 
the second one assumed secession (in the 1990s) and then federalism (in the 21st 
century) as main goal of its political existence. Cautiously, it appears opportune to 
consider the LN a borderline case in relation to the exclusionist right group. 
The Dutch party system represents another intricate context. First of all, a party 
usually identified by the literature as extremely located on the right is the Centre 
Democrats (CD), as also noted by Mudde (1996, 234) when listing the so-called 
“usual suspect parties”, i.e. parties that are considered as component of right-wing 
                                                
29 Full Italian name: “Democrazia è Libertà – La Margherita”. 
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extremisms. It was established in 1984 by Hans Janmaat and, despite its name30, the 
party adopted a definite nationalist ideology and supported anti-immigrant claims. 
The other Dutch parties marked their distance to the Centrumdemocraten and its 
“alien” ideology, insomuch a cordon sanitaire in the period 1989-1998 was set up 
against Centre Democrats MPs. The party entered a profound crisis at the end of the 
1990s, because of an extremely weak consensus (under 1 per cent) and the risk of 
being banned likewise the Centre Party ’86. In the end, the CD was officially 
dissolved when its founder died in 2002. This explains why Benoit and Laver did 
not include the CD in their research; however, the incorporation of the CD in the 
exclusionist right group is, by all means, appropriate. Just few months before the 
CD dissolution, another political actor with a strong anti-immigrant accent was 
established: the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). The main claim of that party was the fight 
against the supposed threat put forward by Muslim immigration in the Netherlands, 
i.e., Fortuyn denounced the incompatibility of Muslim values within the tolerant 
and libertarian Dutch society and the risk of a clash between Dutch secularism and 
Islam. This helps explain why in Benoit and Laver data the LPF turned out to give a 
low saliency to social policies, with a centre-left score, whereas immigration had a 
great salience and LPF stance was definitely on the radical right. In the end, given 
that results on LPF degree of right-deviancy is controversial — confirmed only 
with Benoit and Laver data — it appears prudent to rule out the Pim Fortuyn’s list 
from the ERP set. About SGP and CU, both are close in some respects to right-
wing radicalism, but a major difference between relates to their European 
affiliation: the former is member of the group of Europe for Freedom and 
Democracy (EFD), while the latter is part of European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group. This means that the CU is farer from the right radicalism than 
the SGP and therefore is not considered as right-exclusionist, while the latter can be 
considered as borderline case. 
Thus far, the Iberian Peninsula is an area devoid of ERPs, since both for Spain 
and Portugal the right-deviancy is expressed by conservative Christian democratic 
                                                
30 The use of a label appealing to a “moderate” profile is somewhat frequent: for instance, the 
Sweden Democrats. The aim of these labels is probably to avoid any suspect of being extremist and 
anti-democratic. 
 66 
parties that are far from right-wing radicalism as such. This conclusion stems from 
the European affiliation of both PP and CDS/PP. 
The 1991 landslide general elections in Sweden was featured by the New 
Democracy (NyD) breakthrough, which gathered 6.7 per cent of votes and marked 
the best score ever for a right-wing party31. In the aftermath, due to internal 
disagreements and quarrels, the party weakened and dropped to 1.2 per cent in the 
1994 elections; therefore, it lose its parliamentary representations and, finally, in 
1998 secured only 0.2 per cent of the vote and dissolved. The party was included 
only in the 1999 Chapel Hill’s survey and its GAL/TAN score was only of 6 out of 
10 and its right-deviancy is under 0.50. Hence, the New Democracy is not 
considered part of the exclusionist right group. 
Finally, in the United Kingdom, the case of Tories can be ruled out from right-
wing radicalism: although the party is rather deviant also in the Benoit and Laver 
inquiry, the party can be ruled out on the base of its tradition and values that are 
totally mainstream and central in British politics. Different is the discourse about 
the UKIP that unfortunately was included in Benoit and Laver study. This could 
have been a useful control for a party that resulted two times right-deviant in 
Chapel Hill’s surveys and in Europe too is not affiliated to the mainstream centre-
right. On the contrary, the UKIP is member of the EFD like the LN and SGP 
mentioned early. Cautiously, the UKIP is considered as a borderline case. 
Table 2.4. Summary of case selection. 
Country Chapel Hill’s Benoit and Laver ERPs 
Austria FPÖ (1999, 2002, 2006) 
BZÖ (2006) 
FPÖ 
(BZO not included) 
FPÖ, BZÖ 
Belgium VB (1999, 2002, 2006) 
FN (1999) 
N-VA (2006) 
VB 
FN 
(N-VA not deviant) 
VB, FN 
Denmark DF (1999, 2002, 2006) 
FP (1999) 
KF (2006) 
DF 
FP 
(KF not deviant) 
DF, FP 
Finland PS (1999, 2006) 
SKL-KD (1999, 2002, 2006) 
KESK (1999, 2002) 
EKA (1999) 
PS 
SKL-KD 
(KESK not deviant) 
(EKA not included) 
PS 
France FN (1999, 2002, 2006) 
MPF (2006) 
FN 
MPF 
FN, MNR 
MPF borderline 
                                                
31 Actually, the party was perceived as radical as to be considered distant from other traditional 
competitors. 
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MNR (1999) 
D (1999) 
(MNR not included) 
(D not included) 
Germany DVU (1999) 
REP (1999) 
CSU (2002, 2006) 
(NPD not included) 
DVU 
REP 
(CSU not deviant) 
NPD 
DVU, REP, NPD 
Greece LAOS (2006) 
ND (1999) 
(LAOS not included) 
ND 
LAOS 
Ireland FF (1999, 2002, 2006) FF - 
Italy AN (1999, 2002) 
MS (1999) 
LN (2002) 
CDU (1999) 
PP (2006) 
AN 
MSFT 
LN 
(CDU not deviant) 
(PP not deviant) 
AN, MSFT 
LN borderline 
Netherlands CD (1999) 
SGP (1999, 2002) 
CU (2002, 2006) 
(LPF not deviant) 
(CD not included) 
SGP 
(CU not included) 
LPF 
CD 
SGP borderline 
Portugal CDS/PP (1999, 2002, 2006) CDS/PP - 
Spain PP (1999, 2002, 2006) 
PNV (1999) 
PP 
(PNV not deviant) 
- 
Sweden KD (1999, 2002, 2006) KD - 
UK UKIP (1999, 2006) 
Conservatives (1999, 2002) 
(UKIP not included) 
Conservatives 
- 
UKIP borderline 
 
European affiliation has been a further criterion widely used in this section to 
disentangle more complicated cases. Indeed, the four borderline cases — LN, MPF, 
SGP, and UKIP — are all member of the European EFD. On the other hand, parties 
that are associated within the Christian democratic network are ruled out from the 
ERPs set, like the: Danish KF, Finnish SKL-KD, Greek ND, Irish FF, Portuguese 
CDS/PP, Spanish PP, Swedish KD, and the British Conservative Party. 
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PART 2: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
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III. DEMAND SIDE FACTORS 
1. AN OVERALL THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter has extensively explored dimensions of party competition 
in the tentative of indentifying parties expressing right-deviant stances along the 
GAL/TAN dimension of Chapel Hill’s surveys. Those political actors satisfying a 
fixed threshold have been labelled Exclusionist Right Parties (ERPs). Then, a 
further counter analysis has been carried out with Benoit and Laver data. In 
particular, the aim was to strengthen outputs obtained with Chapel Hill’s surveys 
and to shed light on those parties that are debated cases between conservative 
centre-right and radical right-wing parties. In the end, the final section has supplied 
sixteen ERPs and four borderline cases. 
Once the objects of the present analysis have been singled out, the focus can be 
turned to theoretical arguments concerning the second scope of the present enquiry, 
namely, theories accounting for ERPs’ electoral success or downfall. A great 
amount of researches on right-wing radicalism has been elaborated in the last two 
decades, so that it is useful to spell out some of the major contributions emerged in 
the extensive literature about the electoral fortunes of radical right-wing parties. 
Firstly, Ignazi pointed out four concurrent causes (1992, 16, 2000, 215): «a) the rise 
of a neo-conservative cultural mood; b) a tendency towards radicalization and 
polarization; c) the presence of an underground but mounting legitimacy crisis of 
the political and (above all) party system; d) security and immigration issues». To 
support the first claim, it is argued that in the 1970s some intellectuals, 
disappointed by left-wing parties, moved towards the right side of the political 
spectrum (Bell 1973) and neo-conservatism emerged to counter the massive 
consensus on Keynesian economic recipes which caused the growth of the welfare 
state. Thus, laissez-faire ideas were revitalized to boost free markets and 
entrepreneurial initiatives, together with a major change in values where authority, 
patriotism, family, and tradition were given a renewed importance. Neo-
conservatism cultivated the aspiration to represent the alternative to the left-
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progressive interpretation of society, thus it advanced right to life, anti-feminism, 
traditional moral values, law and order, anti-minority rights, and xenophobia (R 
Flanagan and Inglehart 1987). Ignazi’s second hypothesis pinpoints the polarisation 
of party system: he argues that the neo-conservative mood has induced mainstream 
centre-right parties to move forward to the right, with the risk of losing their 
traditional moderate constituencies. Therefore, this hesitation has given an 
advantage to extreme right parties that could play the role such as the real and 
genuine representatives of radical instances. On the other hand, about parties’ 
placement along the left-right continuum, it is also plausible to consider another 
situation, namely, when mainstream parties have converged too much by the 
median voter in the centre, leaving an empty along their wings. Whether this 
occurs, the centripetal strategy32 of conventional parties may encourage electors to 
vote for radical parties, i.e. it induces a centrifugal effect on voters. The third point 
is related to the specific character of extreme right parties (Ignazi 1992) 
endangering the legitimacy of the system by blaming long parliamentary debates, 
the slowness of democratic procedures, and the frailty of state’s authority. Last but 
not least, another issue favouring the extreme right would be immigration from 
non-European countries and integration of foreigners, especially of Muslim people: 
the clash between different values and life-styles, the growing fear of 
incompatibility, and the rise of criminality (directly associated by some parties to 
immigrations) are factors widely taken into account to explain ERPs electoral 
inroads. Indeed, electors would seek definite policies and the exclusionist right can 
establish itself most successfully where conventional mainstream parties have 
overlapped in their policies, so that they appear such as too mild and toned-down. 
In a very insightful analysis, Elisabeth Carter (2005) focuses also on party 
strategies with special regards to: the reciprocal distance between the mainstream 
centre-right and the extreme right party, and the distance between the two 
conventional moderate centre-left and centre-right parties. In addition to this, 
Meguid points out (2005) that when a new party politicises a dormant issue, it had 
                                                
32 This specific party configuration will be analysed deeply in the next Chapter. 
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better the take the opposite ideological position on that issue than that assumed by a 
mainstream party. 
A fundamental aspect is about social groups that ERPs are able to attract: a 
strong aspect is that in many instances these parties exert a pull on blue-collar and 
low-skilled workers, namely, traditional constituencies of Social Democratic parties 
(Betz 1993; Kitschelt 1995; Ignazi 2000). Social fragmentation has given rise to 
different social groupings with divergent political expectations: people with high 
level of education, working in human-oriented sector of the public service, and 
high-skilled professionals are generally oriented to cast their votes for the ecology 
and left-libertarians parties. On the other hand, those better educated and employed 
in the private sector are generally prone to foster free markets, lower taxes and a 
less expensive welfare state. Finally, those having low level of education – i.e., the 
most threatened by globalisation – are reasonably inclined to sustain state 
intervention in light of its benefices (Betz 1993). The last two groups are both 
potential ERPs voters: those working in the private sector are attracted by 
neoliberal economic stances, whereas the largest part of blue-collar workers, 
involved in object or document processing, is predominantly and may express 
«above average dispositions toward particularist and culturally parochial 
conceptions of citizenship and authoritarian decision making» (Kitschelt 1995, 9). 
Moreover, changes in occupational structures and the transition from «industrial 
welfare capitalism to post-industrial individualized capitalism» (Betz 1993) has 
weakened the traditional political cleavages, and strengthen an increasing and 
worrying alienation of voters from mainstream politics. Kitschelt marked (1995) 
that whether new radical right parties fail to adopt a neoliberal profile in economics 
(for instance, because of their legacy with fascism and state-driven economy), they 
risk loosing many potential voters. 
Finally, it is straightforward that institutional features too cannot be discarded, 
in particular electoral systems. Whether or not a new party is able to enter a party 
system depends inter alia on the entry barriers; from a rational choice perspective, 
voters are deterred to “waste” their votes towards new parties when there are 
single-member districts (SMDs) and plurality rule. Hence, the British electoral 
system is the prototype of a big hindrance to ERPs as their potential supporters are, 
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in each district, a minority that, in many instances, cannot succeed in electing their 
preferred candidate. It is often claimed that the more the system is disproportional, 
the more the extreme right parties will have difficulties in winning seats. However, 
district magnitude and electoral formula are not the only feature to consider, and 
Carter (2005) has disproved that PR systems would foster extremism. 
This short section has just delineated some of the most cited and debated 
factors affecting ERPs electoral performances. The aim was to supply an 
introduction with some hints in the wide set of causal mechanisms that have been 
investigated in the literature. A very useful tentative to frame all hypothesis into an 
encompassing scheme was set up by Roger Eatwell33 who collected a large set of 
thesis and drafted a systematic framework dividing demand-side and supply-side 
theories. The former set of explanations refers essentially to macro socio-economic 
changes, whereas the latter pinpoints those political messages reaching voters and 
affecting mass public. The demand-side is precisely at stake in this Chapter and 
will be treated extensively in the next section. 
2. DEMAND SIDE FACTORS 
Initially, the field of investigation can be conveniently divided into two 
branches: a socioeconomic, and a cultural strand. Starting with the former one, 
three majors subsets can be singled out: a) unemployment, inflation and economic 
growth: it has often been argued that high level of unemployment or its sudden rise 
in a given period, the increasing inflation, and the lowering of economic growth, 
altogether they bring about a spreading sentiment of discontent and dissatisfaction, 
with people blaming incumbent political “caste” because of its negative economic 
performances. Therefore, mainstream parties are meant to be harshly criticised as 
responsible for the gloomy economic contingency. These factors are linked to the 
economic protest-vote thesis; b) globalisation is a world-wide phenomenon 
frequently accused to have made competition for scarce resources even more 
strenuous. Therefore, particular segments of the population – e.g., low-skilled 
employees, manual workers, young and less educated people – are negatively 
                                                
33 Hereafter, I refer to the essay written by Roger Eatwell (2003d). 
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affected by this upsurge in competition, so that these social categories are generally 
labelled as “losers of the modernity”, and they would be more vulnerable to 
political appeals coming from EFRPs. Indeed, these parties advocate the need for a 
defence against fluxes of immigrants from non-EU countries, perceived as 
dangerous threats for jobs and houses, and as scroungers of welfare social 
provisions. Moreover, whether immigrants and asylum-seekers are deeply 
concentrated in few areas of the country, perception of insecurity of indigenous 
people precisely in those areas arises, and a radical climate of hostility represents a 
fertile breeding ground for EFRPs. This account can be epitomised by the 
chauvinist closure thesis; c) traditional loyalties of voters to parties have 
increasingly declined yielding a de-alignment of usual patterns of voting. This 
situation is generated by the lessening of religion and major ideologies roles in 
shaping the political arena since after WWII. Hence, the electoral breakthrough of 
EFRPs can be conceived as a consequence of the disorientation of voters losing 
their attachments to traditional mainstream parties. This stance is also known as 
social disintegration thesis. 
Moving the focus towards value-cultural explanations, the internal distinction 
is two-fold: a) one key factor is linked to the so-called new racism (Carter 2005) or, 
alternatively, culturism: following this interpretation, ERPs cannot be simply 
viewed as updaters of classical racism, i.e. white race supremacy, since they would 
promote a newly form of exclusionism built on cultural grounds. On that account, 
they would blame immigrants not on the basis of the colour of the skin, rather they 
stress the irreducible incompatibility between traditions and cultures of indigenous 
people with those of foreigners. In a more general fashion, they are resort to a 
national interpretation that we can call as cultural clash theory; b) a further sensitive 
point relates to the relation between democracy and extremism: on the one hand, 
there is a growing sentiment of disenchantment against democratic regimes unable 
to satisfy expectations of their citizens, while on the other hand extremism would 
be increasingly perceived as more legitimate and as a tool to reproach political 
élites their pending promises. Moreover, extremism is reckoned to be more 
acceptable whether past fascist or nazi regimes are totally absent, or their memory 
is fading away. This could give an insightful account about the claim that EFRPs 
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are representing a new right that is much more electorally successful the more is far 
from the old one. In general, this stance can be labelled as the theory of neo-
legitimate extremism. 
Re-elaborating from Eatwell (2003d), five thesis can be hypothesized: 1) the 
single-issue thesis, i.e. extreme right parties are just a form of backlash against 
immigration in Europe from the 1980s till nowadays. Immigration is not limited to 
people coming from Northern Africa, but also from Eastern Europe when 
communism collapsed and civil war broke out in former Yugoslavia; 2) the protest 
thesis, i.e. extreme right parties are the representatives of 'anti-politics' sentiments, 
in particular they express discontent against mainstream parties. In practise, this can 
be verified by falling turnouts at the polls and declining share of votes of dominant 
parties. Given their 'anti-' stance, extreme right parties are expected not to be able to 
formulate an articulated political platform; 3) the social breakdown thesis: this is 
underpinned on concepts such as anomie, insecurity, and inefficacy. In particular, 
the loss of security is at the roots of opposition to unfamiliar cultures and, 
conversely, support for traditional values. On the same wave, the revival of ethnic-
nationalism is a tool used to foster self-esteem against insecurity, and ethno-
regionalism is seen as a natural barrier against immigration. Moreover, the decline 
of class and religious-based allegiance and voting is producing a de-alignment of 
society leading to the breakdown of traditional partisanship, and this boosts 
furthermore social isolation through a vicious circle; 4) the “mirror” post-
materialist thesis: from this perspective, extreme right parties oppose a reaction to 
post-materialist leftist values of green and libertarian parties about quality of life, 
sexual freedom, and self-expression. Indeed, they put forth an authoritarian 
conception of society, along with moral and traditional values that they claim as 
being threatened; 5) the economic interest thesis: this stance argues that workers, in 
a vulnerable condition when they are exposed to international competition, will be 
more supportive of extreme right parties as they expect these parties to set up 
barriers against globalisation. Hence, extreme right parties are supported by the so-
called “losers” of the globalisation process, and by those who fear economic change 
because of their lack of skills to cope with economic competition. The following 
table provide a theoretical elaboration stemming from what has been said above. 
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Table 3.1. Demand-side factors. 
Side Thesis Factors 
Economic protest-vote 
unemployment  
inflation 
recession 
Chauvinist closure generous welfare states world-wide competitiveness 
Social disintegration 
resentment 
disenchantment 
anomia 
de-alignment of usual voting patterns 
Cultural clash 
extra-European immigration 
xenophobia  
‘alien’ vs. traditional values 
Society 
(Demand) 
Neo-extremism polarisation of voters fascist or nazi historical legacies 
 
Of course, that list of factors does not aim at being exhaustive, since there is a 
great amount of determinants that could be included into analysis. Nevertheless, the 
present chapter points at verifying the explicatory power of a restrained subset with 
peculiar characters. It is useful to remind that the focus is on the relation between 
demand-side factors and ERPs’ electoral performances but, given time and 
resources constraints, it is necessary to opt for a particular point of investigation in 
order to select related explanatory conditions. The present dissertation has certainly 
privileged a value-driven outlook, as showed by the analysis of the GAL/TAN 
dimension in the previous chapter. In a similar vein, a cultural perspective will 
guide the selection of conditions34. Therefore, the attention is pointed at some 
aspects such as traditional values and new life-styles, nativism and hostility towards 
immigrants, xenophobia from both on cultural and economic ground, resentment 
against politicians, and satisfaction with democratic functioning. 
Hence, the adopted framework is a blend of factors mainly belonging to the 
social disintegration and cultural clash thesis as described above. As noted early, 
embracing that perspective narrows the explanation supplied by the present 
analysis. Indeed, economic wealthy (e.g., GDP per Capita) and public spending 
data (e.g., flux of Social Security Expenditures) are as well important and have 
                                                
34 An encompassing description of strategies about the selection of conditions is provided by Amenta 
and Poulsen (1994). An important example where a given perspective is followed in the selection of 
conditions is showed by Ragin (1994). 
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been adopted in other studies (Redding and Viterna 1999). Besides, the socio-
economic account, which was rather fashionable in the 1990s, has recently lost 
attractiveness to a large extent. This stems from the observation that some 
economic index, e.g. GDP growth, is not markedly different across West European 
countries, so that this does not account for divergent electoral consensus for the 
ERPs. On the same wave, the argument is put forth in relation to other indicators 
like inflation or unemployment. On the other side, historical legacy matters in 
affecting politics and public opinion: for instance, in Germany the memory of tragic 
events of WWII is a formidable obstacle to the resurgence of right-wing parties and 
movement, even when they might deny any connection with national-socialism. 
That said, considering some authoritarian legacy would imply to provide a sort of 
ad hoc explanation, whereas the purpose of this comparative study is to sort out one 
or more common patterns able to explain the outcome (i.e., ERPs’ electoral scores). 
Furthermore, as outlined in the previous chapter, ideological tenets of ERPs are 
hostility against so-called ‘alien’ values and libertarian claims, defence of cultural 
and ethnic homogeneity of the nation, expression of resentment against politicians, 
and other issues already mentioned. For these reasons, the political ground is 
‘fertile’ for the emergence of the exclusionist right when those feelings are held by 
a rather consistent percentage of people. For instance, it appears straightforward to 
think of xenophobia as a key condition fostering the establishment of a party giving 
political representation to that sentiment. In other terms, the presence in society of 
certain predispositions and claims from citizens make easier the outcrop and 
electoral success of those parties adopting a coherent ideological profile. It is 
obvious that between society and parties there is a circular and nonstop reciprocal 
influence, though this chapter is interested just in the demand-side, namely, the 
relation from society towards political parties. By consequence, the following 
section will make extensive use of datasets gathering information collected at the 
individual-level in several European countries. 
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3. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
3.1. Social surveys data 
A preliminary remark is needed: briefly stated, the purpose of this chapter is to 
assess the potentiality for each country in terms of electorally successful ERPs. 
Moreover, this potential is supposed to be directly associated to the existence of a 
cultural ‘fertile’ ground at the societal level. Given the framework of current 
analysis, individual-level data are inspected in order to evaluate the potential 
existence of favourable social conditions for ERPs. As the investigation is 
structured around fourteen West European countries — the same set of the previous 
chapter — this section will employ data collected into the European Social Surveys 
(ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008)35. These are multi-country surveys, covering more 
than 30 nation-states, whose first round was fielded in 2002/2003 and the last in 
2008/2009. In comparison to other data source, like the widely known World Value 
Survey36, the ESS appears to be appropriate in terms of both countries covered and 
type of information gathered. Yet, a limitation is still present since ESS first round 
dated 2002 and, therefore, the present investigation is restricted to the first decade 
of the XXIst century. Since ESS data were not available for the 1990s, resorting to 
other data source would have been a viable solution. However, consistency and 
coherence, in the type of data here employed, have been privileged over other 
options. In other words, resorting to the same data source strengthens the 
comparison of cross-time and cross-country results. 
European Social Surveys encompass an extended set of topics and the 
questionnaire comprehends approximately 120 items in each round. Furthermore, 
topics are split into core and rotating modules: the first is the set of questions 
always repeated in the various rounds, while the second are bulk of items embodied 
at intervals. In particular, the 2002 survey comprises a specific ‘D’ module 
constituted by 59 issues listed in the Appendix. Those topics are related to the field 
                                                
35 Henceforth, with reference to: Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway 2002; 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway 2004; Norwegian Social Science Data Services, 
Norway 2006; Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway 2008. 
36 This is another wide known collection of useful data but, unfortunately, it did not included several 
countries that are important here, like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. 
Data and documentation are available on the following site: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. 
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of inquiry here considered, since they try to measure several aspect of the same 
topic, i.e. immigration. Unfortunately, that module was fully gathered only in 2002. 
By consequence, to perform a diachronic comparative analysis, the current 
investigation will focus only on those items within the ‘D’ module that were 
covered also by ESS subsequent rounds. 
Although immigration lies at the heart of ERPs’ political platforms, the point 
of view of this chapter cannot be shrunk exclusively to this perspective. Indeed, in 
accordance to the analytic framework, in the majority of cases ERPs are expected 
to support a cultural posture in defence of traditional values. In particular, they are 
supposed to counter left-libertarian claims by advocating a firm conservative stance 
on social policies like abortion, euthanasia, and gay rights. About the last topic, it is 
important to measure the extent of intolerance nourish by that part of citizens who 
do not agree with new life-style promoted by the spread of gay culture and customs. 
The topic is taken from a cultural point of view, since also a consistent part of the 
Christian democratic electorate may be against gay marriage or adoption, i.e. 
overall called “new rights”, even without not espousing exclusionist right-wing 
values as a whole. Again, the exclusionist-right ground can enlarge easily when the 
percentage of people holding hostility towards gays attitudes grows. 
Furthermore, the emergence of ERPs is from a general crisis of how 
democracy actually works, fostering so-called populist attacks. Indeed, ERPs leader 
are often prone to accuse contemporary democracies such as corrupted regimes and 
closed oligarchies, in defence of privileges and against the “true” will of the people. 
For these reasons, ERPs may increase their consensus when a consistent percentage 
of citizens do not trust at all their politicians and mistrust over politics is thick. In 
this vein, the vote casted for an ERP is potentially driven by resentment, 
disenchantment, and protest. In fact, when democracy is “under indictment”, 
traditional mainstream parties are more accountable and are easily targets of 
protests. This point of view underscores how the crisis of democracy is rebounds on 
the crisis of mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties. 
Having clarified the theoretical background and directions of investigation, 
seven items within European Social Surveys questionnaires are isolated. The 
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hypothesis at stake is: the greatest the items’ score, the greatest ERPs’ electoral 
success. 
Table 3.2. European social surveys’ items. 
2002 2004 2006 2008 
B46: FREEHMS B31: FREEHMS B31: FREEHMS B31: FREEHMS 
D5: IMDFETN B36: IMDFETN B36: IMDFETN B36: IMDFETN 
D27: IMBGECO B38: IMBGECO B38: IMBGECO B38: IMBGECO 
D28: IMUECLT B39: IMUECLT B39: IMUECLT B39: IMUECLT 
D29: IMWBCNT B40: IMWBCNT B40: IMWBCNT B40: IMWBCNT 
B10: TRSTPLT B10: TRSTPLT B10: TRSTPLT B10: TRSTPLT 
B32: STFDEM B32: STFDEM B32: STFDEM B32: STFDEM 
Source: ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008. 
 
The first one is coded as “FREEHMS” and the related question asks 
respondents to express to what extent they agree on the argument that gays and 
lesbians are free to live as they whish and answers range within five modalities37. 
Those who opted for “strongly disagree” are the most relevant for the present 
analysis, since that percentage shows the size of those defending conventional 
habits and life-styles in society. The second item is codes as “IMDFETN” and the 
related question ask respondents whether many or few immigrants of different 
race/ethnic group from majority should be allowed to settle down in the country. 
This is clearly linked to the homogenous conception of society within state 
boundaries. Modalities of answering were four-fold: allow none, a few, some, or 
many. Since the focus is on the more radical exclusionist postures, the percentage 
of respondents who said “none” is extracted. 
From the third to the seventh item, the set of possible answers range from 0 to 
10 and the assumption here is that the cumulative percentage at stake is composed 
of those who opted for 0 and 1. This is a somewhat restrictive choice, though 
motivated by the aim of grasping the more radical fraction within respondents. The 
third item is coded as “IMBGECO” and the related question is whether 
immigration is bad or good for country’s economy. Hence, the item measures a sort 
of “economic xenophobia” fuelled by those people who feel threaten from 
immigrants about job markets competition. The fourth item is coded as 
“IMUECLT” and the related question is whether country’s cultural life is 
                                                
37 These are: strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, strongly agree.  
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undermined or enriched by immigrants. This is the complementary issue to the 
previous one, since it regards the threat of cultural clash. The fifth item is coded as 
“IMWBCNT” and the related question is whether immigrants make country worse 
or better place to live. This is as a sort of summarizing point of view of xenophobia 
in comparison with the two precedent issues. The sixth item is coded as 
“TRSTPLT” and respondents are asked to assess their trust on politicians. This 
issue has to do with faithful in politics and can supply an account about anti-politics 
sentiments and what has been said early about corrupt elites. The seventh and final 
item is STFDEM where the question is how satisfied with the way democracy 
works in country. This topic can grasp those citizens who feel more neglected by 
politics and without enough means to make them heard. In this vein, democracy 
today would be not sufficiently democratic because of the distance between people 
and politicians. 
3.2. The outcome 
The percentage gathered at the polls by ERPs represents the object of 
investigation, i.e. the aim of the present investigation. Indeed, the purpose is trying 
to verify whether a link actually exists between those factors listed in the previous 
section and ERPs electoral scores. In terms of statistical and quantitative analysis, 
the ERPs vote share would be defined as the dependent variable and the societal 
factors as independent variables. The extant inquiry resorts extensively to 
quantitative datasets and descriptive statistical tools, though no regression analysis 
is performed and its framework is outstandingly qualitative and comparative (Ragin 
2008). Thus, a coherent terminology is employed: henceforth, societal factors are 
called as conditions and the objected to be explained is referred to as outcome. As 
early specified, conditions relates to four ESS rounds in the first decade of 21st 
century: in accordance to this, the outcome is measured along the same period of 
time. 
Table 3.3. Classification of countries by electoral of ERPs (2000-2009). 
Country Year Party % % % Mean 
2002 FPÖ 10.0 10.0 
FPÖ 11.0 2006 BZÖ 4.1 15.1 
FPÖ 17.5 
Austria 
2008 BZÖ 10.7 28.2 
17.8 
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2003 VB 16.8 16.8 Belgium/Flanders 2007 VB 17.5 17.5 17.2 
2003 FN 5.3 5.3 Belgium/Wallonia 2007 FN 5.3 5.4 5.4 
2001 DF 12.0 
2001 FP 0.6 12.6 
2005 DF 13.3 13.3 Denmark 
2007 DF 13.9 13.9 
13.3 
2003 SMP/PS 1.6 1.6 Finland 2007 SMP/PS 4.1 4.1 2.9 
2002 FN 11.3 
2002 MNR 1.1 12.4 
2007 FN 4.3 France 
2007 MNR 0.4 4.7 
8.6 
2002 REP 0.6 0.6 
2005 REP 0.6 0.6 Germany 
2009 REP 0.4 0.4 
0.5 
2004 LAOS 2.2 2.2 
2007 LAOS 3.8 3.8 Greece 
2009 LAOS 5.6 5.6 
3.9 
Ireland - - - - - 
2001 AN 12,0 
2001 MSFT 0,4 12,4 
2006 AN 12,3 
2006 MSFT 0,6 12,9 
Italy 
2008 MSFT-LD 2,4 2,4 
9.2 
Netherlands - - - - - 
Portugal - - - - - 
Spain - - - - - 
Sweden - - - - - 
UK - - - - - 
 
Some preliminary remarks have to be put forth. The outcome is quantified in 
terms of electoral scores for the Lower House. This implies that other types of 
elections (Senate, President of the Republic, or local assemblies) are discarded. 
This choice is motivated not just by the aim of increasing comparability between 
data, but also because central governments depend on the confidence stemming 
from the Lower House. Hence, the House of Deputies has a fundamental role in 
affecting policies, while the Senate is frequently elected with different electoral 
systems and its functions are divergent38. However, Presidential elections create 
some drawbacks to the analysis. When considering countries like Austria and 
Finland, the President is directly elected by citizens, though its role is not that 
relevant at the pure political level. The same argument does not hold true for 
                                                
38 A typical example of asymmetric bicameralism is Germany: the Bundestag and Bundesrat plays 
two very different roles in German politics. 
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France: indeed, the Presidential election has become more and more central and can 
be considered as the most important electoral event of French politics. This is due 
to the sharing of powers between the President and the Prime Minister, in addition 
to usual prerogatives that the Chief of the State holds in foreign politics. After the 
recent constitutional reform that has equalised Presidential and legislative terms, 
elections for the Assemblée Nationale resembles more and more to a confirmation 
of the Presidential election results to provide him a coherent majority of MPs in the 
assembly. Yet, for the sake of coherency in comparing different countries, 
Presidential elections cannot be included, though this implies an underestimation of 
the National Front’s strength. In fact, its scores were considerable especially in 
2002 Presidential elections.  
Furthermore, a second point regards Belgium. As already seen before, the 
Kingdom is divided in two separate cases since two party systems actually coexist. 
The exception in represented by the bilingual Region of Brussels and, following 
what outlined by Carter39, it appears opportune to compute party scores considering 
that Flemish parties contest legislative elections presenting their lists in Flemish 
constituencies and in Brussels; the same, mutatis mutandis, for Walloon parties in 
Wallonia and Brussels40. This brought about higher percentages than those 
computed at the federal level, though this solution appears to be more appropriate 
to estimate forces of Belgian parties. 
At the outset, countries can be approximately divided into three groups. The 
first one is composed of five cases where the ERPs have obtained a relevant 
electoral success, i.e. Austria, Flanders, Denmark, France, and Italy. In particular, 
among them, in the first three countries ERPs have a vote share considerably over 
10 per cent.  The second group is composed of countries where ERPs have a 
middle-to-low vote percentage: i.e. in Wallonia, Greece, and Finland. Finally, the 
third groups is made of countries where ERPs are either markedly weak in terms of 
consensus or totally absent from the political arena like in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
                                                
39 See (Carter 2005, 12, note 4). Data are also available on the European Election Database 
(http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/). 
40 Data source can be found in Carter (2005) and in (Neestar). 
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4. DATA EXAMINATION 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
This sub-section provides analytical statistics concerning the seven ESS items 
described above41. The aim is evaluating to what extent the fourteen countries at 
stake are featured by an exclusionist right potential, i.e. a breeding ground where 
ERPs can flourish. The analysis is about the seven mentioned items and, finally, 
some of them are merged to obtain four final conditions, i.e. indexes or independent 
variables.  
The first item is coded as “FREEHMS” by the ESS survey, though henceforth 
it will be referred to simply as traditionalism. An important remark is that the 
current investigation takes into account only the percentage of people that totally 
disagreed with the sentence on gays and lesbians’ freedom to live their life as they 
wish. Altogether, the mean score of traditionalism is equal to 4.31 per cent: this 
implies that, on average, slightly more than four respondents strongly disagree on 
freedom about gays and lesbians’ life-style. The average value appears as rather 
low and its standard deviation amounts to 2.86, thereby dispersion around the mean 
is weak. This represents an important hint that, in practise, traditionalism may not 
be a relevant condition for the purpose of the research42.  Its values range from 0.9 
per cent in the Netherlands (2008) to 12.1 per cent in Greece (2002). The Hellenic 
country holds the highest average equal to 11.27 per cent, while the lowest place in 
the ranking is filled up by Sweden with a mean score of 1.5 per cent. The following 
graphical representation provides each country’s situation. 
                                                
41 The complete list is provided by Table 2.2 that is followed by a detailed description about how 
items are measured in the present inquiry. 
42 Indeed, as a general principle, when the scope of an inquiry is to account for variation of the 
outcome, conditions as well are expected to vary, enabling to discriminate among cases. Moreover, a 
condition with a very limited variance would be closer to a constant and, therefore, it would lose the 
meaning behind its label. In a nutshell, a comparative inquiry, aiming at explaining different 
outcomes, needs diversifying conditions. 
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Figure 3.A. Traditionalism across 14 countries by ESS datasets 
 
The extreme position of Greece is quite unexpected, but its outstanding values 
will be confirmed also by following data. Greece is strongly deviant on 
traditionalism since its score is more than two and a half standard deviations above 
the mean.  Surprisingly, Finland as well is almost one and a half standard 
deviations above the mean and this mainly due to the 2002 high score after which 
the trend has been decreasing. Another relevant point is that, among those countries 
with strongly successful ERPs, only two of them —i.e. Austria and France — 
scored over the mean, while in Greece and Finland ERPs gathered moderate share 
of votes hitherto. Furthermore, the majority of countries scored under the mean, 
with the notable bottom position of Denmark in the ranking and this counters the 
theoretical expectation that traditionalism foster ERPs backing. 
The second item is coded as “IMDFETN” though, henceforth, it will be 
referred to as nativism. As already noted, the investigation takes into account the 
percentage of people that answered “none” when asked how many immigrants of 
different race or ethnic group should be allowed to live in the country. On the 
whole, the mean score of nativism is equal to 12.54 per cent, i.e. more than twelve 
respondents are totally opposing ethnic or racial heterogeneity in society. There are 
two important differences from traditionalism: indeed, nativism registers a sharper 
average and, secondly, its standard deviation is 6.70, greater than that of 
traditionalism. This implies that scores across countries are more dispersed and 
nativism can actually serve better off as a useful condition to discriminate among 
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cases. On average, it is again Greece holding the highest mean equal to 26.37 per 
cent, while the smallest is Sweden for the second time, with a mean of 2.63 per 
cent. About single scores, the lowest percentage is 2.2 per cent in Sweden, while 
the greatest score is in Portugal and equal to 30.1 per cent, both in 2006. 
Figure 3.B. Nativism across 14 countries by ESS datasets. 
 
Some remarks need to be highlighted. Firstly, Greece is again the more distant 
country from the average since its position is more than two standard deviations 
above the mean. Portugal as well is just slightly below. On the opposite side, 
Sweden confirms as the most deviant under the mean and Denmark is anew at the 
end of the ranking. A crucial point is, that, among those countries with successful 
ERPs, only one of them —i.e. Belgium — scored over the mean, while the majority 
of cases scored above the mean. Moreover, Portugal, United Kingdom, and Spain 
are above the average, though ERPs are practically absent from the political arena. 
Summing up, nativism is more able to discriminate between countries since its 
standard deviation is rather consistent; on the other hand, falling short of 
expectations, countries with successful ERPs scored low on this condition. 
That said, the focus is then shifted on three items that are connected to the 
concept of xenophobia. The first one of them is coded as “IMBGECO” and 
respondents were asked to rank in a range from 0 to 10 (i.e., corresponding to “very 
bad” and “very good” options) the impact of immigration on country’s economy. 
As previously stated, the present inquiry considers only the cumulative percentage 
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of 0 and 1 scores. On the whole, the mean score is 8.88 per cent and its standard 
deviation is 4.88. The highest score is that of Greece equal to 27.6 per cent, whilst 
the lowest is that of Spain equal to 3.6 per cent, both in 2002. On average, Greece 
has the greatest mean of 24.6 per cent, whereas Italy has the smallest score equal to 
5.1 per cent.  
Figure 3.C. IMBGECO item across 14 countries by ESS datasets. 
 
The second is coded as “IMUECLT” and respondents were asked to rank in a 
range from 0 to 10 (i.e., corresponding to “undermined” and “enriched” options) 
the impact of immigration on country’s culture. Again, the present inquiry 
considers only the cumulative percentage of 0 and 1 scores. On the whole, the mean 
score is 6.53 per cent and standard deviation is 5.62. The highest score is that of 
Greece equal to 27.8 per cent in 2008, whilst the lowest is that of Finland equal to 
1.1 per cent in both 2002 and 2008. On average, Greece has the greatest mean of 25 
per cent, whereas Finland has the smallest one equal to 1.38 per cent. 
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Figure 3.D. IMUECLT item across 14 countries by ESS datasets. 
 
The third and last one is coded as “IMWBCNT” and respondents were asked to 
rank in a range from 0 to 10 (i.e., corresponding to “worse” and “better” options) 
the impact of immigration on country making a worse or better place to live in. 
Once again, the current inquiry considers only the cumulative percentage of 0 and 1 
scores. On the whole, the mean score is 8.41 per cent and standard deviation is 
5.58. The highest score is that of Greece equal to 28.4 per cent, whilst the lowest is 
that of Sweden equal to 2.1 per cent, both in 2008. On average, Greece has the 
greatest mean of 26.5 per cent, whereas Sweden has the smallest score equal to 2.85 
per cent. 
Figure 3.E. IMWBCNT item across 14 countries by ESS datasets. 
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The last three items refers essentially to as many facets of xenophobia, as 
demonstrated by the high and statistical significant degree of correlation among 
them. 
Table 3.4. Correlation coefficients among three ESS items. 
 IMBGECO IMUECLT IMWBCNT 
IMBGECO 1 - - 
IMUECLT 0.917** 1 - 
IMWBCNT 0.920** 0,956** 1 
**: Statistical significance at the level of 0.01 (2-tails). 
Source: ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008. 
 
For these reasons, they can be merged into one encompassing index measuring 
the percentage of people supporting xenophobic views43. The new xenophobia 
index amounts, for each country, to the average of the three previous items’ scores. 
The overall mean score is 8.18 per cent and standard deviation is equal to 5.46. 
Through a closer examination of single cases, Greece is a strong outliner since its 
score its more than three standard deviations over the mean. On the whole, five 
countries have a score above the mean and two of them — i.e., United Kingdom 
and Portugal — have no relevant ERPs. 
Figure 3.F. Xenophobia across 14 countries by ESS datasets. 
 
                                                
43 Following Lijphart (1971, 687), the property-space is conveniently reduced when two or more 
variables are related to a similar underlying concept or feature. 
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Finally, the sixth and seventh items are connected to resentment. The first one 
is coded as “TRSTPLT” and respondents were asked to rank their trust in 
politicians from 0 to 10 (respectively, “not trust at all” and “complete trust”). In 
accordance to the same logic employed before, the present inquiry considers only 
the cumulative percentage of 0 and 1 scores. On the whole, the mean score is 17.73 
per cent and standard deviation is 10.13. The latter is the largest value across the 
entire analysis and this highlights that trust in politicians is very different across 
countries. Indeed, the highest score is that of Portugal equal to 45.9 per cent, whilst 
the lowest is that of Denmark equal to 3.1 per cent, both in 2004. On average, 
Portugal has the greatest mean of 38.05 per cent, whereas Denmark has the smallest 
one equal to 3.58 per cent. 
Figure 3.G. TRSTPLT item across 14 countries by ESS datasets. 
 
The second one is coded as “STFDEM” and respondents were asked to rank 
their trust in politicians from zero to ten, correspondent to “extremely dissatisfied” 
and “extremely satisfied” respectively. In analogy of what has been done so far, the 
inquiry considers only the cumulative percentage of 0 and 1 scores. On the whole, 
the mean score is 5.67 per cent and its standard deviation is 4.18. The highest score 
is registered by Portugal equal to 20.8 per cent, whilst the lowest is that of Denmark 
equal to 0.8 per cent, both in 2004. On average, Portugal has the greatest mean of 
13.63 per cent, whereas Denmark has the smallest score equal to 1.08 per cent. 
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Figure 3.H. STFDEM item across 14 countries by ESS datasets. 
 
The statistical correlation between the two items is positive and significant at 
the level of 0.01 (2-tails), and equal to 0.799. Therefore, they can be merged into 
one encompassing index measuring the percentage of people moved by resentment, 
dissatisfaction, and mistrust towards politics. The new index is briefly labelled as 
resentment and is equal, for each country, to the average score of the two 
components. The overall mean score amounts to 11.70 per cent and standard 
deviation is 6.85. The highest score is registered by Portugal amounting to 33.4 per 
cent, whilst the lowest is that of Denmark equal to 2.0 per cent, both in 2004. On 
average, Portugal has the greatest mean of 25.84 per cent, whereas Denmark has 
the smallest score equal to 2.33 per cent. Again, Portugal has a score more than two 
standard deviations above the mean and, in general, this is the first instance where a 
plurality of countries has a greater score than the average. 
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Figure 3.I. Resentment across 14 countries by ESS datasets. 
 
Summary statistics about the four main items are summed up in the following 
table: 
Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics about the four main ESS items. 
Item Min Max Mean Std.dev. 
Traditionalism 1.50 11.27 4.38 2.74 
Nativism 2.63 26.37 12.53 6.56 
Xenophobia 3.41 25.37 8.19 5.46 
Resentment 2.33 25.84 12.02 6.38 
 
4.2. Comparative analysis 
On the basis of descriptive statistics presented above, the relation between ESS 
items scores and ERPs electoral support does not appear to be strong and, therefore, 
the hypothesis stated before (see §3.3.1) did not receive a solid confirmation. 
Assuming Greece as an example, the Hellenic extreme deviant position is rather 
unexpected since the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) was a recently established 
political actor with a moderate support at the polls hitherto. Instead, drawing from 
statistics data, Greece should have a massively successful ERP. Given the four 
main items issued from the previous subsection, they can be merged into a unifying 
measure to estimate the demand-side potential of each country, accounting for the 
“fertile ground” fostering exclusionist right prosperity. The new demand-side 
potential can be simply obtained by calculating the average of four indexes — 
traditionalism, nativism, xenophobia, and resentment — for each country. Results 
are represented through a bar chart diagram as follows: 
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Figure 3.J. Demand potential in fourteen countries. 
 
As showed, only five countries are over the mean (i.e., 9.3 per cent) and, in 
particular, two of them — i.e., Portugal and the United Kingdom — have no 
electorally successful ERPs. Although the UK has the same average score of 
France, the strength of the French National Front is greatly higher than any radical 
right-wing party in the UK, even referring to actors like the British National Party 
that were not taken into account by precedent expert surveys. Furthermore, among 
cases with electorally strong ERPs, only France and Austria are above the average, 
whereas Belgium and Italy are slightly below. However, these four countries show 
a very similar demand-side potential around the mean. On the other hand, the most 
unexpected position is that of Denmark where, despite the notable electoral strength 
of the Danish People’s Party (DF) and Progress Party (FP), demand-side factors 
occur in a very weak manner. This was manifest since Denmark has always had 
scores below the mean when dealing with ESS items, in particular on resentment 
where Danes interviewed showed a great confidence in politicians and satisfaction 
about how democracy works. 
For better representing the relation between electoral performances and 
demand-side potential, percentage values of both measures can be standardised and 
plotted in a diagram as follows: 
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Figure 3.K. Plot diagram about electoral strength and demand potential. 
 
Whether the two measures were positively correlated then cases would be 
closer to a diagonal cutting across the first and third quadrant. In other words, 
whether data confirmed theoretical expectations, cases would fill up the top-right 
and bottom-left quadrants. Yet, plots’ positions in the diagram do not confirm that 
situation. It should be noted that the outcome is more able to differentiate among 
cases than demand-side potential does: indeed, standard deviation for electoral 
strength is equal to 6.07 and for demand-side potential is 4.57. Moreover, 
concerning those five cases with strongly successful ERPs, only Austria and France 
are in the expected quadrant (I), while Belgium and Italy are in the second one (II), 
although very close to the borderline. The more unexpected position is held by 
Denmark whose coordinates are: more than one standard deviation above the mean 
about electoral strength, but more than one standard deviation below the mean 
about demand potential. Thus, Denmark falsifies theoretical expectations. Thirdly, 
the True Finns (PS) in Finland and the LAOS in Greece have gathered a moderate 
success, but in the second case Greece has the highest potential for exclusionist 
right prosperity. Fourthly, the third quadrant (III) is full of countries whose ERPs 
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are actually electorally irrelevant: Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and 
Sweden. However, the position of the United Kingdom and, in particular, that of 
Portugal is troublesome. Especially in the last instance, Portugal has not displayed 
any relevant ERP hitherto, though its demand-side potential is the second strongest 
in the ranking, just below the Greek one. Briefly, the explanatory power of 
demand-side factors appears to be rather unsatisfying. 
To make comparison extensively detailed and rigorous, Boolean algebra and 
crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) are appropriate tools (Ragin 
1987; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). These allow a cross-country comparison through 
ESS items single scores and also the entire bulk of cases can be grouped on the 
basis of common configurations of conditions. QCA terminology calls this process 
as the construction of the truth table. Given that this analysis is based on 
dichotomous values, the number of different possible combinations of conditions is 
equal to 2k, where k is the number of conditions. In the present situation, since k is 
equal to 4, then the number of different possible combinations of conditions is 16. 
However, a major limitation of QCA is the so-called limited diversity, i.e. the 
number of real instances is too small than the number of conditions included in the 
investigation. Since the present analysis is dealing with 14 cases, then 4 conditions 
leading to 16 configurations are over-abundant and the risk is to “individualise” 
each case with a particular combination of conditions. On the contrary, one of the 
basic goals of QCA is to single out groups of cases featured by the same 
combination of conditions and limits the amount of logical remainders, i.e. logical 
combinations of conditions lacking any corresponding observed case. This is the 
reason why it appears opportune to drop one condition, since the relation between 
14 cases and 3 conditions becomes more balanced. Descriptive statistics reported 
early (see Table 2.5) has already displayed that traditionalism has the lower 
standard deviation, so that that item is less able than the others in discriminating 
between cases. For these reasons, traditionalism is put aside and the following 
analysis will be underpinned on three causal conditions. 
Boolean algebra is based on dichotomisation of values into 0-1 binary codes. 
One of the biggest hindrance of csQCA is fixing thresholds to dichotomise data. 
The best solution is anchoring this process to qualitative thresholds, so that 
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justifying binary codes on the ground of substantive knowledge. When this is not 
possible due to the lack of aprioristic theoretical thresholds, it is possible to revolve 
dichotomisation on some statistical data like the arithmetic mean or median of the 
distribution (Ragin 2000, 2008). Since the present analysis lacks of any solid 
qualitative anchor, it appears appropriate to consider primarily the arithmetic mean 
of raw scores —and also the median when necessary — for each condition in order 
to assign binary values to each case. 
Starting with the electoral outcome across these 14 West European countries44 
here at stakes, the mean of ERPs vote percentages is 4.82 and the median is 1.7 
(i.e., the mean score of Finland and Germany). Two cases are particularly 
cumbersome, namely, Greece and Finland for which the ERPs electoral success has 
been classified as “moderate”. The setting of an electoral threshold beyond which a 
case is given a positive outcome [1] is a choice that can vary among different 
studies, e.g. Veugelers and Magnan (2005) opted for 3 per cent mean percentage, 
Redding and Viterna (1999) chose 4 per cent45, and Kitschelt(1995) opted for a 
double threshold of 2 and 6 per cent. In the present research, the cut-off point has 
been set at 5 per cent and this is underpinned by two main reasons. Firstly, the main 
drawback of binary values is that they prevent from grading values of conditions, 
hence cases that on a middle ground creates criticisms; therefore, it is better to be 
prudent in attributing a positive outcome [1]. Secondly, the 5 per cent is the highest 
legal46 threshold to gain representatives in Western Europe: this is obviously the 
case of the German Bundestag. 
Passing to the first condition, nativism has mean of 12.53 and a median of 
10.715 (i.e., the mean score of Germany and Austria). Yet, two outliers —i.e., 
Greece and Portugal — strongly affect the mean value of this condition: indeed, by 
excluding those two cases, the mean drops to 10.23. Thus, a value of 11.50 as a 
threshold appears congruous. Secondly, xenophobia has a mean of 8.19 and a 
                                                
44 The previous Table 2.3 has already provided a full description. An important difference is that 
Flanders and Wallonia are not considered individually anymore, so that the outcome of Belgium 
stems from the arithmetic mean of Flemish and Walloon electoral scores. This change was forced by 
European Social Survey data that do not distinguish between Flanders and Wallonia. 
45 As two authors specified, a party that «crosses that threshold at least once during the 1980s or the 
1990s is counted as a significant party for that decade» (Redding and Viterna 1999, 495). 
46 On the other hand, effective rather than legal thresholds will be considered in the next chapter. 
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median of 7.09 (i.e., the mean score of Germany and Italy). In this situation as well, 
Greece is an outliner and without it the mean drops to 6.87. Thus, a value of 7 as a 
threshold appears correct. Thirdly, resentment has a mean of 12.02 and a median of 
13.53 (i.e., the mean scores of UK and Spain). In this situation, Portugal is an 
outlier and the mean, without it, drops to 10.96. Thus, a value of 11 as a threshold 
appears congruous. 
Table 3.6. From ESS scores to binary values. 
Country Out_raw OUTCOME Nativ_raw NATIV Xeno_raw XENO Resent_raw RESENT 
Austria 17.80 1 10.70 0 8.88 1 14.07 1 
Belgium 11.30 1 15.05 1 7.86 1 9.15 0 
Denmark 13.30 1 7.98 0 5.48 0 2.33 0 
Finland 2.90 0 9.65 0 3.41 0 4.55 0 
France 8.60 1 11.13 0 10.23 1 14.84 1 
Germany 0.50 0 10.73 0 7.12 1 13.81 1 
Greece 3.90 0 26.37 1 25.37 1 20.03 1 
Ireland 0.00 0 8.17 0 6.23 0 12.23 1 
Italy 9.20 1 9.70 0 7.07 1 13.85 1 
Netherlands 0 0 10.03 0 4.78 0 4.38 0 
Portugal 0 0 26.28 1 8.47 1 25.84 1 
Spain 0 0 12.70 1 5.05 0 13.43 1 
Sweden 0 0 2.63 0 3.54 0 6.14 0 
UK 0 0 14.28 1 11.17 1 13.63 1 
         
threshold 5.00  11.50  7.00  11.00  
 
A first important step in the analysis is the search for necessary conditions. The 
general rule is that a given condition c is necessary if c is always present [1] when 
the outcome is present [1] (Caramani 2009). With reference to table above, when 
OUTCOME is present, correspondingly, the value of a given condition as well 
must be present [1] in all its instances in order to be necessary. It is easy to remark 
that this does not hold true for any condition, thus on the whole no necessary 
condition is present. However, XENO is condition that, more than all others, is 
close to be a necessary condition since this does not hold true only for Denmark. In 
fact, the Nordic country is the only one that, despite OUTCOME is present [1], the 
condition XENO is absent [0]. On the other side, for Austria, Belgium, France, and 
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Italy, it is true that OUTCOME 47 XENO. Since the number of possible 
combinations of conditions is equal to 23=8, the truth table is as follows: 
Table 3.7. Three-condition truth table. 
NATIV XENO RESENT OUTCOME Country 
0 1 1 C Austria, France, Germany, Italy 
1 1 0 1 Belgium 
0 0 0 C Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden 
1 1 1 0 Greece, Portugal, UK 
0 0 1 0 Ireland 
1 0 1 0 Spain 
 
Limited diversity is restricted since, among 8 possible configurations, actually 
six of them are at least associated with a real instance and logical remainders are 
only two. Unfortunately, contradictory configurations are present. In the first line of 
the truth table, contradiction is due to the presence of Germany with Austria, 
France, and Italy. As mentioned before, the outcome of Germany is absent [0] 
contrary to the other three cases where is present [1]. This is hardly surprising when 
considering that Italy and Germany, along all four ESS items, displayed very 
proximate values. Checking also the precedent plot diagram (see Figure 2.K), the 
demand-side potential of those four countries was very similar around the mean. 
The third line of the table above represents another contradictory configuration: in 
this case, vice versa, contradiction is due to the [1] outcome of Denmark, whereas 
for all other cases the outcome is absent [0]. The Danish anomaly is already been 
talked about early, since its demand-side potential was markedly lower than Danish 
People’s Party electoral fortunes. The fourth line of the truth table confirms the 
weakness of the output here at stake: Greece, Portugal, and UK do not have a 
contradictory outcome, though, all conditions are present [1] and the outcome is 
absent [0]. This situation is rather unexpected and counters the framework of 
analysis, since conditions are measured in a manner that the more are present, the 
more the outcome should be stronger. In that case, the presence of three conditions 
is associated with an absence of the outcome and this is contrast with what can be 
drawn from theoretical explanations (see Table 2.1). 
                                                
47 That symbol has to be understood in terms of “implication”. Hence, OUTCOME=1 implies 
XENO=1 in four instances. 
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In the light of those critical points, it does not appear that useful to go on 
further to calculate the minimal formula, i.e. a Boolean expression summarising all 
combinations of INUS48 conditions linked to the outcome. Instead, in the tentative 
of solving contradictions, they will be reconsidered in the final chapter together 
with supply side factors. Thus, complexity can here be represented through the 
following Venn diagram: 
Figure 3.L. Venn diagram with 3 conditions. 
 
Note: Venn diagram produced by Tosmana 1.3.2 software (Cronqvist 2011). 
Abbreviations: AUS: Austria, BEL: Belgium, DEN: Denmark, FIN: Finland, FRA: France, GER: 
Germany, GRE: Greece, IRE: Ireland, ITA: Italy, NET: Netherlands, PO: Portugal, SPA: Spain, 
SWE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
From a societal point of view, there are facets considered such as potential 
favourable conditions for the development and electoral success of ERPs. The 
assessment of the fertile ground for ERPs lies at the heart of this chapter. The 
                                                
48 The acronym stands for: an insufficient though not redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient 
condition for the outcome (JL Mackie 1974). 
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analysis carried out above supplied useful information to draw some conclusions 
about the topic. Firstly, demand side factors are rather weak in explaining 
differences among ERPs electoral support. Moreover, a common path able to 
account for the positive or negative outcome did not emerge. These setbacks are 
due to two main reasons: either the research focused on “wrong” factors, i.e. items 
that actually are not causally connected to the outcome, or have incorrectly been 
brought into account. Secondly, a necessary conditions for the outcome to occur is 
not present; only xenophobia come close to that status since it is a quasi-necessary 
condition — except for Denmark — and this represents one of the most important 
findings. Concerning single countries, a tricky case is again Denmark because, 
although the electoral performance of the Danish People’s party is sizeable, related 
scores on causal conditions are low-lying. The argument is reversed for Greece, 
Portugal, and the United Kingdom:  the first two countries especially hold a thick 
potential and this has been realized only in the Hellenic case where the LAOS 
gathered increasing vote percentages in the last three legislative elections. 
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IV. SUPPLY SIDE FACTORS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As outlined early, since the beginning of the 1990s many researches49 lavished 
a lot of efforts in the tentative of providing explanations about electoral change and 
the rise of parties belonging to the area of right-wing radicalism. However, it is still 
on the ground the reconstruction of a cross-European pattern encompassing that 
phenomenon. This chapter will analyse supply-side factors and focus not only on 
ERPs, but also on party systems as a whole. Indeed, one of the main goals is 
investigating party system changes in the last twenty years50. In particular, the 
current chapter is interested in examining party competition together with a key 
institutional setting — the electoral system — in relation to the outcome, i.e. ERPs 
electoral performances. The investigation has adopted a descriptive perspective and 
is underpinned on the amount of survey data that have been collected especially in 
the last three decades. Certainly, dimensions of party competition hold different 
relevance, varying across countries. Yet, for the sake of parsimony in comparison 
(Lijphart 1971), two topics have been chosen for their overall importance, i.e. 
economy and immigration. The former is about the distributional conflict that has 
been the crucial ground of political struggle, all along the post-WWII party 
competition, and has forged the voting framework of large portions of West 
European electorates. The latter one is an emerging issue, though its importance has 
grown up to being explicitly included by Benoit and Laver expert surveys (2005). 
Indeed, the two scholars showed that immigration holds the third position in the 
ranking of more salient issues in European party systems51. 
                                                
49 See: Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Betz 1993; Harris 1994; Baumgartl 1995; Kitschelt 1995; 
Betz and Immerfall 1998 
50 Namely, the time period 1990-2009. 
51 In particular, immigration shares the third position with the “EU collective security” dimension. 
Moreover, it is the most relevant dimension in seven countries: Belgium, Finland, Greece, Iceland, 
Norway, Spain, and Sweden (Benoit and Laver 2006, 173). 
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Thus, once all data are systematically organized, the focus will be committed 
to party competition. This perspective is coherent with a party-oriented 
investigation where the focus is on parties and their reciprocal interactions. Perhaps 
because of complexity due to the presence of multiple causal factors, 
competitiveness among parties and their strategies — in terms of spatial positions 
and movements — is an aspect that did not received great attention, with few 
exception like Carter (2005). Therefore, this strengthens the necessity of 
elaborating on this point of view. The purpose is to verify whether some common 
configurations of conditions exist in those party systems where ERPs reached 
significant electoral scores, whereas in others they completely failed or gained only 
moderate-to-low results. 
The next section will take into examination several supply-side factors that the 
literature singled out as affecting party performances. The third section will deal 
with methodological issues related to data and pattern of analysis. The fourth 
section will define the outcome to be explained and the fifth will present an 
extended country-by-country investigation. Finally, the last section will try to 
define an encompassing framework to highlight common configuration of 
conditions across all cases here at stakes. 
2. SUPPLY SIDE FACTORS 
The main argument here is about the political opportunity structure52, in which 
several factors play a central role: a) the electoral system is rated as one of the 
major elements shaping the results of electoral competition through its 
psychological and mechanical effects (Duverger 1958). In a nutshell, the electoral 
system affects the way citizens cast ballots and the distribution of seats among 
parties. Starting from these assumptions, scholars who tried to evaluate electoral 
system effects, when considering right-wing extremism, obtained highly 
controversial and unexpected outcomes (Carter 2002, Carter 2005). Whether, on the 
one hand, it has been often argued that PR formula booster extremism along with 
the emergence of new challengers, on the other hand, recent analysis deny this 
                                                
52 Major researches in this field are: Abedi 2002; Carter 2002; Golder 2003; Carter 2005; Meguid 
2005; Norris 2005; Arzheimer 2009. 
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connection, even though all results seem strongly affected by the way in which 
variables are operationalized (Kitschelt 2007). State funding and media access are a 
couple of elements that are equally central in explaining ERPs success, since 
financial autonomy and access to modern mass media are crucial. In general, these 
claims are enclosed in the electoral system thesis; b) an uppermost explanation is 
built on the spatial representation of politics. By considering expert surveys, 
different scenarios can be analysed by focusing on the spatial location of parties on 
a given dimension like the overarching left-right axis. That said, the spotlight could 
be turned to: the position of the ERP, the position of the largest mainstream 
conservative party, and the distance between them. In addition to this, the 
programmatic convergence between the two mainstream parties of the centre-left 
and centre-right is blamed to be responsible for the shifting of voters towards the 
extreme right to search for a concrete alternative. Furthermore, everything outlined 
above can be re-analysed by taking into account the left-right positions of parties 
along the “Taxes vs. Spending” dimension, i.e. checking for the location of parties 
in the economic domain. These factors are covered by the spatial structure thesis. c) 
the silent counter-revolution (Ignazi 1992) claimed that the emergence of radical 
right-wing parties represents a backlash to counter the rise of green and left-
libertarian alternative parties on the opposite side. Therefore, comparing electoral 
scores of ecology parties and ERPs can unveil important insights53. Likewise, 
matching the ERPs electoral support vis-à-vis that of the radical and neo-
communist left can provide new findings, since one can check whether the 
prosperity of one of the two sides prevents the other to grow, since both might 
appeal, at least partially, to the same pool of disgruntled voters through a populist 
propaganda. Moreover, this represents an indirect test of the supposed abandon of 
leftist parties by manual and low-skilled workers in favour of the opposite wing of 
the political spectrum. A third crucial aspect can be the strategy adopted by the 
mainstream centre-left party: this political force could try to weaken its mainstream 
                                                
53 That argument will not be treated in the following sections. Yet, by considering only two 
examples, France and Germany are not in line with that thesis: in the former case, the National Front 
is a strong ERP, whilst the electoral performances of the Greens were much lower; on the other 
hand, the German Grünen gathered important results in the 1998 and 2002 general elections and 
entered governments with the social democrats, whereas The Republicans and the German People’s 
Union performed poorly at the polls. 
 103 
centre-right counterpart by adopting an adversarial position than that assumed by 
the ERP, thereby raising its political importance and, indirectly, shifting 
conservative voters towards more radical rightist stances. This divide et impera 
strategy would allow the mainstream centre-left party to split the right-wing side of 
the political spectrum, so as to increase its relative power. That said, these claims 
are referred to as the thesis of mirror sides. d) one additional aspect that, hitherto, 
has not been duly taken into consideration is the territorial organisation of state 
powers within its boundaries, namely, federalism and local assemblies. The key 
point is linked to a crucial feature of the ideology fostered by ERPs, that generally 
strengthen the importance of traditional culture, especially local values and 
symbols; likewise, given what has been said above about the higher density of 
immigrants in some portions of the territory, it seems plausible to imagine the rise 
of these political forces precisely in those areas where citizens feel more threatened. 
In addition to this, elections to local assemblies can be a starting benchmark for 
newcomers that can take profit of local electoral systems that are usually more 
representative, i.e. providing minor barriers to win seats. This interpretation can be 
labelled as the thesis of local extremism. e) one further factor to be considered is 
the strategy applied by mainstream parties towards ERPs. An a priori discernment 
has to be done in relation to the electoral and political importance eventually 
reached by extremist parties, since it is quite straightforward that an ERP holding a 
marginal status is rather different than an ERP party that had eventually overcome 
the so-called threshold of relevance. That said, the strategy of mainstream parties, 
either at a local or national level, can play a notable effect whether they opt for 
including ERPs into the executives or chose to exclude them by a cordon sanitaire. 
These arguments are endorsed by the pariah party thesis. 
Furthermore, always with concerns to the supply side, a two-fold set of 
interpretations lays on party organisation and policy platforms: a) as widely 
underlined, party organisation still holds a pre-eminent role, since well-organised 
and well-led parties (Carter 2005) seem able to perform better at the polls than, 
conversely, parties with a loose internal organisation and a weak leadership. The 
substantial element is that of charisma, even though the argument risks to be a 
circular one as it can be easily argued that charisma is attributed to parties that are 
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electorally successful. However, the charismatic factor is salient since it is strictly 
linked to the typical populist style and ideology of ERPs, in the way that the leader 
is the defender of the true will of the people, i.e. the personification of the ordinary 
man's wisdom. Summing up, this is the populist leadership theory. b) the political 
platform elaborated by ERPs, namely, their policy positions, is necessarily another 
factor able to affect their electoral fortunes. This kind of analysis holds some 
analogies with that conducted about the spatial location of parties, in that it puts 
forth a comparison between ERPs and the largest mainstream conservative party on 
some critical policy, i.e. the salience put on crime, the positive emphasis on the 
national way of life, the negative stance on multiculturalism, the pursued degree of 
integration in the European Union. Finally, this represents the policy platform 
theory. 
Returning back to Eatwell (2003d), the scholar analyses a second bunch of 
theories based on supply-side factors. A re-elaboration of his arguments is 
presented as follows: 1) the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) theory: in this 
case, several party and institutional aspects are brought into consideration. Starting 
with the spatial locations of political parties, it is argued that the more mainstream 
parties are close to the centre of the political spectrum, the more extreme right 
parties can exploit the uncovered issues on the rightist side. In addition to this, three 
more elements are investigated: the more mainstream parties adopt issues usually 
belonging the extreme right side, the more extreme right parties are legitimised; 
secondly, proportional electoral systems generally promotes the entry of new 
parties in the political arena; thirdly, federalism and local elections fosters localism 
and, by this way, the potential outbreak of extreme right parties; 2) the 
mediatisation thesis: the argument is that contemporary mass media stress the role 
of leadership and focus strongly on charismatic personality, therefore politicians 
with skills in communication can take advantage and spreading their image and 
ideas. This could explain why extreme right parties generally rely on charming 
leaders. Furthermore, mass media are involved in promotion versus de-
legitimisation of issues and parties; 3) the national tradition thesis: the more 
extreme right parties claim to represent the authentic legacy with national tradition 
and customs, the more they are legitimised as the “true” defenders of the people. As 
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already said, social change and “new values” are perceived as threats to national 
tradition; 4) the programmatic thesis: the extreme right parties' electoral 
campaigning is often issue-driven and those parties show a peculiar ability in 
picking up issues which, though usually discarded by mainstream parties, are of 
major concern of people. In this vein, populism is directly linked to their skill in 
portraying themselves as the authentic democrats and supporters of people’s will; 
5) the charismatic leader thesis: this brings a major concern on the supposed 
decline of party democracy, in favour of a leadership-driven politics where leaders 
would be the crucial factor in attracting voters. A particular implication is 
insightful: the leader can implement of sort of “proxy control”, in fact the more s/he 
is constantly in touch with the masses, the more people have the impression that 
s/he could be influenced by their votes. Therefore, this could create an impression 
of direct democracy through the mediation of the leader. 
Given the large amount of factors that can be assumed as drivers in favour of 
ERPs electoral fortunes, these can be summed up in the following table: 
Table 4.1. Supply-side factors. 
Side Thesis Factors 
Electoral system 
PR-formula  
generous state funding 
free media access  
Party spatial location 
 
strategic entry of ERPs 
convergence of MRP54 and MLP55  
extent of distance between MRP and ERP 
Local extremism powerful local assemblies 
Mirror sides electoral success of GAL
56 parties 
adversarial position assumed by the MLP 
Pariah parties cordon sanitaire against ERPs 
Leadership charismatic leadership  close-knit internal organisation 
Institutions and  
political parties 
(Supply) 
Policy platform 
Euro-scepticism  
law&order  
cultural and economic protectionism 
centrist economic position 
                                                
54 The acronym stands for: Mainstream Rightist Party. 
55 The acronym stands for: Mainstream Leftist Party. 
56 This is the acronym for Green, Alternative, Libertarian (parties). 
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3. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
3.1. Data 
To represent party positions along a given domain, different alternatives are 
available like elite studies, textual analysis of party programs or mass judgments, 
though the preferred option has been expert surveys. The motivation for this choice 
is due to the rather considerable amount of information collected by different 
scholars. Surely, the Manifesto Research Project could have been another 
importance source of data, though expert judgements hold two major strength 
points: they are legitimated by experts knowledge and confidence with proper 
features of their party system of reference and, moreover, these surveys generally 
include a significant amount of small parties that are generally dismissed by the 
Manifesto Research Group. 
That said, the chapter resorts to different expert surveys with the aim of tracing 
the position of political parties along the longest lifespan possible, starting from the 
1990s, hence after the end of the Cold War. The most serious obstacle is the 
divergent structure of surveys collected by different groups of scholars, thus it is 
necessary to reorganize data to make them comparable in a consistent way. The 
first hindrance is represented by the question that respondents are expected to 
answer with regards to party stance: in other terms, it is fundamental to make sure 
that party stances that are measured relates to the same dimension or, at least, 
referred to interrelated concepts. Therefore, assessments referred to each 
dimensions separately. Starting with the economic domain, Laver and Hunt (1992) 
and its successor Benoit and Laver (2006) surveys treat the economic dimension 
exactly in the same way, hence data are perfectly comparable. The division of 
parties between pro-state and pro-market views are assessed also by Chapel Hill’s 
expert surveys (Steenbergen and Marks 2007) and even though the question asked 
to expert is not exactly the same, the content is surely comparable since it greatly 
overlaps. Moreover, data are temporally intertwined since the first Chapel Hill 
survey was collected between Laver-Hunt and Benoit-Laver surveys. The argument 
is more complicated with regards to immigration since data were not easily find out 
as the topic has become politically relevant only recently, therefore it was not 
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included in the Laver-Hunt study (1992). Thus, data collected by Lubbers (2000) 
played a central role: in his study a great bulk of European political parties are 
assessed, concerning their stances on immigration in 1990 and 2000. These data 
have represented a very useful starting point since they allowed investigating party 
movements during the last decade of the XXth, whilst data collected by Benoit and 
Laver (2006) were gathered mainly in 2003. Unfortunately, question asked to 
respondents is not exactly the same as the two authors conceived immigration as 
dimension on which parties where located concerning their views on the 
repatriation in the country of origin versus the integration in the host society of 
immigrants. Despite the awareness of this difference, one cannot deny that parties 
that are in favour of repatriation hold as well a restrictive view on immigration and 
vice versa. Taking into account the two different questions, but the high likely 
correlation between the two dimensions, Benoit and Laver data represent the third 
source of data, while the fourth one is given again by Chapel Hill’s expert surveys 
that only in 2006 included a specific dimension regarding the support versus the 
contrast of tough policies on immigration. Here again, the assumption is that a party 
holding a restrictive conception on immigration will be in favour of repatriation of 
immigrants and will uphold tough policies in that domain too (and vice versa).  
A second, though notable, point is related to make data comparable, since 
dimensions in the surveys are constructed along different rankings: i.e., value range 
can vary from zero to ten or from one to twenty. Therefore, an indispensable step is 
the normalization of data thereby scores can be compared among them. To reach 
that aim, the normalization formula57 is appropriate and all raw scores will be 
transformed into values varying from 0 to 1. Afterwards, spatial location of 
political actors can be easily plotted, for each single dimension separately, through 
a graphical representation where four horizontal axes constitutes the four surveys 
and are presented from the oldest (at the top) to most recent (at the bottom) in terms 
of periods of time. A line passing from all party locations emphasizes the pattern of 
each party about its stances on economy and immigration and this graphical tool 
make clearer party swings through time. Since the main object of analysis is given 
                                                
57 As reported by Carter (2005, 143) in the note 11 of the fourth chapter: «(score – minimum 
possible score) / (maximum possible score – minimum possible score)». 
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by the electoral performances of exclusionist right parties, it is fundamental to 
inspect how we can evaluate and measure this event. 
3.2. Pattern of investigation 
The investigation is based on a rigorous scheme so as to compare the same 
properties across different party systems. Some hypothesis are put forth to verify 
whether the electoral success of ERPs is enhanced by the presence or absence of 
certain conditions. 
One of the fundamental institutional settings in party competition is 
represented by the electoral system, whose mechanisms usually play a key role in 
favouring or discouraging the entry of new party actors in the political arena. The 
crucial importance of electoral systems is widely recognized in the literature, since 
they act as functions transforming votes into seats. By consequence, their 
algorithms affect party relevance in terms of parliamentary representation and, thus, 
they attribute to political parties relative power in coalition bargaining and 
government formation. One of the major features of electoral system are given by 
legal or effective thresholds that parties have to overcome to obtain seats in national 
legislatures. Furthermore, the proportional or majoritarian formula and the district 
magnitude are two pre-eminent characters affecting the degree of proportionality of 
vote share translation into seats. Briefly, the last three are the most important 
attributes that influence party competition and elections of MPs. Following Sartori 
(2004), plurality systems have a “freezing” effect at the district level, i.e., in the 
single district only two candidates can eventually compete for winning the seat. 
Whether the party system is structured and no ethnic-linguistic minorities are fully 
concentrated in some areas of the state, the final outcome is a two-party system. 
Bearing in mind those two a priori conditions, the expectation is that the British 
plurality system provides a strong effective barrier to the entry of new competitors. 
On the other hand, the very heterogeneous set of PR systems is more difficult to 
assess in terms of disproportionality in the allocation of seats. This is due to the 
several characteristic, as already noticed, that can vary the degree of proportionality 
during the process of transformation of votes into seats. Therefore, two essential 
features will be taken into account: the presence/absence of a legal threshold, in 
terms of minimal percentage of votes that a party need to gather in order to gain 
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seats. Of course, thresholds can be set directly by electoral laws both at the national 
and local level, or be implicit. The latter situation is strictly linked to the second 
feature to assess: the district magnitude, i.e., the dimension of the constituency, 
namely, the number of seats at stakes in that district. That represent a decisive 
factor since the more the district magnitude is greater, the more the distribution of 
seats is proportional. This is clearly proved by first-past-the-post system where the 
district magnitude is equal to 1 and votes casted for all candidate but the first one 
do not received any parliamentary representation. The general principle is that the 
more a PR system has a lower district magnitude, the more that system will yield 
very similar effect to majoritarian electoral systems. A particular interpretation is 
reserved to the French double-ballot system whose peculiar traits make it different 
from other systems, with special regards to the possibility given to electors to vote 
twice within two weeks. To sum up, the hypothesis is stated as follows: ERPs are 
expected to perform better at the polls when dealing with PR formula, featured by 
large district magnitude and low or absent legal thresholds. Therefore: the more the 
electoral system is permissive, the more ERPs electoral scores increase.  
When considering ERPs, in the same vein for all other new parties, it has to be 
pointed out that they were recently established at that time58. Thus, to install 
themselves in party competition, they predictably needed a political opportunity 
structure enabling to capture part of the electorate that did not feel represented by 
any pre-existing party. In spatial terms, a “window of opportunity” creates when 
parties are located in a way they are not able to cover all along a given issue. 
Parties of the radical right have often been labelled as anti-immigration party, i.e. 
single-issue party that focus on the issue of immigrants coming from countries 
outside Europe. Even though, the analysis presented in the previous chapter has 
showed that ERPs are more than mere opponents of immigration, sure enough this 
topic stands in the heart of their ideology. Therefore, the ERPs can actually settle 
down when the mainstream centre-right party hold a too moderate stance on 
immigration, thereby opening the way for the entry of a more radical challenger. To 
assess this hypothesis is necessary to focus the starting point of lifespan analysis, 
                                                
58 Some exceptions are the French Front National and the Danish Progress Party. 
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i.e. in 1990 when first data have been collected. This is of critical importance since, 
once a party has successfully acquired the status of political actor truly opposing 
massive immigration, the electorate will tend to identify that party as the political 
actor that originally support that stance. In other terms, the exclusionist right party 
is seen as the owner of that issue, thus making it difficult for other parties to 
substitute for it in that role. When “issue ownership” has been acquired, it is 
important to investigate the reaction, if any, of mainstream centre-right parties that 
have to face a new competitor on their right and decide whether or not radicalise 
their own stances on the same topic. In 1990, if no ERP was present, the same logic 
of analysis is applied for the next periods, since for mainstream right-parties is 
always present the possibility the political threat of a new competitor along their 
right-wing about immigration policies. The strategic entry of an ERP is assessed 
just along the dimension of immigration because this is the issue that most probably 
has triggered the emergence of that kind of parties. Indeed, economy does not lie at 
the heart of ERPs and the related dimension, as already described above, had been 
holding the primacy in terms of party competition and ideological struggle. 
A third spatial configuration that will be inspected concerns convergence of 
mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties. In the literature (Carter 2005) the 
convergence hypothesis has been put forth to argue that the most favourable 
ground, where parties of the radical right can flourish, is given by the reciprocal 
approaching of traditional moderate parties. The argument upholds that, when those 
parties tend to come close to each other, they forcedly tend to overlap and support 
almost the same policies. Thus, voters would have to choose substantially between 
two parties without a concrete alternative. Indeed, if the platform of the two most 
important parties — i.e., Christian Democrats (or the Liberals) and Socialists — 
appeared such a light alternative to each other, at least part of the voters would be 
tempted to take into account proposition coming from radical actors59. An 
overlapping among party supplies may carry out the unintentional effect of 
shedding light to more clear-cut and “pure” proposal from ERPs. As Bartolini 
(1996) pointed out, four settings are crucial for political competition, i.e. 
                                                
59 For a similar argument, see Hainsworth (1992). 
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contestability of elections by parties and candidates, availability of electors to 
change their vote from one election to the next, the presence of concrete and visible 
political alternatives among which electors decide for which casting their votes, and 
finally the vulnerability of a government to be substituted as consequence of 
unfavourable election results.60 The third element is assumed here as the crucial 
one, while the first one is approximated by the permissiveness of the electoral 
system and the second is intended in terms of the “fertile ground” analysed in the 
previous chapter. 
It is useful to remind that an excessive degree of coalescence between 
mainstream parties could foster anti-elite and anti-politics sentiments in the 
electorate, and ERPs always mark their willingness of representing the “true 
people” versus the “corrupt elite”. That said, the twofold hypothesis to be assessed 
is: when mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties convergence on economy 
and/or immigration, ERPs’ electoral scores increase.  
3.3. The outcome 
Research is oriented towards finding out, if any, common configuration of 
party systems properties previously classified in regards to divergent electoral 
performances of exclusionist right parties. Therefore, the section is a description of 
the divergent electoral scores of political actors at stake in order to put forth a 
classification of party systems. The second chapter exposed above helps identify 
the majority of political actors that belong to the set of the exclusionist right, with 
some few exceptions that does not alter consistency of conclusions reached before. 
The procedure is quite straightforward: since analysis time period starts from 1990, 
electoral scores of exclusionist right parties have to be gathered since that time 
point till 2009, again for the 14 countries included in the second chapter. Vote 
shares refer to ballots casted for the Lower Chamber during legislative elections. 
Table 4.2. Classification of countries by electoral scores of ERPs. 
Country Year Party % % Average score 
1990 FPÖ 16.6 16.6 
1994 FPÖ 22.5 22.5 
1995 FPÖ 21.9 21.9 
Austria 
 
1999 FPÖ 26.9 26.9 
20.2 
                                                
60 For a concrete application of this framework to ethno-regionalist parties, see Tronconi (2005). 
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2002 FPÖ 10.0 10.0 
FPÖ 11.0 2006 BZÖ 4.1 15.1 
FPÖ 17.5 
 
2008 BZÖ 10.7 28.2 
 
1991 VB 9.5 9.5 
1995 VB 11.9 11.9 
1999 VB 14.2 14.2 
2003 VB 16.8 16.8 
Belgium/Fl 
2007 VB 17.5 17.5 
14.0 
1991 FN 2.4 2.4 
1995 FN 6.9 6.9 
1999 FN 3.4 3.4 
2003 FN 5.3 5.3 
Belgium/Wa 
2007 FN 5.3 5.4 
4.7 
1990 FP 6.4 6.4 
1994 FP 6.4 6.4 
1998 DF 7.4 
1998 FP 2.4 9.8 
2001 DF 12.0 
2001 FP 0.6 12.6 
2005 DF 13.3 13.3 
Denmark 
2007 DF 13.9 13.9 
10.4 
1991 SMP/PS 4.8 4.8 
1995 SMP/PS 1.3 1.3 
1999 SMP/PS 1.0 1.0 
2003 SMP/PS 1.6 1.6 
Finland 
2007 SMP/PS 4.1 4.1 
2.6 
1993 FN 12.4 12.4 
1997 FN 14.9 14.9 
2002 FN 11.3 
2002 MNR 1.1 12.4 
2007 FN 4.3 
France 
2007 MNR 0.4 4.7 
11.1 
1990 DVU 0.3 
1990 REP 2.1 2.4 
1994 REP 1.9 1.9 
1998 DVU 1.2 
1998 REP 1.8 3.0 
2002 REP 0.6 0.6 
2005 REP 0.6 0.6 
Germany 
2009 REP 0.4 0.4 
1.5 
2004 LAOS 2.2 2.2 
2007 LAOS 3.8 3.8 Greece 
2009 LAOS 5.6 5.6 
3.9 
Ireland - - - - - 
1992 MSI 5.4 5.4 
1994 MSI/AN 13.5 13.5 
1996 AN 15.7 
1996 MSFT 0.9 16.6 
2001 AN 12.0 
2001 MSFT 0.4 12.4 
2006 AN 12.3 
2006 MSFT 0.6 12.9 
Italy 
2008 MSFT-LD 2.4 2.4 
10.5 
1994 CD 2.5 2.5 Netherlands 1998 CD 0.6 0.6 1.6 
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Portugal - - - - - 
Spain - - - - - 
Sweden - - - - - 
UK - - - - - 
 
4. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
4.1. Austria 
The Austrian electoral system is grounded into PR61 family, even though 
proportionality degree in seat distribution is corrected by some mechanisms. Each 
single voter has one vote to cast for a list with the possibility of expressing one 
preference. Two barriers are set to reduce access to the Nationalrat: one full quota 
at the regional level (Land) and 4 per cent at the national level. At the first stage, 
seats are allocated through the Hare quota — i.e., largest remainders method — 
whilst d’Hondt method is applied in the second step. The mean district magnitude 
(MDM62) is equal to 20.3 (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 137) and, therefore, rather 
large to maintain a good degree of proportionality. As said before, after having 
allocated seats at the regional level, the remainders of votes are recovered at the 
national level: this reduces the amount of wasted ballots and, in the end, the real 
barrier for small parties is the 4 per cent national threshold. Considering that 
percentage, the Austrian electoral law cannot be considered as a strict proportional 
electoral system (Kitschelt 1995; Veugelers and Magnan 2005). 
Current lifespan analysis starts from 1990, but the most important ERP in 
Austria — i.e., the FPÖ - was founded in 1956, as the Federation of Independents’ 
heir. As already stated, it was only in 1986, following the Haider’s seize of power, 
that the Liberal-nationalists underwent a radical right-wing turn. From then 
onwards, the FPÖ was able to acquire an increasing centrality in the Austrian party 
system that, for about forty years, had been largely dominated by the Christian 
Democrats (ÖVP) and Social Democrats (SPÖ). It was exactly in the 1990 national 
elections that the FPÖ realised an increased of 6.9 percentage points and jumped to 
                                                
61 This is the common abbreviation for “proportional representation”.  
62 Henceforth, the acronym MDM refers to the mean «number of seats to be filled in a constituency» 
(Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, 632) 
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16.6 per cent of the vote; conversely, the ÖVP suffered a loss of votes equal to 9.2 
percentage points and dropped to 32.1 per cent, namely, their worst electoral result 
from the end of WWII. Since ERP’s favourite issue is the opposition to mass 
immigration, it is plausible to verify whether along the ÖVP’s right-wing side there 
was a niche representing an opportunity for the Liberal-nationalists.  
Figure 4.A. Austria: immigration scale. 
 
Actually, in 1990 the ÖVP occupies a truly centrist position (i.e., 0.56 score), 
thereby leaving a consistent empty space for the entry of a party supporting more 
radical views on immigration. Due to the geographical collocation of Austria, that 
phenomenon must not be interpreted only in terms of people coming from North 
Africa or Middle East, but also from Central and Eastern Europe after the demise of 
the Soviet Bloc. Actually, in 1990 the FPÖ expressed a radical stance on 
immigration of 0.88, thus mirroring that of the Greens on the left-libertarian side. 
Therefore, the first condition related to an opportunity niche on the right, on the 
field of immigration, is satisfied. Moreover, exploring the economic axis, in 1992 
the FPÖ expressed the more pro-market profile, though not that far from the ÖVP. 
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The aim was probably to differentiate from the two mainstream parties — ÖVP and 
SPÖ — that were quite close to each other at that juncture. Few years later in 1994, 
the FPÖ made a second leap reaching 22.5 per cent of the vote, while the ÖVP 
dropped to 27.7 per cent, thus losing around 800,000 votes. The 1995 elections left 
the situation substantially unchanged, while the 1999 elections represented the 
outbreak of the Austrian right, and his leader became at the same time famous and 
contested all over Europe. In 1999, the FPÖ realised its best electoral score ever 
with 26.9 per cent of the vote and climbed to the second position, outranking the 
Christian Democrats and surpassed only by the Social Democrats that, however, 
lost slightly less than 5 percentage points. 
Figure 4.B. Austria: economic scale. 
 
Three main parties’ positions along the two axes deserve an accurate analysis. 
Starting for immigration, the distance between the FPÖ and ÖVP was just a bit 
lower in 2000 than in 1990, while the SPÖ has shifted remarkably towards the 
centre. It is plain to see that the two mainstream parties are very close to each other, 
expressing a moderate stance around 0.6 score, that is somewhat uncommon for a 
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Social Democratic actor. Noticeably, convergence of the SPÖ and ÖVP is 
associated with the FPÖ best electoral performance. Therefore, this particular 
configuration concerning the dimension of immigration brings confirmation to the 
convergence theory. About economy, the party placement is more complex: all 
parties had undergone a pro-state turn, with the FPÖ coming very close to the 
ÖVP’s right in 1999. Whether this centrist swing of the FPÖ is fruitful for its 
electoral fortunes is no easy to state, since economy is not properly a core issue for 
ERPs. That said, since the 1999 elections represented the peak for the FPÖ 
consensus, the 2003 vote completely reverse the respective electoral weights of the 
FPÖ and ÖVP: the former lost 16.9 percentage points, while the latter gained 15.4 
percentage points. This confirms again that the respective performances at the polls 
of those two parties are interrelated. However, that situation does not appear to be 
explained by their spatial positions along the two axes of party competition: on 
immigration, the distance between them is almost identical compared to 1999, 
whilst in economy the Liberal-nationalists shifted on the left-wing side of the 
Christian Democrats. It is not possible to argue whether the FPÖ centrist trend in 
economy affected in some way its consensus. An exogenous factor is its 
participation in government: after the 1999 breakthrough, it acquired a coalition 
potential for the first time and entered the executive with the ÖVP. This fact had to 
be mentioned, though it will not analyse deeply since participation in government 
by ERPs is at present uncommon, save the Austrian and Italian political contexts. 
The 2006 vote presented a different configuration given the exclusionist right 
split into two parties and the establishment of the BZÖ. In 2006, the FPÖ 
completed its centripetal trend in the economic domain and assumed a stance that 
was even below 0.5 score; on the other hand, the BZÖ assumed a strategic position 
between Liberal-nationalists and Christian Democrats. On immigration, the FPÖ 
radicalized its stance, compared to that of 1990, and the BZÖ was just slightly on 
its left. More interestingly, the ÖVP have undergone a rightist swing up to 
assuming a position near to the FPÖ stance in 1990. Furthermore, the SPÖ assumed 
in 2006 a posture greater than 0.5, thus more on the right than on the left. 
Therefore, the three main Austrian parties are, to a different extent, political actors 
that do support a critical view on immigration. In 2006 vote, the Christian 
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Democrats suffered a substantial loss equal to 8.1 percentage points, though they 
were able to defend their second top rank place with 34.2 per cent of the vote, just a 
little less than the Social Democrats. As previously stressed, it can be argued that 
there has been a transfer of votes between ÖVP and the exclusionist right. In 2006, 
the BZÖ contested general elections for the first time and overstepped the 4 per 
cent threshold. The FPÖ gathered just a feeble increase in votes and the 
exclusionist right, on the whole, collected 15.1 per cent of votes. Concerning the 
respective weights of the two ERPs, as expected, the BZÖ triumphed in Carinthia 
where Haider’s party collected the second largest share of votes (second only to the 
SPÖ) equal to 25.4 per cent, whilst both FPÖ and ÖVP suffered major vote leaks: 
the former lost 16.3 and the latter 9.7 percentage points. The BZÖ was a truly 
regional-grounded party, indeed Carinthia was the only Land where the party was 
able to win seats for the Nationalrat. That said, since in 2006 the exclusionist right 
was just above 15 per cent of votes, its performance is much minor than in 1999. 
This reduced, though consistent, consensus for right-wing radicalism is associated 
with a more rightist stance of ÖVP along the dimension of immigration; moreover, 
the two mainstream parties are distant in both dimensions. Therefore, the centrist 
position on economy of FPÖ do not seem having profited to the Liberal-
nationalists, together with a situation of no convergence of SPÖ and ÖVP. Finally, 
the role played by the Liberals (LIF) is marginal as that party lost its parliamentary 
representation since 1999. On the other hand, the Greens are represented in the 
Nationalrat since 1986, though they never acquired a coalition potential (Sartori 
1976) since they never entered any government. 
Summing up what has been said hitherto, the Austrian case confirms two 
hypothesis: in 1990, the strategic positioning of the FPÖ was made easier by the 
centrist posture of the ÖVP along the axis of immigration; secondly, in 1999, the 
convergence of the two mainstream parties on immigration fostered the FPÖ 
electoral consensus. Concerning economy, the centripetal trend of the Liberal-
nationalists does not seem profiting for that party or, at least, does not play a crucial 
role. 
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4.2. Belgium 
A federal law regulates the electoral system in Belgium. The system for the 
election of deputies to the Chamber of Representatives is an open list proportional 
formula. Voters cast their ballots choosing a party list, with the possibility of 
expressing one or more preference over the same party list. The number of seats is 
allocated to electoral constituencies63 in proportion to their population and MDM is 
7.5 (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 137). Each party has to overcome a 5 per cent 
threshold at the constituency level64 in order to gain MPs65. Seats are allocated using 
the method of Hare quota at two levels (provincial and federal) and the effective 
threshold is 9.20 (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 142), therefore, even greater than 
the legal one. Since the effective threshold is over the mean66 and the MDM is 
rather small, the Belgian electoral system is not strictly proportional. 
4.2.1. FLANDERS 
Looking at the spatial location of political parties in 1990 on immigration, the 
rather moderate position of the Flemish Liberals (PVV/VLD), just below 0.7, 
actually left the right-wing side of the political spectrum available for a more 
restrictive position on immigration like that of the Vlaams Belang67 (VB). Some 
features of party competition deserve greater attention. 
Firstly, the VB has always occupied a very extreme position, close to the scale 
limit. Secondly, with the exception of the VU/N-VA, the other parties did not enact 
any counter-offensive strategy to balance the VB’s political posture. Considering 
the period between 2000 and 2003, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the 
Liberals, and the Greens, all moved towards the left-wing side. This situation could 
be linked to a methodological aspect, i.e. the question asked to experts in the 2003 
survey is formulated in a rather different way than in the other cases. Yet, even in 
2003, the VB has kept its rightist position, so that its radical and very divergent 
stance on immigration, compared to all other political actors, is confirmed. Thirdly, 
                                                
63 The electoral constituencies generally coincide with the provinces, with two exceptions: Brussels-
Hal-Vilvorde and Louvain. 
64 As a consequence of a decision issued by the Court of Arbitration, the 5 per cent threshold is not 
applied in the following constituencies: Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde, Walloon Brabant, and Louvain. 
65 This acronym stands for “Member(s) of Parliament”. 
66 Considering all fourteen countries here at stakes, the mean value of effective thresholds is 8.42. 
67 At that point in time, the name of the party was Vlaams Block. 
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just the VU/N-VA moved significantly towards the right during the first six years 
of the 21st century: the N-VA is, in the plurality of its components and internal 
structure, the heir of the VU or, more specifically, its former right-wing faction.  
Figure 4.C. Flanders: immigration scale. 
 
However, the VB has always profited of an empty rightist side, without any 
effective challenger. Its electoral scores have always increased through years: in 
1995, it overcame 10 per cent of the vote and in 2007 reached its best electoral 
performance with 21 per cent of the ballots. 
Another important element is the degree of convergence between MRP and 
MLP68. In Belgium as a whole, and in Flanders as well, the evaluation of 
convergence is problematic since three major and traditional party pillars are 
present: the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the Liberals. More recently, a 
four party “family” has added to three previous ones, i.e., the Ecologists. More in 
details, it is not easy to compute the degree of convergence because of the difficulty 
                                                
68 The same acronyms explicated by note 48 and 49 (see Table 4.2) are here employed. 
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in choosing which is the MRP. Indeed, the Socialist party (SP) can be considered as 
the natural MLP, whereas on the right two options are viable: the Christian 
Democratic and the Liberal party. By adopting an historical point of view, the 
Christian Democratic party, especially in Flanders, is the most electoral supported 
party within the centre-right area. Therefore, it appears plausible to choose the 
CD&V as MRP69. Therefore, convergence is assessed as the distance between 
CD&V and SP. The graphical representation of party positions about immigration 
depicts an almost identical movement, in terms of direction, of both CD&V and SP. 
These parties are very close to each other and their reciprocal distance slightly 
increased only in 2006. Considering only that year, the increased distance between 
the two mainstream parties has not entailed a reduced consensus for the VB, on the 
contrary as said early. Considering the average distance of the two Flemish 
mainstream parties, it comes out that the mean value is second smallest one, just 
above that of Sweden. To sum up what has been said so far, the VB increasing 
consensus at the polls has been favoured by an empty space on the rightist side of 
immigrations scale where the VB did not face any real challenge from the Christian 
Democrats or the Liberals; furthermore, both MRP and MLP has maintained a high 
degree of convergence on the left of the centre, so that the VB posture appeared to 
be the only real alternative for those opposing immigration. 
Sure enough, immigration is fundamental in understanding patterns of ERPs 
electoral inroads, though economy is crucial as well in party competition. Taking 
into account the VB stance in isolation, the Flemish secessionist party has held a 
rather pro-market stance around 0.75. In 1999, it radicalized its economic receipt 
through a pronounced turn towards the right. Thus, it even stepped over the 
Liberals and became the more pro-market political actor in Flanders. After that 
leap, the VB returned to its previous economic stance that in 2006 overlapped with 
that of the VU/N-VA. Since the VB electoral scores increased steady over years, it 
is not easy to assess whether either a stronger or weaker stance on economy has 
profited or damaged the party. Two points can be stressed: when the party 
underwent a right-wing shift, it passed from 9.5 in 1991 to 14.2 in 1999, thus it 
                                                
69 The spatial positions of the Flemish Liberals (VLD) will be taken into account in §5.2. 
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realized an addition of 4.7 percentage points; on the other hand, when the VB 
turned back towards a moderate pro-market position, it jumped from 14.2 in 1999 
to 21.0 in 2007, with a gain equal to 6.8 percentage points.  
Figure 4.D. Flanders: economic scale. 
 
Therefore, the VB was able to increase its vote share both with a stronger and a 
weaker pro-market stance, though in the second case the rise of votes was larger. 
Like with immigration, the two mainstream parties are very close to each other, 
insomuch that Flanders has the minor distance between centre-left and centre-right 
parties — i.e., the highest degree of convergence — at the same level of Portugal. 
The minor distance between the two mainstream parties was realized in 2003 along 
the economic dimension and in 2000 along the dimension of immigration. Focusing 
on a single configuration at one point in time does not seem to boost 
comprehension about the VB electoral success. Conclusions can be drawn as 
follows: the convergence of CD&V and SP is proved on average in both relevant 
dimensions and this is associated with a mounting vote share for the VB. 
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To conclude, two important observations regarding the Vlaams Belang are to 
be taken into account. Firstly, the VB did not undergo any centripetal turn along the 
economic dimension, differentiating from FPÖ and DF (see next section). This is 
probably due to the CD&V truly centrist position that the VB decided not to 
challenge. Notably, both in Austria and Denmark the mainstream centre-right party 
– respectively, ÖVP and V — assumed a more pronounced rightist stance in favour 
of market liberalism, than did the CD&V in Flanders where, on the contrary, its 
stance was even to the left of the centre. Secondly, an exogenous though crucial 
factor was not included in analysis, due its peculiar character: the VB is a party 
whose core ideology is soaked with strong secessionism of Flanders from the 
Kingdom of Belgium. It is sure enough that its consensus is boosted by those 
Flemish citizens supporting the split of the country or, at least, with a harsh 
resentment against the federal state. As the present analysis focuses on economy 
and immigration, the issue of decentralisation and secessionism could not be 
included. However, the fight for independence of Flanders has to be mentioned, 
since this appears again as a factor at the basis of the recent upsurge of the N-VA in 
the 2010 federal elections where, for the first time, the VB decreased its vote share. 
4.2.2. WALLONIA 
Compared to the Flemish situation, in 1990 little differences can be noticed in 
Wallonia with regards to party positions along the immigration scale. The Christian 
Democratic party expressed a very centrist position, while the Liberals were just 
slightly below 7.0. Therefore, for the Front National was actually possible to locate 
at the extreme right of that dimension. The structure of party locations was actually 
rather profitable to the FN, either by considering the PSC/CDH or the PVV/MR 
such as MRP. 
The evolution of party competition in the subsequent years, always on 
immigration, is very meaningful. In fact, the Liberals did not turn towards the right 
to attract potential FN’s voters. On the contrary, they underwent a consistent 
centripetal shift, approaching the Christian Democrats. Concerning the other 
parties, the only notable change was the shrinking of the distance between the 
Socialists and Ecologists. The Front National made a noteworthy increase in votes 
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from 1991 to 1995 when it passed from 2.4 to 6.9 per cent, its best electoral 
performance so far.  
Figure 4.E. Wallonia: immigration scale. 
 
The graphical representation underscores how in the mid-1990s the Liberals 
were moving firmly towards the centre, favouring the shifting of voters towards the 
Front National. However, the same argument cannot be held in the aftermath, in 
fact the FN vote share firstly dropped to 3.4 per in 1999 and then growth again to 
5.3 per cent both in 2003 and 2007 federal elections. This means that the 1999 
electoral results is not in line with what has been argued in relation to 1995 and 
then in 2003 and 2007. 
Concerning the degree of convergence, as already stated about Flanders, in 
Wallonia too there are three traditional party families, thus the assessment of 
convergence depends on the political actor to be considered as the representative of 
the mainstream right. In line with what has been argued early, the Christian 
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Democratic party (PSC/CDH) is chosen as MRP70. In the period 1990-2006, the PS 
has assumed a more leftist posture on immigration, while the Christian Democrats 
have always presided over the centre of the political spectrum. Their reciprocal 
distance increased over the years and the best electoral score for the FN was in 
1995 when the space between PS and PSC was actually very narrow. Four years 
later, when the FN dropped to 3.4 per cent, PS and PSC were only a little bit more 
distant. Therefore, the second situation does not confirm the convergence theory. 
The same can be argued when the PS shifted away from the CDH and, despite of 
this, the FN increased its consensus. 
Figure 4.F. Wallonia: economic scale. 
 
Unfortunately, the analysis lacks data in both dimensions: on immigration, the 
FN stance in 2006 is not measured, while in the economic domain its stance is 
assessed only in 2003. Therefore, the only available information is that the FN was 
                                                
70 The spatial positions of the Liberals (MR) will be taken into account in §5.2 
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on the right of the Liberals and, therefore, appears to be a pro-market rather than 
pro-state party in economy, like the Flemish VB. 
4.3. Denmark 
The Danish electoral system is featured by a PR formula where voters cast 
their ballots choosing a party list and may indicate just one preference within the 
candidate list. In particular, MDM is 7.9 (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 137), thus 
much lower than in Austria; however, a Danish political party has to secure at least 
2 per cent of votes at the national level to gain representation into the Folgetinget. 
The electoral system is based on a two-tier set allocation mechanism where the 
lower level resorts to Hare quota, while the upper stage employs a St. Laguë 
modified divisor. Summing up those features, with special attention to the 2 per 
cent national threshold and Hare quota, the Danish electoral law can be evaluated 
as a strict proportional electoral system (Kitschelt 1995; Veugelers and Magnan 
2005). 
At party level, the current analysis identified two ERPs: the Progress Party 
(FP) and the Danish People’s Party (DF). When investigating the Danish 
exclusionist right, it is essential to analyse firstly the Progress Party and then its 
evolution that gave rise to the Danish People’s Party. Indeed, their history and 
pattern are strictly interrelated. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the FP was undergoing its descendent trajectory 
in terms of electoral consensus. Almost twenty years before (in 1972), Mogens 
Glistrup founded the Progress Party as a force mainly devoted to economic 
liberalism and supporting strong tax reductions, a net simplification of bureaucratic 
apparatus, and a sensible reduction in public spending. Naturally, the party was 
placed on the right of the state-market dimension and, during the 1970s, the FP 
secured its best electoral results ever, with the peak of 15.9 per cent in the first 
election that the party contested. Suddenly, the FP became the second largest force 
in Parliament gaining 28 out of 179 seats. Secondly, the ban of immigration from 
Muslim countries became a core element in its ideology. Essentially, the aim was to 
protect the generous amount of resources supplied by the Danish welfare state. For 
these reasons, immigrants from poor and underdeveloped countries were seen as 
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“scroungers” of social benefits, without contributing to the funding of state 
provisions and, therefore, causes of increased levels of taxation.  
Figure 4.G. Denmark: immigration scale. 
 
In 1983, a turning point was marked: the FP leader, Mogens Glistrup, was 
sentenced to three years in prison for tax fraud and Pia Kjærsgaard seized the reins 
of the party. In fact, a key element was the dispute involving the two party factions 
over the strong or soft reduction of welfare state and public spending: on the one 
hand, the radicals leaded by Glistrup and, on the other hand, the moderates leaded 
by Kjærsgaard. As expected, the fight over party economic policies accentuated 
since 1987 when Glistrup was released from prison, and internal dispute pushed 
Kjærsgaard and his followers to exit and form the Danish People’s Party in 1995. 
Therefore, the DF spatial position on immigration scale in 1990 has to be 
intended as related to 1995. The focus is on the political opportunity structure 
available along the MRP’s right-wing side, i.e. the Venstre71 (V). This Liberal party 
                                                
71 Literally, the name means “left”. 
 127 
is the largest bourgeois political actor and its main challenger72 is the Social 
Democratic party (SD). A major finding is that, on immigration, the Venstre 
occupied a moderate position, just above 0.6, while all other parties but the FP were 
distinctly on the left-wing side of the political spectrum. Actually, the only party 
that advocated restrictive policies against immigration was the Progress Party. By 
consequence, the necessary niche for DF to emerge was occupied by the FP that 
became its main rival since both was forced to compete in the same portion of the 
political space. In the 1990s, the DF stance on immigration was even more 
restrictive than that held by the FP and, when the Progress Party declined 
inexorably, the Kjærsgaard’s party slightly moderate its position. The Venstre 
actually tried to challenge the DF by moving towards the right from 1990 to 2000, 
and afterwards it kept its rather restrictive position. Of great relevance is the 
increasing electoral success of the DF that has contested so far four elections (in 
1998, 2001, 2005, and 2007) and has always increased its vote share. The big leap 
was made between 1998 and 2001 when it passed from 7.4 to 12.0 per cent, while 
the FP dramatically dropped to 0.6 per cent and virtually disappeared. Since 2001 
has represented an important election for the exclusionist right, it is useful to focus 
on party movements during that period. As already stressed above, the Venstre 
radicalized on the immigration scale, though the largest spatial swing was 
undergone by the Social Democrats that, as showed by the graphic, from 1990 until 
2006 have incessantly moved towards the right. This trend implied that the distance 
between V and SD has been reducing through years. In other terms, on immigration 
the respective positions of V and SD converged and the DF support increased at the 
expense of the FP. Therefore, increasing convergence within mainstream parties of 
centre-right and centre-left parties is associated with increasing support for the 
ERP. 
About economy, after 1999 the DF underwent a strong centripetal turn, placing 
itself at the centre of political spectrum and abandoning the radical pro-market 
ideology typical of the Progress Party. Furthermore, V and SD kept a considerable 
divergence between their respective economic recipes. It should be noted that the 
                                                
72 The spatial position of the Conservative Party (KP) will be taken into account in §5.2. 
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DF profile, along the two scales, corroborates the welfare-chauvinist label applied 
by Kitschelt (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 137). The combination of exclusionism 
in cultural domain and defence of the welfare state in economic dimension revealed 
as profitable in 2007 when the DF increased its support to 13.9 per cent of the vote, 
thus making robust its presence in the Danish party system, underpinned by an 
increasing percentage at the polls. Moreover, since 2001 the DF has always backed 
the Liberal-Conservative government without entering the executive. Its support for 
Rasmussen’s policies was selectively given when the government took decisions 
touching core ideological tenets of the DF, like more restrictive policies on 
immigration. Yet, DF exponents did not perform charges directly in the executive, 
unlike other countries such as Austria and Italy. 
Figure 4.H. Denmark: economic scale. 
 
4.4. Finland 
The Finnish electoral system is one «of the world’s most durable electoral 
systems, certainly one of the most durable proportional representation (PR) system» 
(Raunio 2005, 473). Indeed, the basic features of electoral districts have been kept 
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unchanged, save minor adjustments through time. At present, the national territory 
is divided into 15 constituencies and district magnitude ranges from 6 to 15. About 
MDM, the «average district magnitude is 13.3» (Raunio 2005, 477). In national 
elections, voting is highly candidate-centred: actually, the voter casts «one vote for 
one candidate writing the identification number of the candidate in the empty circle 
on the ballot sheet supplied» (Raunio 2005, 480). Once polls are closed, seats are 
distributed to parties according to the d’Hondt method and, furthermore, no legal 
threshold is set, neither at the national or the local level. As already mentioned 
before, a candidate can win a seat only on the base of his/her number of preference 
votes. Given that pre-electoral alliances are viable, the distribution of seats is driven 
only by the plurality principle within preference votes. This implies that small 
parties «have tended to enter electoral alliances with larger parties» (Raunio 2005, 
481), and small parties can take advantage of this strategy when their share of votes 
are particularly concentrated on one or few candidates. Firstly, the d’Hondt method 
assigns seats to the coalition and, secondly, candidates with a plurality of votes in 
the coalition are elected. As commonly known, that method tend to favour larger 
than minor parties: in 2003, the three largest parties — the Centre Party (KESK), 
Social Democrats (SD), and National Coalition (KOK) — received a number of 
seats greater than their vote shares, whereas the contrary is true for smaller parties 
(Raunio 2005, 482). On the other hand, the True Finns (PS) won 3 seats with only 
1.6 per cent of votes and this is possible since there is no legal clause for entering 
the Eduskunta. In this manner, the national Parliament is highly representative of 
political forces, including the Swedish People’s Party (SFP). The latter represents 
political demands of Swedish minority in Finland and, for example whether a 
national threshold of 4 per cent was set then the SFP would risk to be excluded and 
this could create tension with a consistent minority within the country. Summing up 
what has been said so far, the PR formula in Finland does not seem to constitute a 
significant barrier to the entry of new party in the political arena, as explicitly 
outlined by Raunio who argued that the «proportional electoral system with large 
constituencies has contributed to the fragmentation of the party system» (2005, 
482). By consequence, no party has never been able to win an absolute majority 
and parties are used to cooperate to form governments: indeed, the «tradition of 
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having cross-bloc coalitions reflects the pragmatic and consensual nature of Finnish 
politics» (Raunio 2005, 474). Thus, the Finnish electoral law can be assessed such 
as a strict proportional system. 
Chapter 2 has showed early how the status of most right-deviant party along 
the GAL/TAN dimension was competed by the Christian Democrats (SKL/KD) 
and the True Finns. As previously discussed, the True Finns is the only party that 
the current research considers such as an ERP. When considering party positions on 
immigration, the SKL/KD has always expressed a centrist position, while PS has 
held a more right-wing stance. This was even more striking after 2000 when the PS 
underwent a strong right-wing turn.  
 
Figure 4.I. Finland: immigration scale. 
 
All along the period under examination, the two main Liberal conservative 
parties — KESK and KOK —have been holding a centrist stance, thereby opening 
the way for the establishment of an ERP. Yet, to evaluate the degree of 
convergence, the National Coalition Party (KOK) is assumed as MRP, while the 
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SD is obviously the MLP. As already mentioned, the PS was founded in 1995 as 
heir of the agrarian party and took advantage of the wide empty space on the right 
of the political spectrum. However, despite of the favourable political opportunity 
structure, PS vote share in 1995, 1999, and 2003 was quite disappointing as just 
over 1 per cent. Only in 2007, the party was able to more than doubling its score, 
reaching its best electoral performance of 4.1 per cent. Focusing on 2006 party 
locations along the immigration scale, KOK and SD strongly converged to the 
centre, while PS somewhat moderated its stance, though maintaining on the right. It 
can be argued that the particular configuration, i.e. convergence of mainstream 
parties, has fostered the PS electoral success. 
Figure 4.J. Finland: economic scale. 
 
In the economic domain, the situation is rather different as showed by the 
graphical representation. On average, both MRP and MLP have kept a notable 
distance, thus supplying a sound alternative. On the other hand, the KESK has 
balanced its economic recipes around the centre and the same can be argued for the 
PS. In this case, the influence of PS stance in economy on its electoral scores 
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cannot be weighted, since the configuration described above kept its main tenets all 
along the period here explored while the PS scores were fluctuant. 
4.5. France 
The French electoral system is featured by particular components that make it 
totally different from all others in Western Europe. First of all, one major 
peculiarity is the double-ballot, i.e. voters cast their ballots twice within a period of 
two weeks. Furthermore, when voters cast their second ballot they know the results 
of the first round of elections. It is straightforward to argue that this situation is 
very distinct than “usual” electoral systems where voters vote just once. About its 
mechanisms, the French electoral system employs a plurality/majority formula: in 
each single uninominal district, during the first round, the candidate collecting an 
absolute majority of valid votes wins the seat. If none of the candidates is able to 
reach that amount of ballots, two or more candidates are admitted to the second 
round where the candidate winning even a simple plurality of votes is elected. 
Therefore, the most important mechanism is the filter enabling candidates to 
contest the second round. In France, a percentage threshold represents this filter and 
was set at different level through time, starting from 5 per cent until the present 
12.5 per cent calculated over the number of citizens having the right to vote in each 
district. This is a key clause since it implies that the concrete threshold can elevate 
up to around 20 per cent out of the total of votes. Thus, two components make the 
system very disproportional in the allocation of seats: the district magnitude — i.e., 
constituencies are uninominal and obviously MDM equals 1 — and, secondly, the 
very high threshold to be admitted to the second round. Yet, the assimilation of this 
system to the majoritarian family does not seem totally straightforward, especially 
when its peculiarities above mentioned are not carefully assessed. It is plain to see 
that the French double-ballot system promoted a reduction of the number of parties, 
since its logic and mechanics discourage party fragmentation. Especially during the 
second round, in many cases the seat is contended between the left and right’s 
candidate. In other words, the seat can be credibly won either by the Socialist or the 
Gaullist candidate. 
Indeed, one of the most acknowledged effects is the under-representation of 
anti-system parties in terms of seats. Within the French party system, the two more 
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extremist parties are the Communists on the left and the National Front (FN) on the 
right. It should be noted that in the first case, the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) 
has actively entered coalition with the Socialist Party (PS); moreover, the support 
of the Communists was decisive for Mitterand’s victory in the 1981 presidential 
election and also for the leftist majority in the 1984 legislative elections. Unlike the 
PCF, the Jean Marie Le Pen’s National Front has been suffering a severe ostracism, 
i.e. the so-called republican (or Gaullist) right all other parties refuse to conclude 
any agreement with FN. The cordon sanitaire aims at weakening through isolation 
a party that is considered not viable for any coalition deal, even though this strategy 
has yield costs for the Gaullist right. In the 1997 legislative elections, the 
Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) refused to bargain any withdrawal of its 
candidates in the second round in favour of National Front’s candidates. Therefore, 
in several traingulaires — i.e., where three candidates contest the seat after the first 
round — right-wing voters split between RPR and FN, and this division represented 
a great advantage for the PS. In 2002, Le Pen’s upsurge to the second rank place, 
after first round of Presidential elections, entailed the resounding Jospin’s 
resignation from politics; afterwards, the Socialist electorate was faced with Chirac-
Le Pen alternative in the second round and it massively opted for Chirac as the 
“less evil”. These two events showed how the National Front is considered such as 
an anomaly to counter by any means. 
Since district magnitude equals 1 and all parties refuse to make an agreement 
with FN, Le Pen’s party has had huge difficulties in winning seats, despite of its 
large vote share in the first round. For instance, in 1997 FN realized its best 
electoral score with 14.9 per cent of the vote, but it won only one seat. Again, in 
2002 its score moderately dropped to 11.3 per cent with any seat gained. This 
represents a good example of how the electoral system distorts the transformation 
of votes into parliamentary seats. The French electoral system belongs by all means 
to the majoritarian group with Westminster plurality formula, though the real 
dissimilarity is the presence of a first round. Even though both the British and 
French electoral systems are very disproportional, the second one has a preliminary 
voting stage that clearly makes it different from all other cases. Indeed, in the first 
round all parties do present their own candidate, even those without any real chance 
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of winning the seat. However, a small vote share may enable parties with a 
“blackmail” power and, when this is true, they assume a crucial role in the so-called 
“horse trading”. Furthermore, the first round keeps many parties “alive”, i.e. minor 
parties can try to collect as much votes as they can to bargain an agreement for the 
second round. Thus, when assessing the French electoral system, it should be taken 
into account not only the degree of disproportionality in the allocation of seats, but 
also a double-round vote. In this vein, it is possible to understand why a 
majoritarian system, with few parties being represented in parliaments, can coexist 
with a pluralism of parties at the electoral level. Summing up what has been said so 
far, the French electoral system represents a barrier to the entry of new party that is 
higher than usual PR-formula, but lower than first-past-the-post system. Of course, 
it is very far from a strict proportional representation. 
Figure 4.K. France: immigration scale. 
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About party competition, in 1990 the RPR held a rather restrictive view on 
immigration equal to 0.78. Compared to other MRP73 in countries where ERPs were 
successful, the Gaullists held the most anti-immigration stance in 1990. Therefore, 
the empty space available was narrower than in other contexts, but it did not 
prevent the FN to become a relevant party in French politics. This can be 
essentially explained considering the founding date of the party. Unlike all other 
parties74, the FN was already established in 1972 and for the first time it contested 
legislative elections in 1978 when it gathered only 0.8 per cent. Its meaningful 
breakthrough was in 1986 when the party collected 9.9 per cent at the polls, 
profiting that the electoral system was changed in a PR-formula with a 5 per cent 
threshold. The FN gained 34 MPs, but the double-round ballot was immediately 
restored since the next election in 1988. Therefore, in 1990 the FN was not a new 
party on the French scene, but a party with a “blackmail” power (Sartori 1976), at 
least at the electoral level. The RPR stance has to be interpreted as a tentative to 
challenge the FN over the issue of immigration. Unfortunately, no data are 
available before 1990 and, therefore, it is no possible to assess the political 
opportunity structure before that point in time. 
By observing the RPR trajectory on the immigration scale, it is remarkable that 
the Gaullist party never overstepped the 1990 level and in 2003 underwent a turn 
towards the centre, leaving free space to the FN’s restrictive platform75. 
Considering also the degree of convergence between the two mainstream rightist 
and leftist parties — i.e., the RPR/UMP and PS — the gap between them is the 
second highest, just under the Italian case. In 2003 it is worth noting that the 
distance between UMP and PS reduced to 0.32 and that point in time coincided also 
with the major distance between UMP and FN. Furthermore, in 2002 a new 
President of the Republic was elected and the Assemblée Nationale was renewed 
two months later. In this case, evaluating whether or not the convergence theory is 
confirmed presents some difficulties. The primary change is the establishment of a 
new party unifying the French centre-right: the entire RPR, about two third of UDF 
                                                
73 For example, in 1990: ÖVP (Austria, 0.56), V (Denmark, 0.63), FI (Italy, 0.65). 
74 Save the FPÖ that represents an exception since it was founded in 1956. About the 1986 Haider’s 
escalation to the top of the party, see §5.1 before. 
75 The competition form the MPF is minor and can be discarded. 
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members, and other minor parties of the Christian Democratic and liberal traditions 
adhered to the UMP76. At the beginning, between the first and second round of the 
2002 presidential election, the acronym was just an umbrella to support re-election 
for Chirac against Le Pen. Afterwards, in November 2002, the party organized and 
change its name into Union for a Popular Movement. Hence, the shift towards the 
centre of the RPR within the period 1999-2003 is due to the merging of this party 
with the UDF and also other minor centrist parties. By the way, the 2003 survey 
considers again the RPR and its distance from the PS is the shortest ever observed, 
as already highlighted before. Comparing the distance RPR-PS and the percentage 
of the FN vote share, it is plain to see that both decreases compared to 1999. Hence, 
the hypothesis that convergence of mainstream parties is associated with higher 
electoral scores of ERPs is not confirmed in this case. 
A further clarification concerns an exogenous factor not taken into account in 
the present analysis: the presidential election. Indeed, the dependent variable is 
consistently defined as the percentage vote share of ERPs in legislative elections 
for the Lower House. There is no doubt that a crucial election, perhaps the most 
important one, regards the chief of the Elisée and these elections exert a driving 
force over legislative elections. This is particularly true when the second ones are 
held around a couple of months after the new president has been elected. As already 
mentioned, in 2002 Le Pen made its best electoral performances in the run-off for 
the presidential elections, though it was massively defeated during the second 
round. The Chirac’s landslide victory and the establishment of the UMP affected 
sure enough the orientation of voters two months later for the National Assembly 
where the President obtained a favourable strong majority of MPs. That said, as 
legislative elections are the only ones considered to define the outcome, the 
hypothesis about convergence is not confirmed. Finally, the FN worst electoral 
performance was made in 2007 when it dropped to 4.3, hence loosing 7 percentage 
points. As showed in the graph, the UMP returned to assume the rather restrictive 
RPR stance of 1990, while the FN for the first time quitted the rightist extremity of 
the scale and moderate its position. The gap between the two mainstream parties 
                                                
76 The acronym stands for: “Union pour un Mouvement Populaire”. 
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was almost unchanged and leaned towards the right when, at the same time, the FN 
moderated. This can be at the origin of the National Front big loss of votes. 
On to the economic dimension, the National Front has undergone a centripetal 
turn, moving from a radical to a more moderate pro-market stance. However, its 
shifting has been less strong than that enacted by the Austrian FPÖ or the Danish 
DF. Concerning the convergence between the two mainstream parties, the PS and 
the RPR was closer in 1999 and, afterwards, they moved away at the beginning of 
the new century. In particular, in 2006 the UMP was on the right side of the FN and 
Le Pen’s party gathered in 2007 a somewhat disappoint percentage at the polls. 
Trying to sum up what has been said about the two spatial dimension, it seems 
more evident that, on the one hand, the radicalization of UMP on immigration and, 
on the other hand, the moderation of the FN on economy, are two processes that do 
not have profited to the Front National. 
Figure 4.L. France: economic scale. 
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4.6. Germany 
The mixed-member PR system in Germany represents a sort of model within 
electoral systems that seek to combine PR and plurality formula. Indeed, it has been 
referred to for electoral reform in New Zealand at the beginning of the 1990s and 
for the election of MPs in the new assemblies of Wales and Scotland. The particular 
mechanisms of that system are sometimes misunderstood, because of the plurality 
formula that creates the impression that the electoral system merges proportional 
and plurality effects in the distribution of seats. On the contrary, the two formulas 
have a plain proportional output since PR is dominant over plurality in regards to 
the distribution of seats among parties. Each voter is given a ballot where she/he 
has the possibility to cast two votes (Saalfeld 2005, 213): the first Stimme is for a 
candidate and the one winning a plurality is elected; the second is a PR-list vote and 
the voter has to cross the closed Landesliste of the preferred political party. Two 
fundamental features are then to be brought into account to understand the 
functioning of the system: seats are distributed at the national level and, secondly, 
the number of seats that each party is entitled to depends on the total percentage 
gathered in the second vote, i.e. the list vote. A main clause countering the 
proliferation of small parties is the 5 per cent hurdle, i.e. all parties not able to reach 
at least 5 per cent of votes at the national level are excluded from seat distribution, 
unless they have won at least 3 seats in single-member districts (SMDs). It should 
be noted that even though a party — e.g., the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) 
in the 2002 elections — was not able either to clear the 5 per cent threshold or to 
win 3 direct mandates, those who won the race in SMDs (one or two candidates) 
are nevertheless elected as individuals (Saalfeld 2005, 214). Once the parties 
admitted to the seat distribution are identified, the «LR-Hare method is used to 
calculate how many seats the parties are entitled to overall. This calculation is 
based on the total number of second votes for each party at the national level» 
(Saalfeld 2005, 214). Since party-lists are established at Land level, the total 
amount of seats for each party is distributed among Länder on the basis of party-list 
vote share in each Land, deducted the winners in SMDs of the same Land. For 
instance (Saalfeld 2005, 215): in the 2002 election, the CSU vote share was 9.0 per 
cent and the Bavarian party was entitled to a total of 58 seats; since CSU candidates 
 139 
had already won a plurality in 43 SMDs, list-seats awarded was 15. Of course, it 
may be that some parties, especially larger ones, win a plurality in a number of 
SMDs greater than the total amount of seats to which are entitled to on the basis of 
list-votes. In that particular instance, the party keeps its over-mandates 
(Überhangmandate) and, for this reason, the assembly (Bundestag) is composed of 
a variable number of MPs. Therefore, the plurality formula plays the role of 
personalising the vote allowing voters to select one candidate, while PR-list vote 
makes distribution of seats among parties depending on their relative weights in 
terms of vote shares. 
It seems that the only effective mechanism provided by the electoral system to 
counter party proliferation is the 5 per cent national clause (i.e., the Sperrklausel). 
However, another fundamental institution has to be taken into account, i.e. the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The Bundesverfassungsgericht was 
established in Karlsruhe in 1951 and its main function is to assess whether bills 
passed by the Parliament are not in contrast with the Fundamental Law, i.e. the 
Constitution of Germany. Furthermore, a great prerogative of that Court is the 
possibility to sentence a party such as unconstitutional, thereby ruling out that party 
from political competition. In particular, the Court might esteem a party to be 
“radical” or “extreme” and, in the latter case, that party is considered to be a threat 
to the democratic order. This is why Germany is sometimes referred to such as a 
protected democracy. On the one hand, ERPs do not generally support anti-
democratic appeals or, at least, they do not overtly claim to overthrown democracy 
to favour a regime change. On the other hand, those parties may be blamed harshly 
whether they uphold similar ideas and goals, especially when maintaining a legacy 
with nazi or fascist movements of the past. The point here is that the presence of a 
Constitutional Court, whose powers can actually sentence the legal dissolution of a 
party, is strongly discouraging for those parties whose ideology is rather farer than 
other political actors. Moreover, the very peculiar history of Germany, i.e. the nazi 
regime and the tragedy of WWII with the Holocaust, created a thick barrier against 
any form of resurgence of nostalgic nazi forces. Political actors trying to build an 
ERP have to face the big hindrance of National Socialism’s shadows, so that their 
opportunities to enter the party system are very thin. Therefore, the supervision of 
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the Constitutional Court, both on the extreme left and right, cannot be discarded to 
understand correctly why in Germany extremist parties have never played any 
significant role hitherto. To shed light on this, it suffice to remember that in 1955 
and 1956 the neo-nazi and, then, the Communist party of West Germany were 
dissolved since their ideology was not in line with liberal-democratic values. As 
highlighted also by Sartori (2004), once extreme parties were out of the game, the 5 
per cent hurdle thin out easily small parties and only three competitors (CDU-CSU, 
SPD, and FDP) became relevant for political bargaining in Parliament. In the 
aftermath, the rise of the Greens and then, after reunification with Eastern 
Germany, the new party of the radical left (PDS77) altered deeply the usual 
configuration of party system, currently underpinned by 5 relevant parties. On the 
one hand, this confirms that the electoral system, on its own, is not able to counter, 
over the 5 per cent barrier, the entry of new actors. On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to expect that an ERP has to face a severe opposition, given the 
totalitarian legacy of the right in Germany and, as already described, the role of the 
Constitutional Court as guardian of the democratic regime. For these reason, the 
institutional settings are not permissive towards new political competitors and the 
electoral system is not strict proportional (Veugelers and Magnan 2005; Kitschelt 
1995). 
Considering party locations, the focus is primarily on immigration and the two 
ERPs are The Republicans (REP) and the German People’s Union (DVU). Data are 
available from 1990 to 2003 and, as expected, both parties occupy a very extreme 
right-wing position. What is really noteworthy is the radical position of the CSU in 
1990, more on the right than its usual partner (i.e., the CDU). The 1990 CSU score 
is 0.76 and lower only than the French Gaullist party, while the CDU held a more 
moderate stance of 0.65. Chapter 2 has already specified that, despite of right-
deviancy of CSU in 2002 and 2006 surveys, the Christian Social Union is not an 
actor belonging to the right-wing radicalism.  
                                                
77 Current name: “The Left” (DL). 
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Figure 4.M. Germany: immigration scale. 
 
Therefore, in light also of its traditional merging with the CDU into a unified 
group in the Bundestag, the CSU can be considered as the mainstream right 
challenger of any ERP. Thus, giving its radical stance, the spatial opportunity 
structure is narrower than in other party systems and, eventually, not favourable to 
ERPs. Summing up, REP and DVU together — just for the sake of investigation 
since party cartels are not allowed to contest elections — gathered 2.4 in 1990; 
afterwards, they dropped to 1.9 in 1994 and rose to 3.0 in 1998, and the latter is 
their best electoral performance hitherto. Considering spatial movements of parties, 
in 1994 the CSU even radicalised its stance, while the contrary in the following 
period until it overlapped CDU position in 2000. It implies that when the CSU 
shifted to the right, REP&DVU lost votes and vice versa when the CSU moved 
back to the left. On the other hand, convergence between mainstream parties did 
not turn out: considering the average within CDU and CSU points and, then, 
comparing that to SPD positions, it is plain to see that no real convergence came 
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along. Yet, in 200678 the SPD assumed a very centrist position, but the CSU moved 
again to the right, thus balancing the distance between Social Democrats and 
Christian Democrats as a whole. After the two-year government driven by Angela 
Merkel, leader of the Große Koalition, the REP electoral score in 2008 was lowest 
than ever, so disconfirming that political convergence of mainstream parties 
actually fosters ERPs’ success. 
Turning the focus to the economic domain, in 1999 CDU and SPD converged, 
while the REP occupied a more pro-market stance. Since 1998 was the best 
electoral date in electoral terms for REP&DVU, this could bring some evidence to 
the convergence hypothesis, along with the pro-market stance of REP that, after 
that period, shifted consistently towards the centre. 
 
Figure 4.N. Germany: economic scale. 
 
                                                
78 After national elections, a Great Coalition was set up since neither the centre-right nor the centre-
left coalitions were able to assemble a majority of seats. It should be noted that SPD and Greens 
ruled out the possibility of a majoritarian left-wing coalition with Die Linke. 
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4.7. Greece 
The Greek electoral system can be classified such as a reinforced proportional 
system. First of all, voters cast their ballots choosing between closed lists and seats 
are distributed to parties by a PR-formula and d’Hondt method. Yet, only parties 
able to poll at least 3 per cent of national votes are entitled to gain representation in 
the Parliament. The reinforced part of the system is due to the majority of seats 
awarded to the party winning a plurality of votes. This provision aims at reinforcing 
governmental stability and favouring one-party governments that have usually been 
set up. On the one hand, the national threshold is an intermediate level between, for 
instance, that of Austria and Denmark. On the other hand, the d’Hondt method and 
the seat bonus for the plurality party bring out disproportionality in the distribution 
of seats. Summing up, the Greek electoral law produces one-party government and 
provides a middle-to-low level hurdle to counter excessive party fragmentation. 
Therefore, it can be conceived as a quite permissive electoral system. 
Figure 4.O. Greece: immigration scale. 
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A major hindrance is that the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), i.e. ERP in the 
current research, is not included in expert judgments but in 2006. This is 
understandable since LAOS contested its first national elections in 2004. Since the 
1990s, the Greek party system was based on four main parties: on centre-right, the 
New Democracy (ND) and on the centre-left the Socialist Party (Pasok); 
furthermore, two parties competed for catching radical left-wing vote: the “old” 
Communist Party (KKE) and the more recent Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza). 
Focusing on immigration, after 2003 the ND started shifting towards the centre and 
in 2006 its stance was just a bit above 6.0, hence a moderate position. This opened 
the way for the LAOS that, as Chapter 2 highlighted before, occupied an extremist 
right-wing position. Therefore, the ND movement favoured the strategic entry of 
new party on its right wing. The two mainstream parties — ND and Pasok — were 
extremely close to each other, around the centre of immigration scale, in 1990 but 
at the time no party was able to take advantage of that configuration. After that 
period, the two mainstream parties moved away and, when LAOS emerged, they 
were rather far from each other. About immigration, the convergence hypothesis is 
not thus confirmed. 
Turning to the economic dimension, ND and Pasok in 1990 were, on the 
contrary, rather far and approached only at the beginning of the new century, 
because of the centripetal movement underwent by the Pasok. As outlined by the 
graphical representation, the LAOS positioned between them and, therefore, this 
may be a first hint about the centrist position on economy of ERPs, likewise other 
political contexts. 
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Figure 4.P. Greece: economic scale. 
 
4.8. Ireland 
The Irish electoral system differentiates neatly from all other European 
electoral laws since it implies an ordinal vote, rather than a categorical one. Indeed 
its electoral system does not rest upon party list, like many other PR systems, but it 
is based on a set of candidates to be ranked by each single voter. Its stability is 
proven as it «remained unaltered since it was first employed in 1922» (Gallagher 
2005, 514). The voter is provided a ballot indicating the data of candidates and their 
affiliated political party: she/he must rank all candidates from number one to the 
last one, thereby expressing a full ordering of preference. This system is widely 
known as Single Transferable Vote (STV) since it is based on a double vote 
transfer: from the candidate who has already reached the (Droop) quota to be 
elected and, secondly, from the last candidate in the ranking that is eliminated from 
competition. The transfer is made taking into account the second, the third, and all 
subsequent preferences, and repeating the process until all seats are assigned. As 
noted by Baldini and Pappalardo (2004), the distortion between votes and seats is 
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rather moderate, even though MDM is 4, thus very small, and this should reduces 
strongly proportionality. On the same point, Gallagher asks «how does it come 
about that disproportionality has not been larger?» (Gallagher 2005, 522). The 
author argues that the answer has to be sought in interparty relations: voters of 
small parties, in order to prevent the Republican Party (FF) to win an absolute 
majority, can give to Fianna Fáil candidates a very low position in their orderings 
of preference, despite of policy positions. As Gallagher clearly states, this result 
«can be achieved under PR-STV by ranking candidates of all other parties above 
the Fianna Fáil candidates on the ballot paper» (Gallagher 2005, 522). That said, it 
is possible to argue that the PR-STV system provides a medium barrier to new 
competitors’ entry in the party system. Given that MDM is even lower than in 
Spain, the Irish electoral law cannot be catalogued as a strict proportional system 
(Veugelers and Magnan 2005; Kitschelt 1995). 
Another key feature of Irish party politics regards the two main parties — i.e. 
the already mentioned Fianna Fáil and the Fine Gael (FG) — with special attention 
to their origins. In fact, the distinction between the Republican Party (FF) and the 
United Ireland Party (FG) is mainly due to divergences concerning the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty that created the Irish Free State: the former opposed the Treaty, whereas the 
second was in favour. Hence, the distinction based on the usual left-right scale, or 
pro-market versus pro-state, is not promising to interpret Irish politics. Indeed, the 
graphical representation of the economic axis is line with this expectation: the two 
parties intersect frequently and in three points in time the Republican Party is less 
pro-market than the FG. Yet, both parties belong traditionally to the centre-right 
side, i.e. they are moderately pro-market. However, since its establishment in 1932, 
the FF has been in power for long periods and only in few intervals the FG seized 
power in coalition with the Labour Party (LP), the historical third largest party in 
Irish politics. 
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Figure 4.Q. Ireland: immigration scale. 
 
The spatial positions of parties on immigration in 1990 appear to have been 
favourable for the entry of new party on the right-wing side. Indeed, both FF and 
FG are very close to the centre and only the Progressive Democrats (PD) are more 
on the right, though rather below 7.0 on the scale. Thus, at the beginning of the 
1990s a window for the strategic entry of an ERP was actually present. In the 
aftermath, the FF radicalized its stance, moving towards its right wing, thus 
countering the possible entry of a new party. Irish politics has particular features as 
mentioned earlier and assessing the degree of convergence between mainstream 
parties is quite troublesome. Indeed, the main alternative is between FF and FG, but 
these two parties hold rather similar stances on both scales (i.e., economy and 
immigration). Furthermore, considering the distance between the LP and either FF 
or FG is not fully appropriate because the Labour Party has always been gathered 
percentages at the polls strongly lower than the other two parties79. Again, 
                                                
79 With the exception of the last 2011 national elections: the FF dropped dramatically and the Labour 
Party became the second force in Parliament, behind the FG. 
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considering the distance between FF and FG would yield a strong degree of 
convergence along both axes, whereas they are considered as alternative by public 
opinion and in political discourse. However, always with regards to immigration, 
all parties are clustered around two groups: the first one is composed by the Labour 
Party, the Greens, and the Sinn Féin80; the second one is composed by the 
Republican Party, the United Ireland Party, and the Progressive Democrats. The 
two clusters are quite homogeneous, saved in 2006, setting up a bipolar alternative. 
Therefore, no real convergence is present and, also, given the right-wing shifting of 
the FF, the ground is not very fertile for the exclusionist right. 
Figure 4.R. Ireland: economic scale. 
 
4.9. Italy 
The high complexity in analysing Italy is primarily given by the outstanding 
change that occurred between 1992 and 1994 when major parties, that had been 
protagonists of Italian politics over almost fifty years, were dismantled after Mani 
                                                
80 Expect in 2006 when that party moved to the centre. 
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pulite’s judicial inquiries. The change of electoral system from an almost pure 
proportional to a mixed plurality-PR formula represented one of the most important 
changes at the institutional level81. During the period 1958-1992, the nine 
legislative elections was held with an electoral system based on a PR-formula, 
Imperiali quota and an MDM slightly smaller than 20, namely, equal to 19.57 
(Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 27). Two legal thresholds were present: to 
participate in the distribution of seats, a party had to win at least one seat at the 
constituency level and conquer a minimum of 300,000 votes at the national level. 
These barriers were rather low and useful to prevent an excessive fragmentation of 
seat distribution to small parties. Considering that MDM was rather high, so that 
only minor parties were not able to win any seat, the effective threshold can be 
estimated such as equal to 2 per cent. In 1994, for the first time, legislative 
elections were held with a new electoral system, combining two different formulas: 
three fourth of the total amount of seats were assigned by a first-past-the-post rule, 
while the remaining candidates were elected through a PR-formula with a 4 per 
cent legal threshold. The procedure to assign seats to candidates was even more 
complex because of the presence of the so-called scorporo: this mechanism was set 
to balance the disproportional effects of plurality formula, so that parties that were 
disadvantaged by the “winner-takes-all” principle, could recover some seats with 
the PR formula. Therefore, the two formulas were not independent from each other 
unlike other cases, e.g. the current Japanese electoral system. There are two reasons 
for which the Italian mixed plurality-PR system cannot be considered as a strong 
mechanism preventing the entry of new parties. Firstly, the first-past-the-post logic 
was set into a pre-existing fragmented party system. Furthermore, the first Italian 
party system, established after the end of WWII, suddenly collapsed. About that, it 
suffice to bear in mind that the Christian Democrats, after about half a century 
continuously in government, split in several parties: the Democrazia Cristiana was 
dissolved and its factions formed new centre-right or centre-left parties. This could 
give only a partial, nonetheless useful, idea about the extent of change of Italian 
                                                
81 The other important reform was enacted in 2001 about the re-allocation of competences between 
State and local authorities. This represented the only Constitutional change, whilst the form of 
government stayed unaltered. 
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party system at the beginning of the 1990s. Given the existence of three different 
political areas, briefly identifiable such as left-wing, centrist or right-wing, parties 
tended to set common electoral “umbrella” to be more competitive in the first-past-
the-post part of the electoral system. This implied that political parties did not 
undergone, in the majority of cases, a real process of merging, thereby reducing 
fragmentation; on the contrary, minor parties took advantage of their “blackmail” 
potential since, in a vast portion of constituencies, their marginal percentage 
support could be decisive in terms of winning or losing the seat. Moreover, once in 
Parliament, original parties tend to set up independent Parliamentary groups, 
assuring greater visibility, discarding political symbols used during the electoral 
campaign. In a counter-intuitive way, the proportional side of the electoral law 
represented a higher barrier to small parties for two reasons: on the one hand, the 4 
per cent national level threshold contributed to give representation only to about 5-
6 parties, excluding small political actors. On the other hand, competitors contested 
elections under their own logo and list of candidates, without pre-electoral 
agreements in most cases. That means that the coalition umbrellas were set just for 
plurality competition and it was exactly there that minor parties gained seats. The 
mixed system ruled three legislative elections — i.e., 1994, 1996, and 2001 — and 
was then substituted by a new system that came into force since 2006. 
The new electoral system was approved in 2005 under the Berlusconi’s centre-
right government, and its basic tenets are the abolishment of plurality formula and 
the “extension” of PR formula to the election of all national candidates with a 
complex set of thresholds and a seat-bonus for the winner. On the one hand, parties 
entering a coalition have to gather at least 2 percent of the national votes to 
participate in seat distribution, whereas parties competing alone have to overcome a 
4 per cent national-level clause. An important exception to the 2 percent threshold 
is that, within all lists under that barrier, the party with the best electoral score can 
participate to seat distribution. In other terms, the best “loser” is recovered and, 
therefore, even parties with a small vote share can gain some seats. On the other 
hand, the party or the coalition with just a plurality of votes receives a seat bonus 
up to 340 members in the Lower Chamber. The constituency design kept unaltered 
and borrowed the same structure applied settled by the PR-formula of the mixed 
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system. Finally, seat allocation is calculated at the national level using the very 
proportional method of Hare quota and highest remainders. By and large, the mixed 
system and the more recent electoral law provide middle-to-law barriers against 
new competitors. Therefore, they can be both considered as permissive electoral 
systems. 
Figure 4.S. Italy: immigration scale. 
 
Focusing on immigration, in 1990 the strategic entry was actually feasible 
given that the position of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) was clearly moderate 
around 6.5. In this study, both AN and MSFT were included in the set of ERPs, 
while the LN was prudentially ruled out. Yet, all three parties are grounded on the 
right-wing extreme of the scale, rather far from FI. Checking the evolution of those 
three actors, AN enacted a slow but continuous moderate shift until 2006 when it 
approached the FI posture. The more radical MSFT kept substantially its position, 
while the NL underwent, after an oscillation between 1990 and 2003, a 
considerable displacement leaving right-wing extremism. The passage to the so-
called “Second Republic” between the turbulent period 1992-1994 created a 
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profound breakpoint from the “old” to “new” party system, and this forcedly 
represents an obstacle for the present analysis in terms of continuity of political 
competitors. That said, the AN best electoral performance was realised in 1996 
when the Fini’s party reached its peak of 15.7 per cent. As previously said, AN 
moderated its stance on immigration approaching FI. By and large, the latter kept 
its rather moderate stance without overstepping the value of 7.0 along the scale. In 
the lung run, this configuration did not profit that much to AN that dropped to an 
electoral score just above 12 per cent in the 2006 legislative elections. On the other 
hand, the two Italian mainstream rightist and leftist parties — i.e., FI and PDS/DS 
— kept a considerable ideological distance in both dimensions. Considering two 
legislative elections, 2001 and 2006, Forward Italy and the Left Democrats held a 
sensible distance both on economic and immigration scales, and AN vote share in 
2006 is just slightly lower than in 2001. Since the ideological gap between the 
centre-right and centre-left parties has always been deep, there is no way to test the 
convergence hypothesis along both axis. Yet, exactly because of this profound 
distance between, the AN score is eloquent. A particular difference of National 
Alliance from all other ERPs was its centrist position in the economy since its 
formal establishment. Therefore, unlike in other contexts as previously described, 
AN did not start as pro-market party, while it had always sustained a centrist 
position. 
The trend towards FI was actually confirmed when the two parties merged in 
2008 into the new People of Freedom party (PdL). Even though no data are 
available after 2006, an empty space opened on the right-wing side. Actually, the 
new Storace’s The Right (LD) party joined the MSFT in a cartel that in 2008 
gathered 2.4 per cent of the vote. Though that percentage did not suffice to 
overcome the 4 percent national-level threshold, since the cartel was not part of any 
coalition, it is important to note an increase in votes when AN dissolved into the 
new centre-right party. A confirmation of this association is done also by the 
consistent increase in votes for the NL that double its percentage compared to 2006. 
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Figure 4.T. Italy: economic scale. 
 
4.10. Netherlands 
The Dutch electoral system represents a sort of archetypal of PR-formula. 
Indeed, seats are distributed at the national level that represents a unique 
constituency. A legal threshold has to be reached to win seats, though its level 
equals 0.67 per cent, and this is the lowest legal threshold all over Western Europe. 
Even though the d’Hondt method is employed to translate votes into seats, the 
Dutch electoral system is the best institutional setting representing parties in a very 
proportional way. By consequence, it is straightforward to argue that a similar PR-
formula does not prevent the emergence of new competitors among which an ERP. 
For these reasons, the Dutch electoral law is a strict proportional system. 
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Figure 4.U. Netherlands: immigration scale. 
 
Examining the multi-party system, two parties emerged as right-deviant along 
the GAL/TAN dimension as described in Chapter 2: the Centre Democrats (CD) 
and the Political Reformed Party (SGP). While the former is certainly an ERP, the 
latter is a borderline case since its ideology is rooted in Christian radicalism82. In 
the Netherlands, the mainstream rightist party is the Christian Democratic Appeal 
(CDA)83. In 1990 on immigration, the Christian Democrats stance was clearly on 
the centre84 and, therefore, the political opportunity structure was actually present 
for the CD that in 1994 gathered a significant 2.4 per cent at the polls. 
Subsequently, the CDA kept a somewhat moderate position, whilst the Liberals 
moved further to the right. However, the declining consensus of the CD appears to 
be due to exogenous factors like its very weak and conflicting internal organisation. 
The gap between the PvdA — i.e., here assumed as MLP — and CDA was rather 
consistent and no factual convergence took place. Yet, a particular feature of the 
                                                
82 Thus, it will not be considered in the current subsection. 
83 The spatial positions of the Liberals (VVD) will be taken into account in §5.2. 
84 Instead, the VVD was more radical at 7.0. 
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Dutch party system on immigration is the unexpected stance of the Socialist Party 
(SP) that in 1990, 2000, and 2006 expressed a position more on the right than on 
the left of the political spectrum. 
Figure 4.V. Netherlands: economic scale. 
 
Checking the economic dimension, an important point in time in 1999 where 
the PvdA and CDA converged to the centre. Yet, in 1998 the CD collected a 
percentage of votes just a barely above 1 per cent. Therefore, this represents an 
instance disconfirming the convergence hypothesis. 
4.11. Portugal 
The Parliament of Portugal is composed of four-year term candidates elected 
by a proportional representation. An important feature of the electoral law is the 
absence of any legal threshold to win seats. Yet, multi-member constituencies have 
an MDM of about 12, a middle way between large (like in Italy with the first 
electoral system) and small constituencies (like in Spain or Ireland). Seats are 
assigned employing the d’Hondt method and, as widely known, it tends to over-
represent large parties to the detriment of small ones. As showed by Baldini and 
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Pappalardo (2004, 142), the effective threshold is 5.90. Summing up, the 
Portuguese electoral law can be conceived as a permissive electoral system. 
Figure 4.W. Portugal: immigration scale. 
 
As Chapter 2 highlighted earlier, Portuguese party system does not display any 
proper ERP. However, in all three surveys (Steenbergen and Marks 2007) the 
Social and Democratic Centre-People’s Party85 (CDS-PP) resulted such as the most 
right-deviant along the GAL/TAN dimension. Since the People’s Party is member 
of the homologue European group cannot be considered as an ERP. Considering 
immigration, in the last decade of the 20th century, a favourable configuration of 
party positions was actually present. Indeed, the mainstream rightist party’s 
placement — the Social Democratic Party (PSD) — was just slightly at the right of 
the centre, while the PP was more radical around 6.5 on the scale. Therefore, in that 
decade the political opportunity structure was convenient for a new exclusionist 
right actor. In the aftermath, the PP gradually shifted towards the right, almost 
                                                
85 Henceforth, it is referred to simply as People’s Party. 
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reaching 8.0, whereas the two mainstream party of the left (PS) and the right (PSD) 
approached to the centre. Hence, when convergence created a favourable context 
for an ERP, its potential uprising was hampered by the PP radical stance. 
Figure 4.X. Portugal: economic scale. 
 
In economy, saved in 1999, the distance between PS and PSD is rather evident, 
whilst the PP has always kept a neat pro-market stance. That said, an ERP might 
eventually emerge in the future on two conditions: the adoption of very extremist 
stance on immigration and a centrist position in economy. In fact, the only chance 
for collecting votes is trying to differentiate from the People’s Party posture. 
4.12. Spain 
The Spanish electoral system, despite belonging to the PR group, carries out 
strong majoritarian effects. Thus, it witnesses well how even PR formulas can yield 
a consistent distortion in the process of transformation of votes into seats. Its main 
feature is the very small MDM, indeed multi-member constituencies are generally 
assigned a mean number of candidates lower than 7. Moreover, whether Madrid 
and Barcelona large districts are excluded, the mean average district magnitude 
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decreases around 5 (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004). Seats are distributed at the 
local-district level and a party has to reach at least 3 per cent of votes (at that level) 
to win seats. Thus, a legal threshold is actually in force, even though its role is 
eventually minor since the effective threshold to win seats is dependent on the 
district magnitude. As highlighted by Baldini and Pappalardo (2004, 142), the 
effective threshold is 10.20 per cent, hence markedly higher than the legal one. This 
features make the electoral system particularly suitable for larger parties, whose 
consensus is widely spread all over the country, and for small parties whose vote 
shares are notably concentrated in thin areas like regions, i.e. in the Autonomy 
Communities of Spain. On the contrary, those parties that have a consensus from 
middle to low percentages, without any specific geographical concentration, are 
meant to be seriously under-represented. Indeed, larger parties — like the Popular 
Party (PP) and the Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) — are over-represented, i.e. 
they usually gain a percentage of seats greater than the percentage of votes; on the 
other hand, regional parties generally win a number of seats that is substantially 
proportional to their amount of votes. Instead, the United Left (IU) is strongly 
under-represented: even though its vote share has been around 4-5 per cent, the 
party is not able to win seats at the local level since those are generally won by the 
two largest parties. Moreover, the IU does not have any particular area where its 
vote share is outstanding compared to other constituencies. By consequence, the 
emergence of an ERP is severely hampered, saved whether its electorate would be 
particularly condensed in some constituencies. Yet, the electoral system is not 
permissive and represents a major obstacle to the entry of new competitors, at least 
without a regional-based political platform. 
Spatial positions of parties on immigration shed light on obstacles towards the 
entry of new parties. As showed, in 1990 the position of the Popular Party was over 
7.0 and in 2003 was even further on the right over 8.0 on the scale. The respective 
distance towards the PSOE has been always consistent and particularly deep in 
2003. In a nutshell, the PP radical stance on immigration and the absence of 
convergence with the Socialists are not favourable configurations for ERPs to 
emerge. The data about DN and FE-JONS spatial positions are available only for 
the last decade of the 20th century: as showed by the graphic, they expressed a very 
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radical stance between 9.0 and 10.0, but their electoral scores were de facto 
negligible. 
The Popular Party stance in economy is evidently pro-market and more rightist 
than other mainstream Christian Democratic parties. The only point in time when 
the two mainstream parties are relatively close to each other was in 1999 when 
especially the Socialists converged to the centre. About economic positions, 
unfortunately no data are available for extreme right parties.  
Figure 4.Y. Spain: immigration scale. 
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Figure 4.Z. Spain: economic scale. 
 
 
4.13. Sweden 
The Swedish electoral system employs a PR-formula and, unlike other 
Scandinavian countries described earlier, political parties need to gather at least 4 
per cent of the national vote to entry Parliament. That legal threshold is rather high, 
considering that in Denmark is only 2 per cent and in Finland is totally absent. The 
method used to distribute seat is the modified St. Laguë that, considering the degree 
of disproportionality, is more proportional than the d’Hondt method and less 
proportional than the pure St. Laguë one. Computations to assign seats to parties 
take place at the national level and this increases proportionality. Briefly, the 
Swedish electoral system provides a middle hurdle for parties to gain seats, on the 
wave of the Austrian electoral law, but cannot be conceived as permissive. 
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Figure 4.AA. Sweden: immigration scale. 
 
In the analysis of right-deviancy along the GAL/TAN dimension, the Christian 
Democrats (KD) resulted as the farer party along that axis. However, KD is 
member of the European People’s Party, thus it was ruled out from the exclusionist 
right group. On the other hand, the New Democracy party (NyD) was considered in 
the literature as a party ideologically compatible with right-wing radicalism. Even 
though it is not conceived as an ERP by the current research, it appears appropriate 
to mention briefly its electoral performances. Its major breakthrough was in the 
1991 elections when NyD gathered an outstanding 6.7 per cent and entered the 
Riksdag. Examining party positions on immigration, this result is not surprising. 
Indeed, the stance of the Moderate Party (M) — i.e., the mainstream rightist party 
— was equal to 6.0, thus leaving a profitable empty space on its right wing for the 
entry of new more radical competitor. The Moderates moved just slightly to the 
right in 2000 but, in the aftermath, they assumed an even more centrist position 
than before. Nevertheless, the NyD was not able to profit of this trend and, on the 
contrary, it dissolved by the end of the last century after declining electoral scores. 
This is probably due to exogenous factors that are not considered in this study, in 
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particular a weak organisation that brought about internal quarrels. That said, in 
2006 the position of all parties, but the radical left, was clustered around the centre: 
this implies that the electoral breakthrough of an ERP is always viable. That 
expectation has found evidence in the 2010 elections when the Sweden Democrats 
(SD) conquered a crucial 6.2 per cent. They entered Parliament and acquired a 
relevant role since the centre-right government, leaded by the Moderate Party, is 
not backed by an absolute majority of seats. 
Figure 4.AB. Sweden: economic scale. 
 
Examining the economic dimension, parties are more far away from each 
other. The economic platforms of Social Democrats and Moderates are very 
different and the 2006 configuration reflects the setting of two blocks, i.e. centre-
right and centre-left. Thus, convergence is absent and the only information about 
NyD is its pro-market stance in 1999, while no data are available for the Sweden 
Democrats. 
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4.14. United Kingdom 
The Westminster model is underpinned by the plurality electoral system, where 
in each uninominal district the winner takes all. Namely, the candidate who gathers 
just a plurality in her/his district is elected, whereas votes given to all other 
candidates, from the second to the last one, are “wasted”, i.e. they are not 
represented in Parliament. As Duverger noted (1958), the plurality system tend to 
produce a two-party system at the district level, since in each constituency only two 
candidates hold real chances to win the seat. Electors who are aware of this 
structure of competition will tend to vote strategically for the candidate who had 
more possibilities to defeat the candidate farer from their ideal point. When this 
holds true, the plurality brings about a psychological effect on the voter, while the 
mechanical effect of the electoral system is due, as said above, to the first-past-the-
post logic of seat distribution. According to this reasoning, the entry of new 
competitors in the political arena appears very difficult, since parties already 
existing for many decades have acquired a comparative advantage than potential 
new parties that are unknown to the electorate. Furthermore, gaining credit towards 
the electorate as competitors with chances of winning seat is not an easy job for a 
hypothetical ERP. As outlined by Sartori (2004), the plurality system is able to 
yield a two-party system at the national level only when party system is structured 
and no incoercible ethnic or religious minorities are present. The second caveat 
shed light on countries like Canada and India displaying, despite the plurality 
formula, a truly multi-party system. Thus, in the United Kingdom, as long as the 
plurality system will be in force, the possibility for new competitors to gain MPs in 
the House of Commons is restricted and viable only by holding a majoritarian 
consensus in some area of the countries. This appears the only real chance that they 
hold to win some seats in those districts where their consensus is strongly greater 
than in others. Hence, once the two-party system is deeply rooted, the plurality 
formula wields a strong freezing effect at the district level (Sartori 2004) and 
constitutes a formidable obstacle to the rise of an ERP. The plurality system is sure 
enough the least permissive electoral law. 
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Figure 4.AC. United Kingdom: immigration scale. 
 
Moreover, examining party positions on immigration, the Conservative Party 
held a radical position all along the last decade of the 20th century. This forced the 
BNP to place itself on the very extreme right. In 2006, the Conservatives’ stance on 
the topic was even further on the right and, again, the UKIP was pushed on the 
right wing limits of the axis. It should be reminded that the UKIP is considered like 
a borderline case in the exclusionist right group, whilst no more data are available 
for the BNP both in 2003 and 2006 and is not included in the set under 
investigation. Its very thin electoral scores appear to have been very affected by 
electoral barriers and the radical stance of the Conservatives. 
Concerning positions on economy, the BNP data are absent, whereas are 
available for the UKIP in 1999 and 2006. That party have held a very pronounced 
pro-market stance, more than the Conservative Party. After the Thatcher era, the 
Tories moderated sensibly their stance, abandoning their radical neo-liberal 
economic platform. Yet, the distance in regards to the Labour Party appears to be 
significant, with the partial exception of 1999 when they positioned closer than in 
other points in time. On the other hand, the Labour Party underwent an evident 
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right-wing turn on immigration until 2006, when its stance around 6.5 is generally 
more usual for a rightist than a leftist mainstream party. However, the convergence 
took place on the right-wing side of the political spectrum, and not on the centre, 
hence this does not seem a favourable contingency for ERPs. 
Figure 4.AD. United Kingdom: economic scale. 
 
5. DATA EXAMINATION 
5.1. Strategic entry 
The first step is based onto the political opportunity structure framework. 
Indeed, the aim here is to estimate the extent of a potential empty space for an ERP 
to enter the immigration scale. Therefore, the spatial positions of political parties 
along that dimension in 1990 are brought into account. In particular, the focus 
points to the first time period for which data are available. Besides, while in some 
countries ERPs were already active, the beginning of the 1990s is by all means a 
crucial stage. In fact, after 1989 stunning changes — i.e., the fading of the Cold 
War, the collapse of the Communist block in Eastern Europe, and the breakdown 
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USSR — politics entered a new era. Furthermore, the economic downfall of 
communism and the prevalence of the liberal-democratic model triggered a sensible 
mutation of party struggle. In fact, cultural and value conflicts could receive greater 
attention since the communist threat has been practically extinguished. Thereby, as 
already argues in Chapter 1, the antagonism between pro-state and pro-market 
competitors loosened, while globalisation soared as the new world wide social 
phenomenon. 
Hence, the following table reports the spatial position on the immigration scale 
of the mainline rightist party in each country. More specifically, the latter one 
generally is either a current European People’s Party member — namely, part of 
the Christian Democratic family86 — or a Liberal party and, therefore, generally 
associated to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. As commonly 
known, the three European traditional mainstream party families are: the Socialists 
and Social Democrats on the left; the Christian Democrats and the Liberals on the 
right, even though the liberal-democratic parties have a greater variance of postures 
inside their group. 
Table 4.3. Strategic entry: 1990 scores on immigration scale. 
Country Party Family Score 
Austria ÖVP Christian Democrats 0.56 
Belgium/Fl VVD Liberals 0.69 
Belgium/Wa PRL Liberals 0.72 
Denmark V Christian Democrats 0.63 
Finland KOK Christian Democrats 0.52 
France RPR Gaullist 0.78 
Germany CDU/CSU87 Christian Democrats 0.67 
Greece ND Christian Democrats 0.53 
Ireland FF Liberals 0.72 
Italy FI (1995) Christian Democrats 0.65 
Netherlands VVD Liberals 0.71 
                                                
86 Actually, some insider nuances deserve to be mentioned. The French RPR is on the wake of 
Gaullist tradition. Although belonging to the centre-right area, its ideological tenets cannot be 
simply reduced to Christian Democratic values. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party too 
has a peculiar history and specificity making it different from all other usual confessional parties of 
continental Europe. Finally, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia borrowed a consistent part of its cadres from 
the defunct Democrazia Cristiana, though its personal imprinting and leadership created a 
charismatic party able to round up many former liberals and social democrats. Beyond their 
historical backgrounds, all three parties are antagonists of socialists and left-wing democratic 
parties. 
87 The Christian Social Union is further on the right than the Christian Democratic Union, its larger 
partner in the Bundestag, with a score of 0.76 compared to 0.65. Since the former contest general 
elections just in Bavaria, the final score reported in the table equals the mean scores of two parties, 
so that avoiding the over-estimation of considering just the CSU’s stance. 
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Portugal PSD Christian Democrats 0.55 
Spain PP Christian Democrats 0.72 
Sweden M Christian Democrats 0.60 
United Kingdom Cons Conservatives 0.71 
 
Descriptive statistics of party scores return 0.65 (mean) and 0.67 (median). 
Since party scores range from 0 to 1, the mean is an appropriate cut-off point to 
divide cases presenting a favourable spatial opportunity structure for ERPs. 
Namely, all political parties whose posture is equal or inferior to the median 
position, actually left a profitable empty space on their right-wing that might 
stimulate the entry of a new ERP competitor. 
Figure 4.AE. Bar chart about 1990 immigration scores. 
 
The figure below helps representing the overall situation, with the Flemish 
Liberal party (VVD) in the median position and the vertical line representing the 
fixed threshold. All parties over the median position are positioned so as the entry 
of new right-wing challenger is discouraged. Among them, the only country where 
an ERP currently exist and is electorally successful — and already had a prominent 
role at that point in time, i.e. the National Front — is France where the Gaullist 
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party expressed a firm rightist posture just a bit lower than 0.8 This may be due to 
the early relevance of the FN that, in the 1984 European elections and in 1986 
general elections, made spectacular inroads, thereby forcing the Gaullist to a 
reaction. Actually, the so-called French “Republican” right very soon was 
compelled to enact a strategy to counter the expansion of the Front National: The 
political struggle between the “two rights” is still nowadays a crucial factor in 
French politics. The Spanish Popular Party as well is neatly on the right, but this is 
hardly surprising since, as already mentioned above, the mainline rightist party in 
Spain is the result of the movement from the right to the centre of Alianza Popular, 
a political actor that absorbed other moderate centrist parties. Within the group of 
parties over the median, there are three Liberals actors, i.e. in Wallonia, Ireland, 
and the Netherlands. Summing up, French RPR is the only case that goes markedly 
counter the theoretical expectation issue from political opportunity structure 
framework. 
On the other hand, considering Flanders as the median position, together with 
Italy, Denmark, and Austria above theoretical expectations are satisfied. Indeed, 
those four countries have electorally successful ERP and in 1990 their respective 
mainline rightist parties had a posture on immigration below the threshold. This is 
particularly true in the Austrian party system where the ÖVP stand at the right of 
the centre. The Haider’s escalation to party leadership dated just four years early 
and the FPÖ was still a member of the Liberal International until 1993 expulsion. 
The very moderate posture of the Christian Democrats is then comprehensible. 
Nevertheless, in the same group, there are also countries without successful ERPs, 
especially Sweden, Portugal, Finland, and Greece, even though in the last two cases 
ERPs have been recently able to increase their support. 
With the exception of France, the moderate position of mainline rightist parties 
is necessary condition. 
5.2. Party convergence 
The very first stage concerns the identification of the so-called Mainstream 
Rightist Parties (MRPs) within each party system. That label refers to the party(-
ies) that can be considered as leader(s) in the centre-right area because of their 
spatial positions and electoral vote shares. However, the task is intricate in some 
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political context. Indeed, while the centre-left segment is usually presided over by a 
Socialist/Social Democratic party88, the setting is trickier in the centre-right 
interval. In fact, in some of the countries here at stake, Christian democratic and 
Liberal parties compete for the supremacy. Moreover, a clear-cut bipolar 
competition is not always present. In other terms, party configuration is not 
necessarily structured around two opposite blocks leaded, respectively, by an MLP 
and MRP whose supremacy cannot be credibly challenged by their allies. The 
baseline of the investigation is drawn upon Kitschelt89 whose list is composed of 
major moderate left and right parties whose average electoral support in the 1980s 
was at least equal to 15 percent. In regard to the leftist area, the only change is 
about Portugal where the major moderate actor is the Socialist Party. Indeed, even 
though the parties of the so-called post-materialist and libertarian “New Left” — 
e.g., the Left Block or the Unitarian Democratic Coalition — have a notable 
strength, in the last two decades the Socialists are by all means the dominant party 
of the centre-left area. On the other hand, more significant changes are made to the 
centre-right counter-part. 
The first troublesome case is Belgium, here analysed separately into its two 
main regions. As already mentioned, pillars underpin Belgian politics (and society) 
and the focus is on the Christian Democratic and the Liberal ones. In Flanders, 
there are two major actors located in centre-right: the Christian Democrats (CD&V) 
and the Liberals (VLD). On the one hand, the more right-wing party, both along the 
economic and immigration scales, is the VLD, though the role played by the 
CD&V cannot be put aside. This is further confirmed by electoral trends, since the 
Christian Democrats have held the largest vote share in the last two decades. By 
calculating the mean percentage at the polls, the CD&V reached 15.13 percent, 
while the VLD 12.52. The following graph highlights that the latter overstepped 
slightly the former within the interval 1999-2003. In light of this situation, the 
choice of considering both parties as MRP(s) appears consistent.  
                                                
88 Namely, a party that at present is member of the “Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats” 
(S&D) in the European Parliament. 
89 See footnote of Table 2.2 (Kitschelt 1995, 54). 
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Figure 4.AF. Flanders: CD&V and VLD electoral trends (1991-2010). 
 
In Wallonia, the setting is rather different: although the Christian Democratic 
and the Liberal parties are important players, the Humanist Democratic Centre 
(CDH) is a small party whose vote share never overstepped 10 per cent at the 
federal level and the mean vote percentage is 6.43. On the other hand, the Liberals 
(MR) has gathered a larger average (10.28 per cent) and has always kept their 
electoral supremacy over the Christian Democrats. Moreover, the MR is the most 
right-wing party on both dimensions here at stakes. Given the actual gap of 
electoral strength between the two parties, the current analysis will consider only 
the francophone Liberals as MRP. Indeed, the goal is to maintain parsimony and, 
therefore, the general principle is that the MRP is unique. Party systems featured by 
two MRPs are to be considered as exceptions and adequately motivated like in 
Flanders and in the Netherlands (as explained later on by this subsection). 
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Figure 4.AG. Wallonia: MR and CDH electoral trends (1991-2010). 
 
About Denmark, Kitschelt (1995) considered the Conservative Party (KF) as 
the mainline rightist party and that choice is upheld by the primacy over the 
Liberals during the 1980s. However, at the beginning of the 1990s a shift in the 
balance of power between the two parties occurred. In particular, in the 1994 
elections the Venstre (V) overstepped the KF for more than 8 percentage points. 
Since that time onwards, the Liberals has consolidated their unchallengeable 
supremacy in the centre-right area. It is straightforward to consider the Venstre as 
MRP, also in accordance with right-wing spatial position. More precisely, V and 
KF hold an average position of 0.76 on economy, while on immigration V is a little 
more rightist on average than KF (i.e., 0.72 compared to 0.71).  
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Figure 4.AH. Denmark: V and KF electoral trends (1990-2007). 
 
Some doubts may be arisen in relation to Finland because of the presence of 
KESK and KOK. However, the former agrarian party has recently evolved in a 
centrist-liberal party. More in details, the KESK has a mean score on economy 
equal to 0.51 and on immigration equal to 0.55. On the other hand, the KOK is 
evidently more right wing on average, i.e., 0.76 on economy and 0.56 on 
immigration. Thus, it appears opportune to take into account the latter as MRP, 
since it put forth a political platform alternative to that of the Socialists. In this case, 
again, the present investigation sticks with Kitschelt’s selection (1995). 
About Ireland, as already explained early, the main problem is that the overall 
left-right scale does not really fit Irish politics. In particular, this holds true in 
relation to the competition between FF and FG, two parties with very similar 
profiles in terms of economic and immigration tenets. That said and considering 
that the Labour Party has usually allied with the Fine Gael to form executives (like 
after the very recent 2011 elections), the Fianna Fáil is selected as MRP.  
Finally, in the Netherlands, there is a configuration similar to that previously 
described about Flanders. Two main parties belong to the centre-right area: the 
Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Liberals (VVD). With regard to economy, 
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VVD is clearly more pro-market than CDA (respectively, average scores are 0.81 
and 0.60) and the same in relation to immigration (respectively, average scores are 
0.76 and 0.56). However, electoral trends emphasize that CDA has had a largest 
average vote share in the 1989-2010 time period, i.e. 22.9 and 18.8 percent. During 
the second half of the 1990s, the Liberals were able to overstep their competitors 
and the same happened in the 2010 general elections. Saved these situations, the 
Christian Democrats have held the primacy in the centre-right area: e.g., in the 
2002 general elections the CDA outdistanced the VVD with more than 12 
percentage points. In analogy with Flanders, both parties are taken into account as 
MRP. 
Figure 4.AI. Netherlands: CDA and VVD electoral trends (1989-2010). 
 
In conclusion, German CDU and CSU are sometimes considered as a single 
party and, in other cases, as two distinct parties. Here, the choice has fallen onto the 
first option and party scores with electoral vote shares are employed to determine 
the spatial coordinates of the new CDU&CSU political player. More precisely, 
CDU and CSU spatial positions, on both dimensions, are weighted with their 
respective percentage of votes, polled in the closest election. The calculation of 
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weighted means is congruous since the two parties — that usually form one single 
party group in Parliament — have not the same electoral strength. Indeed, in terms 
of power relation, the Christian Democratic Union has more relative power than 
their Bavarian allies. 
Table 4.4. Germany: CDU&CSU scores on economic and immigration scales. 
 Economy Immigration 
surveys 1992 1999 2003 2006 1990 2000 2003 2006 
CDU 0.66 0.57 0.71 0.68 0.65 0.68 0.72 0.77 
CSU - 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.76 0.79 0.73 0.87 
elections 1994 1998 2002 2005 1990 1998 2002 2005 
CDU 34.2 28.4 29.5 27.8 36.7 28.4 29.5 27.8 
CSU - 6.7 9.0 7.4 7.1 6.7 9.0 7.4 
         
CDU&CSU 0.66 0.59 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.72 0.79 
 
Summing up, the following table provide the comprehensive list of MRP and 
MLP for each European country. 
Table 4.5. Mainstream Rightist and Leftist Parties. 
Country MRP MLP 
Austria ÖVP SPÖ 
Belgium/Flanders PVV/VLD; CD&V SP 
Belgium/Wallonia PRL/MR PS 
Denmark V S 
Finland KOK SDP 
France RPR/UMP PS 
Germany CDU&CSU SPD 
Greece ND PASOK 
Ireland FF LABOUR 
Italy FI PDS/DS 
Netherlands VVD; CDA PvdA 
Portugal PSD PS 
Spain PP PSOE 
Sweden M SAP 
UK CONS LABOUR 
 
To determine the size of the spatial gap between the mainstream right and left 
parties, it is sufficient to calculate the difference between MRP and MLP scores for 
each of the four survey values, along both dimensions. Then, the two final average 
scores are the mean of the four distances. With regards to Flanders and the 
Netherlands, given the presence of two MRPs, the party interval is calculated twice 
and, afterwards, a final average score of them is computed. For instance, in 
Flanders, firstly the spatial gap in calculated between VLD and SP and, secondly, 
between CD&V and SP. The two resulting values are employed to compute a 
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comprehensive mean score. The aim of this analysis is assessing the degree of 
convergence between mainstream parties and, in analogy with Chapter 3, binary 
values are attributed to countries to signal when convergence is present [1] or 
absent [0]. Needless to say, the big hindrance is assessing when convergence 
actually turned out, i.e. the theoretical difficulty lies in the identification of a 
threshold under which convergence is present. In other terms, since party distances 
are here at stakes, this investigation needs to fix a cut-off point under which MRP 
and MLP are sufficiently close to state that they converged.  
On the economic scale, the mean and the median are very close to each other. 
Values are distributed in a way that the assignment of [1] and [0] scores are 
troublesome. From Finland (0.44) upwards, mainstream parties are on average 
enough far to state that convergence is absent. On the other hand, from Netherlands 
(0.35) downwards, mainstream parties are on average rather close to state that 
convergence is present. On a middle ground, there five cases whose situation is less 
straightforward to evaluate: Flanders (0.37), France and Spain (0.38), Denmark and 
UK (0.39). However, the inclusion of VLD has increased the Flemish mean, while 
considering only CD&V that value is much lower. Moreover, Flanders are above 
the median and, for these reasons, convergence is evaluated as absent, whereas in 
all other four cases is coded as present [1]. 
Table 4.6. Economy: score distance between MRP and MLP. 
Country 1992 1999 2003 2006  E_AV E_CONV 
Austria 0.15 0.20 0.38 0.40  0.28 1 
0.54 0.45 0.48 0.53 0.50 Belgium/Fl 0.28 0.27 0.11 0.30 0.24 0.37 1 
Belgium/Wa 0.54 0.44 0.49 0.43  0.47 0 
Denmark 0.44 0.43 0.39 0.30  0.39 0 
Finland 0.44 0.48 0.39 0.44  0.44 0 
France 0.38 0.29 0.38 0.49  0.38 0 
Germany 0.37 0.18 0.26 0.33  0.29 1 
Greece 0.36 0.20 0.21 0.27  0.26 1 
Ireland 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.25  0.29 1 
Italy 0.42 0.40 0.57 0.47  0.47 0 
0.61 0.30 0.46 0.43 0.45 Netherlands 0.41 0.09 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.35 1 
Portugal 0.28 0.16 0.31 0.22  0.24 1 
Spain 0.42 0.21 0.49 0.40  0.38 0 
Sweden 0.49 0.42 0.56 0.47  0.48 0 
UK 0.62 0.28 0.38 0.26  0.39 0 
mean      0.37  
median      0.38  
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The investigation of the immigration scale appears more clear-cut, because of 
the “break” between Flemish and Dutch scores. Taking into account that the mean 
is 0.25, the median 0.22, and the standard deviation 0.082, the difference between 
Flanders (0.22) and the Netherlands (0.28) equal 0.6. By sorting countries in a 
decreasing order, convergence on immigration is stated as absent [0] from the 
Netherlands upwards, while converged occurred [1] from Flanders downwards.  
Table 4.7. Immigration: score distance between MRP and MLP. 
Country 1990 2000 2003 2006  I_AV I_CONV 
Austria 0.14 0.04 0.25 0.30  0.18 1 
0.29 0.23 0.41 0.24 0.29 Belgium/Fl 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.21 0.15 0.22 1 
Belgium/Wa 0.37 0.27 0.22 0.28  0.29 0 
Denmark 0.28 0.22 0.19 0.10  0.20 1 
Finland 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.02  0.19 1 
France 0.46 0.37 0.32 0.33  0.37 0 
Germany 0.30 0.28 0.36 0.25  0.30 0 
Greece 0.02 0.20 0.28 0.31  0.20 1 
Ireland 0.37 0.32 0.42 0.11  0.30 0 
Italy 0.44 0.38 0.53 0.37  0.43 0 
0.37 0.33 0.42 0.38 0.38 Netherlands 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.28 0 
Portugal 0.19 0.14 0.24 0.11  0.17 1 
Spain 0.26 0.32 0.48 0.25  0.33 0 
Sweden 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.09  0.14 1 
UK 0.27 0.18 0.25 0.15  0.21 1 
mean      0.25  
median      0.22  
 
 
5.3. Comparative Analysis 
The country-by-country analysis described in section 4 has already tackled the 
most important features of the electoral systems. At present, the aim is to classify 
them in accordance with their degree of “permissiveness”, i.e. whether their 
structure provides a strong or weak barrier in preventing small parties or new 
challengers to enter the party system. Thus, legal and effective thresholds and the 
mean district magnitude (MDM) are crucial tools to that purpose. It is worth noting 
that in Belgium and Spain local the legal threshold is lower than the effective 
threshold, hence the last one is indicated in the table, while in Germany the number 
of members in the Bundestag is variable. The related binary values are obtained 
through a comprehensive qualitative assessment. 
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Table 4.8. Electoral systems: thresholds and MDM values. 
Country Threshold MDM 
Austria 4 20.30 
Belgium/Fl 9.2 7.50 
Belgium/Wa 9.2 7.50 
Denmark 2 175 
Finland 5.4 13.21 
France 12.5 1 
Germany 5 620.20 
Greece 3 5.30 
Ireland 16.96 3.81 
Italy 4 155 
Netherlands 0.67 150 
Portugal 5.9 12.70 
Spain 10.2 6.73 
Sweden 4 349.18 
UK 35 1 
Note: Legal threshold in bold characters. 
Source: MDM values are drawn from Baldini and Pappalardo 2004. 
The following table reports all binary scores employed in the csQCA analysis 
and the outcome has been dichotomised by resorting again to the 5 per cent hurdle 
(see Table 3.6). 
Table 4.9. Binary values. 
Country OUCTOME ELSYS E_CONV I_CONV 
Austria 1 0 1 1 
Belgium/Fl 1 0 1 1 
Belgium/Wa 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 1 1 0 1 
Finland 0 1 0 1 
France 1 0 0 0 
Germany 0 0 1 0 
Greece 0 1 1 1 
Ireland 0 0 1 0 
Italy 1 1 0 0 
Netherlands 0 1 1 0 
Portugal 0 1 1 1 
Spain 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 1 
UK 0 0 0 1 
 
It is plain to see that there are no necessary conditions, i.e. conditions that are 
always present [1] when the outcome is present [1]. For the search of sufficient 
conditions it is very useful to made up the truth table, whose lines represent 
configuration of causal conditions for which at least one real case exists. The 
usefulness of the truth table regards identification, if any, of group of countries 
sharing a common configuration of conditions and, on the other hand, contradictory 
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configurations where countries sharing the same configuration display divergent 
outcomes. 
Table 4.10. Truth table. 
ELSYS E_CONV I_CONV OUTCOME COUNTRY 
0 1 1 1 Austria, Belgium/Fl 
0 0 0 C Belgium/Wa, France, Spain 
1 0 1 C Denmark, Finland 
0 1 0 0 Germany, Ireland 
1 1 1 0 Greece, Portugal 
1 0 0 1 Italy 
1 1 0 0 Netherlands 
0 0 1 0 Sweden, UK 
 
The overall situation can be better represented through a Venn diagram as 
follows: 
Figure 4.AJ. Three-condition Venn diagram. 
 
Note: Venn diagram produced by Tosmana 1.3.2 software (Cronqvist 2011). 
Abbreviations: AUS: Austria, BEL(FL): Belgium/Flanders, BEL(WA): Belgium/Wallonia, DEN: 
Denmark, FIN: Finland, FRA: France, GER: Germany, GRE: Greece, IRE: Ireland, ITA: Italy, 
NET: Netherlands, PO: Portugal, SPA: Spain, SWE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom. 
Firstly, cases with a positive outcome [1] are brought into account. In terms of 
electoral strength of ERPs, Austria and Flanders hold a major relevance and they 
share the same combination of causal conditions. Indeed, both countries do not 
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have a permissive electoral system: although grounded in the PR formula, their 
respective electoral systems are equipped, as already described, with barriers 
countering the entry of new political players. In terms of party spatial positions, 
MRP and MLP have held a reciprocal means below the average with respect to the 
European mean level. Thus, convergence theory receives confirmation in those two 
countries. In Austria, along the economic scale, the trend about the MRP and MLP 
distance has been increasing for the entire period analysed. However, that gap has 
been very low during the 1990s and the same is true also in relation to immigration 
where MRP –MLP divide was only 0.4. It is worth noting that in 1999 the FPÖ 
realized its major electoral breakthrough. In Flanders, complexity is given by the 
presence of two MRP. Considering the more right-wing between the, i.e. the 
Flemish Liberals, the distance is strong on economy but just over the mean on 
immigration. Moreover, the MRP-MRL gap on immigration is below the mean in 
two occasions, i.e. in 2000 and 2006. On the other hand, taking the Christian 
Democrats as MRP, the divide with the Socialists is always weak, especially on 
immigration: e.g., in 2000 that difference equals just 0.10. Summing up, in Flanders 
party positions on immigration appears to play a more important role with reference 
to the VB electoral strength. 
A more problematic instance is the Italian configuration of conditions. Firstly, 
three different electoral systems have been employed from 1990 to 2006. 
Furthermore, several main parties were dissolved during the turbulent period 1992-
1994. These are two major reasons why Italy has a very different situation from all 
other countries in the set that did not undergo profound changes in terms of 
electoral laws and political actors. Since party proliferation has been increasing 
from the 1994 elections onwards, the electoral systems have been proved inefficient 
in providing sufficient barriers to contain party fragmentation. On the other hand, in 
terms of party spatial locations, no convergence occurred neither on economic nor 
on immigration scales. For the sake of clarity it is useful to analyse the mixed 
electoral system employed in three elections (1994, 1996, and 2001). Even though 
three fourth of total seats were assigned with a plurality formula, elections were 
contested by two coalitions internally made of several parties. Therefore, 
fragmentation was embedded a priori into coalitions. Moreover, these were based 
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on a larger party with their minor allies and the former played as a pivot in 
bargaining with its party partners the distribution of candidates in all 475 districts. 
These negotiations were necessarily based on the electoral reciprocal support of the 
pivot party compared to its allies. Thus, although strongly majoritarian, the 
electoral system has been handled to produce proportional effects, at least within 
coalitions. The style of communication and political competition was strongly 
adversarial for several accounts, among which, the harshly contested political role 
of the media-tycoon Silvio Berlusconi and the lack of consistent party alternation in 
the national government; indeed, about this second aspect, for about half a century 
the Christian Democrats have uninterruptedly ruled the country (with the Socialists 
and other small parties), while the Communists and the MSI as well suffered the 
conventio ad excludendum preventing them to participate in national governments. 
The DC-PCI gap, after the dissolution of both parties, was renewed between Forza 
Italia (FI) and the Left Democrats (DS), namely, the main heirs of the two cultural 
traditions in Italy, i.e. the Catholic and the communist. This depicts a pattern where 
the two pivot parties of their political camps use to struggle in a deeply conflicting 
way. The confirmation of this attitude comes from the absence of convergence 
between FI and DS. Then, the Italian case does not fit theoretical expectations 
stemming from the convergence hypothesis. 
Secondly, the truth table displays two contradictory configurations. The first 
one involves France that is placed in the group with Wallonia and Spain. It is plain 
to see that the French position is not in line with causal mechanisms here at stakes. 
Indeed, its configuration is made up of the absence of all three conditions. Likewise 
Italy, France presents an adversarial bipolar competition underpinned on the rivalry 
between the Socialists with other minor parties of the gauche and the republican 
right founded by de Gaulle. The PS and RPR have always been far from each other, 
especially on immigration. Hence, the settlement of a “third pole” on the right, 
embodied by the National Front, has been proved strong as much as to survive and 
develop despite unfavourable conditions from the supply side point of view. 
Neither the electoral system has advantaged Le Pen’s party, on the contrary the 
double-round voting system has deprived the FN of many seats that it would had 
collected with a less disproportional electoral system. This fact has been 
 181 
documented in the 1986 parliamentary elections ruled by a PR formula with 5 per 
cent national threshold. Thus, France represent a deviant case in terms of supply 
side factors since the National Front, considered also such as a sort of archetypal of 
radical right party, has managed to survive and prosper despite institutional and 
party factors are neatly adverse. 
The second contradictory configuration joins Denmark with Finland. Two 
conditions are present, i.e. permissive electoral system and convergence between 
MRP and MLP on immigration, and one in absent, MRP and MLP are not 
convergent on economy. Since two conditions are positively set, the electoral 
strength of the Danish People’s Party (DF) is explained by a PR system without 
relevant barriers preventing party fragmentation, combined with a convenient 
opportunity structure on immigration. Of course, the last one is the favourite issue 
exploited by ERPs. In accordance to this, the weak electoral support of the True 
Finns (PS) in Finland goes counter theoretical expectation, even though the 
electoral trend is increasing. 
On the whole, three out of five countries where the outcome is positive [1] 
have two conditions that are present [1] and in all those three cases (Austria, 
Denmark, and Flanders) MRP and MLP converged on immigration. On the other 
hand, Italy and especially France do not satisfy the hypothesis, in particular in both 
instances MRP and MLP are not convergent in any dimension here analysed. 
That said, the focus is shifted towards cases whose outcome is absent [0]. 
Starting from the analysis of electoral systems, four cases do not have permissive 
electoral system: Germany, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Yet, in the 
first two countries a convergence occurred on economy, but not on immigration, 
whereas the other way around for the last two cases. Then, in the Netherlands the 
situation is more complicated. As widely knows, the Dutch electoral system is 
extremely permissive and its degree of proportionality is almost pure. This is 
associated with a convergence on economy, but not on immigration. Therefore, it is 
possible to argue that although two conditions are present, the absence of 
convergence on immigration had a major impact on impeding the rise of a strong 
ERP. Comparing the Dutch to the Danish case, one important difference is about 
the role played by the Liberals: in Denmark, the distance between the Venstre and 
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the social democratic party has been decreasing, especially because of the right-
wing shifting of the latter player. On the contrary, in the Netherlands the VVD has 
kept its right-wing posture and a consistent distance from the PvdA, thus thwarting 
the settlement of an ERP. Last but not least, the position of Greece and Portugal is 
totally incoherent with theoretical expectations. This is in line with what has been 
discovered in the previous chapter when they showed a configuration where all 
three conditions were present. Whether in Greece the LAOS has recently polled 
better, in Portugal an ERP is totally absent, perhaps because of the CDS/PP, 
namely, a steady conservative Christian Democratic party. However, since all 
conditions are present [1] and the outcome is absent [0], theoretical hypotheses are 
totally rejected. To conclude, two cases are in the same group of France described 
early: Wallonia and Spain. In these instances, hypotheses are confirmed since for 
both countries the outcome is absent [0]. More precisely, in Wallonia the FN has 
had an average consensus below 5 per cent and has been classified as absent in 
binary terms. This implies that Spain fits better the hypotheses since no ERP has 
ever polled any consistent percentage. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has extensively examined supply side factors, related to one 
fundamental institutional setting, i.e. the electoral system, and to party positions 
along two key dimensions, namely, economy and immigration. Permissive electoral 
rules, in particular PR formulas are widely appraised such as facilitating channel for 
new and small parties to gather votes and elect MPs. Whether PR formulas 
privileges the principle of representation, the prerogative of majoritarian electoral 
systems is governability, namely, they usually manufacture strong majorities and 
executives by over-representing the most voted party and under-representing parties 
from the third position downwards in the ranking. Therefore, the tested hypothesis 
postulated that the more the electoral system is permissive (i.e., approximating pure 
proportionality in the allocation of seats), the largest the ERPs’ vote shares. Despite 
theoretical expectations appeared plausible, empirical results weakly corroborate 
the hypothesis. Indeed, considering for instance the Netherlands and Portugal, the 
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electoral system is markedly permissive but ERPs’ scores are very low, in the 
former case, and nil in the latter one. 
The second and the third hypothesis referred to the convergence of mainstream 
parties along, respectively, the economic and the immigration axis. The tested 
argument revolved around the expectation that the more MRP and MLP are 
spatially close to each other, the largest ERPs’ vote shares. The location of Austrian 
and Flemish mainstream right and left parties is associated with ERPs’ scores 
above the average and, therefore, those two cases corroborate both hypotheses. 
However, Greece and Portugal are conversely on the opposite side since, despite 
convergence is present in both cases and dimensions, ERPs are not successful. 
In the light of those controversial results, the next chapter is devoted to 
combine all factors employed in the comparative analysis of both sides. The main 
purpose is to identify the combination of demand and supply side factors featuring 
each country. 
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V. AN ENCOMPASSING ANALYSIS 
1. A COMPREHENSIVE BOOLEAN ANALYSIS 
The aim of this final chapter is to put together all facets of analysis. Therefore, 
all information supplied by the last two chapters will be combined to join demand 
and supply side factors. Given the research question underpinning this research, the 
purpose is to pinpoint configurations of conditions that are causally associated to 
the outcome. Thus, as a first step, a comprehensive six-condition Venn diagram is 
made up to inspect how cases are distributed in the elaborate set of 64 possible 
combinations of causal conditions. Causal factors are, respectively, the three 
conditions of demand and supply side of the two previous chapters. With regards to 
the outcome, i.e. the ERPs vote percentage, an important remark is needed: this 
final chapter brings into account the average vote share from 1990 to 2009, that is 
the same amount of Chapter 4. As specified early, Chapter 3 considered a narrower 
period of time, concerning both conditions and the outcome, since European Social 
Survey data are not available in the last decade of the XXth century. This means that 
validity of demand side condition scores is extended to that period of time too. 
Acknowledging obvious criticisms, this assumption was inevitable since the lack of 
survey data in the 1990s. Furthermore, since the two decades at stake are 
contiguous, it does not appear such an overestimation to presume that the same 
country trends would have been reported whether data were collected in the 1990s. 
On the other side, the benefit of extending the period of analysis lies in thickening 
the relevance of results of this comprehensive inspection. 
In short: on the one hand, nativism, xenophobia, and resentment are the three 
causal conditions of the demand side; on the other hand, electoral system, 
convergence on economy, and convergence on immigration are the three causal 
conditions of the supply side. Therefore, the 15 cases are distributed across the 
26=64 combinations of conditions. Through the same procedure early employed, 
countries are associated to their own configuration based on their binary values. 
Nevertheless, due to the unbalanced relation between a small number of cases and 
 185 
rather larger number conditions90, the drawback is the “individualisation” of 
countries. Briefly stated, it is unlikely to find out common patterns binding causal 
factors and the outcome. Indeed, the truth table confirms these expectations and, 
additionally, the only common configuration consists of a contradiction between 
Denmark and Finland. A somewhat complex six-condition Venn diagram help 
visualise the overall situation. 
Table 5.1. Six-condition truth table. 
NATIV XENO RESENT ELSYS E_CONV I_CONV OUTCOME COUNTRY 
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 Austria 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 Belgium/Fl 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Belgium/Wa 
0 0 0 1 0 1 C Denmark, Finland 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 France 
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 Germany 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 Greece, Portugal 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 Ireland 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 Italy 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 Netherlands 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 Spain 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 Sweden 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 UK 
 
The early investigation on the demand side has already revealed that Austria, 
France, Germany, and Italy shared the same configuration made of a [1] value on 
[XENO] and [RESENT]. The contradiction was due to the [0] outcome of Germany 
since both REP and DVU polled very poorly on average. Those four countries 
manifest a different configuration on the supply side and Austria only still has two 
[1] values on [E_CONV] and [I_CONV], though the most critical case is Germany.  
On the whole, it has three positive conditions [1], likewise Italy and one more 
than France: this already suggests that Germany does not fulfil in a good manner 
the hypothesis on ERPs electoral strength. In fact, its ERPs are too weak in 
electoral terms and this is not in line with what causal factors would imply. Two 
factors seem to play a crucial role. Like Austria and France, the German electoral 
system is not permissive: beyond the 5 per cent national threshold that sure enough 
counters excessive party fragmentation, the role of the Constitutional Court as 
                                                
90 That carries out a big number of combinations of conditions. It is worthwhile noting that the 
balance between the number of cases (N) and the number of conditions (k) should always be 
carefully checked, since the volume of combinations of causal conditions increases exponentially 
when k increases. 
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“guardian” of democracy is decisive. Indeed, radical parties are used to avoid the 
risk of being labelled as extremist and, thereby, bypassing the Constitutional 
Court’s ban from political competition.  
Figure 5.A. Six-condition Venn diagram. 
 
 
Secondly, the historical legacy of the National Socialist regime is severely 
cumbersome, hence the establishment of any ERPs — regardless of its claim to be 
free from any nazi legacy — is blamed as suspicious. Italy as well experienced an 
authoritarian regime under Mussolini’s command for about twenty years, until its 
collapse at the end of World War II. Yet, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), de 
facto heir of fascist ideology and values91, contested elections since 1948 — the 
                                                
91 The MSI was established in 1946 by former supporters of the Italian Social Republic (RSI), 
among which Giorgio Almirante became the founder of the party and its charismatic leader. 
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first democratic election after the new republican constitution had been approved 
— and it was capable of stabilising its vote share around a 5 per cent average, so as 
to preserve its small group of MPs in the national Parliament. When the old party 
system crumbled and the majority of MSI’s lieutenants exited the party to form the 
new and more moderate National Alliance (AN), the conventio ad excludendum92 
was then removed and AN joined Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and the Northern 
League in a double-side93 alliance that won the 1994 general elections. Therefore, 
the Italian radical right gained an active position in politics and its key members 
left their long-term “exile” to fill major institutional charges. In Germany, the 
radical right is far from being considered as a “standard”, though radical, political 
player and rightist social demands in terms of xenophobia and resentment are at 
least partially absorbed by the Bavarian CSU, as demonstrated by its right wing 
location on immigration. 
The demand side presented also a second contradictory configuration involving 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. As said just above, the three 
supply side factors are not able to solve the contradiction between the two first 
countries, whereas the last two share a mirroring configuration on the supply side. 
Indeed, the Netherlands have a [1] value on [ELSYS] and [E_CONV]. Conversely, 
in Sweden only a convergence on immigration came about. Two additional remarks 
have to be put forth. In the former case, the outcome was set to [0] given the 
marginal vote shares of the Centre Democrats (CD), the only Dutch political party 
here considered as an ERP. Nevertheless, the electoral performances of the List 
Pim Portuyn (LPF) and, then, the Party for Freedom (PVV) has to be monitored 
firmly, since it is possible that the second one may come closer to the ERP group in 
the near future, given its sharp Islamophobic platform. In the second case, the New 
Democracy party (NyD) was ruled out from the set under investigation and, 
notwithstanding, it was a flash party that contested only two national elections. 
Even though the demand side does not constitute a fertile ground for an ERP, the 
convergence on immigration between mainstream right and left parties may 
                                                
92 The MSI had been put aside from the so-called constitutional arch constituted by all political 
forces in defence of the democratic regime. 
93 Actually, two small coalitions were set up in the centre-right camp: FI was allied with AN in the 
centre-south of Italy (Polo del buongoverno) and in the north with NL (Polo delle libertà). 
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actually open the way for the entry of a more radical right wing competitor. 
Actually, the Sweden Democrats were not included in the survey data, but in the 
2010 national elections gathered an impressive 5.7 percent and elected 20 MPs. 
Although this may represents again a short-lived phenomenon, the Sweden 
Democrats might plausibly embody the exclusionist right in Sweden. As Chapter 4 
exhibited earlier about the supply side, a second contradictory configuration — in 
addition to the Danish and Finnish combination — grouped together France, Spain, 
and Wallonia. Those three countries have all supply side conditions set to [0] and 
the contradiction was raised by the anomalous stance of France. Such an anomaly 
consisted of a strong National Front regardless of the absence of favourable supply 
side factors. Bringing into account demand side determinants solves those 
contradictions: all three cases have two out of three factors with [1] value.  
Before passing to the calculation of a minimal Boolean formula, an important 
remark is to be pointed out. Indeed, causal conditions and the outcome have been 
coded in the same logical direction, so that when a given conditions [COND] has a 
[1] value, this is expected to be associate with a [1] outcome, and vice versa with 
[0] value. The six-condition truth table presented above showed rather clearly that 
this assumption in not consistently confirmed. It is sufficient to note that with 
Greece and Portugal all conditions are present, whereas the outcome is absent. 
Moreover, in opposite directions, both France and the UK represent troublesome 
cases: the former has a positive outcome although just two conditions out of six are 
present and, vice versa, the UK has a totally negative outcome despite four 
conditions have a [1] value. Furthermore, to obtain a minimal formula is needful to 
eliminate the contradiction configuration of Denmark and Finland. There are 
different ways to solve this problem, as listed by Rihoux and Ragin (2009, 48-49), 
but none of them perfectly fits the present context and, in any case, a choice is 
always to be justified on either theoretical or empirical grounds. As remarked 
earlier, in Finland the PS made a leap in the very recent 2011 national elections 
reaching 19 per cent with an increase of 14.9 percentage points. Whether this score 
was included in the analysis, the average score of PS would be 5.3 percent. This 
implies that the score of Finland would be coded as [1]. Moreover, when dropping 
a case it must be considered the balance between cases with [0] and [1] outcome 
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and two third of the total have a [0] value for the outcome. These are the main 
reasons why it appears opportune to drop Finland and keep Denmark in the set of 
analysis. 
When dealing with csQCA and searching for a minimal formula, the 
minimisation process is to be performed four times like Rihoux and Ragin clearly 
specified stating the good practises to be followed (2009, 64-65): two times when 
the outcome is present and then absent, and again each of those processes must be 
repeated with and then without logical remainders. This way the final output consist 
of a simpler minimal formula since the software select those logical remainders – 
and makes some simplifying assumptions about them — and returns a more concise 
Boolean expression. Results are as follows: 
I. Minimisation of the [1] outcome without logical remainders: 
nativ * XENO * RESENT * e_conv * i_conv +  nativ * XENO * RESENT * 
elsys * E_CONV * I_CONV + NATIV * XENO * resent * elsys * E_CONV * 
I_CONV + nativ * xeno * resent * ELSYS * e_conv * I_CONV  
 
Table 5.2.  Coverage of single terms of the minimal formula (1; ~LR). 
Term Case 
nativ * XENO * RESENT * e_conv * i_conv FRANCE + ITALY 
nativ * XENO * RESENT * elsys * E_CONV * I_CONV  AUSTRIA 
NATIV * XENO * resent * elsys * E_CONV * I_CONV BELGIUM/FL 
nativ * xeno * resent * ELSYS * e_conv * I_CONV DENMARK 
 
The first term is the only covering two cases, i.e. France and Italy. These two 
countries are featured by an adversarial competition between the two mainstream 
right and left parties, as showed by the absence of convergence both on economy 
and immigration. Moreover, in both countries there is a combination of [XENO] 
and [RESENT] and the former, condition as already highlighted, is a quasi-
necessary condition since is present in four countries out of five. On the contrary, 
nativism is absent in all countries but Flanders. 
II. Minimisation of the [0] outcome without logical remainders: 
nativ * RESENT * elsys * E_CONV * i_conv + NATIV * XENO * resent * 
elsys * e_conv * i_conv + NATIV * XENO * RESENT * ELSYS * E_CONV * 
I_CONV + nativ * xeno * resent * ELSYS * E_CONV * i_conv + NATIV * 
xeno * RESENT * elsys * e_conv * i_conv + nativ * xeno * resent * elsys * 
e_conv * I_CONV + NATIV * XENO * RESENT * elsys * e_conv * I_CONV 
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Table 5.3.  Coverage of single terms of the minimal formula (0; ~LR). 
Term Case 
nativ * RESENT * elsys * E_CONV * i_conv GERMANY + IRELAND 
NATIV * XENO * resent * elsys * e_conv * i_conv BELGIUM/WA 
NATIV * XENO * RESENT * ELSYS * E_CONV * I_CONV GREECE, PORTUGAL 
nativ * xeno * resent * ELSYS * E_CONV * i_conv NETHERLANDS 
NATIV * xeno * RESENT * elsys * e_conv * i_conv SPAIN 
nativ * xeno * resent * elsys * e_conv * I_CONV SWEDEN 
NATIV * XENO * RESENT * elsys * e_conv * I_CONV UK 
 
The only Boolean minimisation regards Germany and Ireland, indeed they 
differed only in relation to [XENO]. Again, the presence of nativism is rather 
unanticipated and counter theoretical expectations: indeed, [NATIV] is positive in 
five cases out of nine. This warns that the correspondent statistical indicator (see 
Table 3.2) measures a facet of nativism by explicitly mentioning race and ethnicity 
(see Appendix 2). Thus, it is possible that the item is perceived in “racist” terms 
and traditional racism – e.g., the white supremacy — is not a winning atout in 
contemporary political competition. This could account (at least, partially) for 
countries where [NATIV] is present and ERPs are unsuccessful at the polls. 
It is now opportune to go further into analysis by computing logical remainders 
in the process of Boolean minimisation. The selection of logical remainders to be 
included is completely managed by Tosmana software (Cronqvist 2011) and is 
driven by the aim of getting a minimal formula as concise as possible.  
III. Minimisation of the [1] outcome with logical remainders: 
ELSYS * e_conv + nativ * XENO * e_conv + elsys * E_CONV * I_CONV = 
= e_conv * (ELSYS + nativ * XENO) + elsys * E_CONV * I_CONV 
Table 5.4.  Coverage of single terms and simplifying assumptions (1; LR). 
Term Case 
ELSYS * e_conv  DENMARK + ITALY 
nativ * XENO * e_conv  FRANCE94 + ITALY 
elsys * E_CONV * I_CONV AUSTRIA + BELGIUM/FL 
Note: simplifying assumptions listed by Table A2.2 (see Appendix 2). 
The conditions e_conv has been factorised since it is shared by two terms. 
Some aspects are remarkable: first, Italy has two paths by which is positive 
outcome can be explained. This situation highlights an important QCA feature, i.e. 
equifinality: different causal factors, combined in different ways, can produce the 
                                                
94 Note that “nativ * XENO * e_conv” is the chosen prime implicant for France.  
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same outcome. That warns also how Italy is a complex case in terms of the relation 
between conditions and outcome. Secondly and in the opposite direction, 
convergence on economy is present for the other two countries — i.e., Austria and 
Belgium — therefore the role played by this condition is ambiguous on the whole. 
In analogy, also the function played by the electoral system is not completely 
straightforward since in two positive cases is permissive (Denmark and Italy) and 
in other two positive cases is not permissive (Austria and Flanders). In the last two 
cases, even though the electoral law provide barriers to the entry of new parties, a 
double convergence of mainstream right and left parties along both dimensions, 
enhances the electoral success of ERPs. 
IV. Minimisation of the [0] outcome with logical remainders: 
NATIV * RESENT + E_CONV * i_conv + resent * elsys * e_conv 
Table 5.5.  Coverage of single terms of the minimal formula (0; LR). 
Term Case 
NATIV * RESENT GREECE, PORTUGAL + SPAIN + UK 
E_CONV * i_conv GERMANY + IRELAND + NETHERLANDS 
resent * elsys * e_conv BELGIUM/WA + SWEDEN 
Note: simplifying assumptions listed by Table A2.3 (see Appendix 2). 
The last raw points out a combination of negative conditions that in line with 
the theory. On the contrary, the first raw counters theoretical expectations since a 
combination of nativism and resentment should be associated to a positive, rather 
than a negative, outcome. Furthermore, three cases out of four — e.g. Greece, 
Portugal, and the United Kingdom — represents deviant cases as it will be showed 
in the next section. 
2. A WEIGHTED-ADDITIVE INDEX OF POTENTIALITY 
In order to assemble all information on tap, an additive six-item index is made 
up to evaluate the overall demand and supply side potential for ERPs in relation to 
each country. The key point is that the index is built by pondering each component 
differently, thereby attributing divergent weights in order to differentiate the 
supposed theoretical relevance among items. Furthermore, this strategy improves 
QCA outputs since the latter brings into account demand and supply side conditions 
that are all “on the same level”. In other words, QCA does not attach a different 
degree of potentiality to conditions regarding their supposed power to affect the 
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outcome. By adopting a different point of view, it appears viable to argue that some 
causal factors have a stronger ascendancy on the outcome than others. In particular, 
three different weights95 are used to rank the importance of components split in the 
two usual domains (demand and supply side), thereby keeping balanced their 
importance to the outcome. 
Starting from the demand side, as showed also through QCA analysis, 
xenophobia is a crucial item insofar as formidable driver for ERPs electorate, thus 
it has been attached a weight equal to 3; secondly, resentment plays a middle-level 
role since ERPs have been capable of catching protest votes and present themselves 
as anti-establishment parties, thus the related item has been attribute a weight of 2; 
finally, nativism has been given a weight equal to 1 since its ambiguous presence in 
many instances where the outcome was absent [0]. On the whole, the assumption is 
that the psychological factor, captured by xenophobia, appears as more relevant as 
associated to the irrationality and fears of citizens both in the economic and cultural 
domain. On the supply side, convergence on immigration is considered as the most 
relevant, since the excessive closeness between MRP and MLP can push voters 
towards ERPs since they express more radical postures on the issue and, therefore, 
it is given a weight equal to 3; secondly, the strategic and debated importance of the 
electoral system is recognised by a weight equals to 2. Finally, convergence on 
economy has a weight equal to 1 and this is rather straightforward since, in several 
occasions, it has been said that economy is not at the core of ERPs’ ideology. 
Moreover its absence is associated to three countries with positive outcome [1], as 
showed with minimisation with logical remainders. 
The following diagram depicts the relationship between the weighted index 
and the average vote percentage of ERPs in the period 1990-2009 (see Table 4.2). 
The index is simply calculated by summing up each country’s score, on each item, 
multiplied by its weight. 
                                                
95 Respectively equal to 3, 2, or 1, based on their decreasing importance in influencing ERPs’ 
potential. 
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Figure 5.B. Weighted index and average vote percentage relationship96. 
 
On the horizontal axis, index value ranges from 3 to 12. In particular, there are 
two cases — Greece and Portugal — reaching the top score and four cases — the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, and Sweden — at the bottom. Putting aside the three 
outliers lying at the bottom-right corner, the relationship between the two plotted 
variables is rather strong. Starting from the case with the most electorally supported 
ERPs (i.e., FPÖ and BZÖ), Austria holds the largest average vote percentage and 
its index equals 9. Hence, its position is in line with theoretical expectations. In 
particular, two conditions out of three are present along both sides. Situation is 
more complicated when index equals 5 since in two countries — France and 
Denmark — ERPs gathered consistent shares of votes, but the True Finns in 
Finland holds a middle-to-law strength. Although Germany stands in a borderline 
position, Greece, Portugal, and the United Kingdom are the real deviant cases. 
In particular, in the latter case, no political actor has been able to profit of such 
a remarkable potential (9 out of 12 points) hitherto. Therefore, the position of UK 
                                                
96 Cases that are considered as outliers are indicated by an asterix (*). 
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disconfirms the theoretical hypotheses. Furthermore, all demand side conditions are 
present in the UK, while convergence on immigration is the only positive condition 
on the supply side. On the whole, the argument of this section is that the focus has 
to be turned onto the electoral system. Given the high potential on the demand side, 
the role played by FPTP — as gatekeeper against party fragmentation — appears to 
be a crucial factor preventing small and new parties — and among them ERPs too 
— to enter the House of Commons. Although a larger number of parties are 
currently able to win some seats than in the past97, these are expression of local 
instances embodied by regionalist parties like the Scottish National Party, the 
Welsh Plaid Cymru, and others from Northern Ireland. Usually the potential 
electorate close to ERPs’ ideology is not geographically concentrated, i.e. over-
represented in some areas, and the same can be argued as well for the Greens. 
Given the “winner takes all” principle of FPTP system, a candidate needs a 
plurality in its constituency to win that seat. This implies that demand side 
conditions should be switch on and concentrated in some districts, in 
correspondence of ERPs’ candidates. In fact, although nativism, xenophobia, and 
resentment, are present on average across the country, these cannot favour ERPs 
saved when they are particularly sharp in small portion of the territory. Just as an 
example, the British National Party could take advantage of immigrant crimes in 
small cities where resentment and xenophobia become deeply felt by local 
population. Nevertheless, as long as FTPT is in force, its braking role represents a 
barrier that ERPs are nowadays not capable to overstep. Moreover, the convergence 
of the Labour and Conservative parties leans evidently on the right98. This clearly 
means that the Labour moved towards the centre of the political spectrum, while 
the Tories kept their right-wing stance. Consequently, for an ERP is not 
straightforward to campaign on immigration, trying to attract part of the electorate 
of the mainstream centre-right party (CONS). 
On the other hand, different observations can be carried out regarding Greece 
and Portugal. In the first case, the LAOS has returned increasing electoral 
                                                
97 Together with a loss of votes for both the Labour Party and the Tories, an erosion of two-party 
system appears on the way (Vassallo 2005). 
98 Indeed, considering all four surveys their average score middle point on immigration is equal to 
0.62. 
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performances, thus Greece may be intended such a “late comer” case, i.e. 
favourable demand and supply side factors have finally enhanced the emergence of 
a “delayed” ERP. On the contrary, Portugal does not have any ERP, though the role 
of the CDS/PP cannot be totally discarded, since the People’s Party holds features 
that are close to a borderline case. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
The description of the West European party system change in the last two 
decades has represented the background throughout the research. This ongoing 
transformation traces back to the ascending relevance of non-economic issue in 
society and, by consequence, in party competition. In particular, the flux of 
immigrants from non-EU member countries has acquired a growing substance and 
triggered frictions on cultural grounds. The return on stage of the right-wing 
radicalism is situated in that context, even though this cannot be conceived just as 
mere corollary of immigration. Indeed, Kitschelt argued that the radical right is not 
simply an anti-immigrant backlash and «the themes of racism and cultural 
intolerance are embedded in broader right-authoritarian political dispositions that 
are prominent among identifiable social groups» (1995, 257). Actually, ERPs gives 
political representation to a broader set of feelings, spread in most European 
countries and bind to the globalisation process. Briefly stated, the latter has brought 
about the weakening of state barriers and facilitated connections among people and 
cultures. By consequence, the risk of being exposed to a wider international 
competition, in economic terms, and to the challenge of unconventional value 
systems, in cultural terms, is appraised as responsible for the widening of public 
fears, anxieties and resentments. Nowadays, most of West European party systems 
consists of four political areas where the mainstream right and left are sided by a 
libertarian left and an exclusionist right. 
The first part of the investigation has been devoted to the portrayal of how 
party systems evolved and this made possible the recognition of the Exclusionist 
Right Parties (ERPs), i.e. the chief object of the analysis. The importance of Part 1 
lies in setting the research context along with the definition of a proper label for 
parties at stakes, thereby avoiding any conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970). As 
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stated in the introduction, the main purpose is the identification of configurations of 
demand and supply side factors accounting for ERPs’ electoral performances. 
Hence, Part 2 is completely committed to that goal. Conveniently, causal factors are 
divided into demand and supply sides, and they are combined in the final chapter to 
bond the entire analysis. As showed by the encompassing analysis, minimal 
formulas for the positive and negative outcomes are rather complex and common 
patterns grouping together several countries did not emerge easily, saved when 
including logical remainders. Moreover, some causal conditions are troublesome, 
like nativism and convergence on economy, in terms of how they actually affect the 
outcome. About the latter point, this leaves open to debate the supposed new 
winning formula for radical right parties based on authoritarianism on cultural 
grounds and a neo-centrist stance on economy (De Lange 2007). Moreover, the role 
of the electoral system is not clear-cut as demonstrated by two polar cases, i.e. 
France and the UK: both countries employ majoritarian electoral systems, though in 
France the National Front has managed not just to survive, but also to acquire a 
strong political blackmail potential (Sartori 1976), whereas in the UK the 
exclusionist right is practically irrelevant. 
Furthermore, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis proved to be a very 
powerful too in conducting a rigorous comparison across countries on a given set of 
conditions. Yet, some limitations are to be reminded, in particular the limited 
diversity drawback, i.e. given a middle-to-low number of cases it is not appropriate 
to increase the number of causal factors brought into account. In a nutshell, this 
setback reproduces the widely known problem of “many variables, small number of 
cases”. QCA is settled on a firm determinism binding conditions to the outcome 
and all causal factors stand on the same level of importance. Nevertheless, the 
construction of the weighted additive index has showed that some factors are more 
influent than others in affecting the outcome. In particular, the two key drivers 
accounting for different degrees of ERPs’ electoral scores are xenophobia, on the 
demand side, and convergence on immigration, on the supply side. Whenever these 
two factors reach high values (in this research, above the West European average), 
then it is more likely that ERPs poll better. 
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Of course, the overall topic needs further inquiries in several respects. Some of 
proposals are here put forth: firstly, a deeper analysis of Greece and Portugal, both 
belonging to the South European area and to third way of democratisation, holding 
a very high potential for ERPs that has been only partially translated into practise 
by the former; secondly, a comparison between Denmark and Finland where causal 
condition’ scores are very similar, but results in terms of ERPs’ vote shares are 
divergent; thirdly, a study of France and the UK for the reason explained early, 
starting from the electoral systems. Moreover, further researches can be conducted 
taking into account other factors than those treated in the present investigation. 
Certainly, one of the most important is populism. The main drawback lies on the 
difficulty in gathering reliable data about that phenomenon, conceived not just as 
political style but also as an ideology. In particular, measuring that property is 
subject to many criticisms and, in terms of political propaganda, populism is not an 
exclusive feature of ERPs since it appears as the leitmotiv of contemporary age. 
Finally, the personalisation of politics and the key role of charismatic leadership is 
another key factor: here, the pitfall lies in the direction of causality. Indeed, it is 
plausible to argue that strong leaders are decisive in the electoral performances of 
their parties or, vice versa, successful parties make their leaders stronger. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A.1. Expert survey party positions: Austria. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
BZÖ - - 0.60 0.76 - - - 0.95 
FPÖ 0.76 0.64 0.68 0.48 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.98 
GRÜNEN 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.10 
KPO 0.22 - - - - - - - 
LIF - 0.76 - 0.75 0.20 0.21 - 0.12 
ÖVP 0.66 0.62 0.72 0.68 0.56 0.64 0.66 0.83 
SPÖ 0.51 0.42 0.34 0.28 0.43 0.60 0.42 0.43 
 
Figure A.1. Austrian bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.2. Expert survey party positions: Belgium (Flanders). 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
AGALEV 0.43 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.05 0.11 
CVP/CD&V 0.60 0.58 0.44 0.56 0.55 0.59 0.35 0.59 
ID21 - 0.51 - - - - - - 
VU/N-VA 0.61 0.50 0.57 0.71 0.53 0.51 - 0.74 
PVV/VLD 0.85 0.76 0.81 0.79 0.69 0.72 0.63 0.61 
SP.A. 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.26 0.40 0.50 0.22 0.38 
VB 0.74 0.88 0.70 0.71 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 
 
Figure A.2. Belgian (Flanders) bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.3. Expert survey party positions: Belgium (Wallonia). 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
ECOLO 0.43 0.18 0.19 0.35 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.20 
FDF/RW 0.51 0.63 - - - - - - 
FN - - 0.74 - 0.99 0.98 0.96 - 
MCC - 0.58 - -     
PRL/MR 0.84 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.72 0.61 0.46 0.53 
PS 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.24 0.25 
PSC/CDH 0.61 0.53 0.52 0.58 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.48 
 
Figure A.3. Belgian (Wallonia) bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.4. Expert survey party positions: Denmark. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
CC 0.33 - - - - - - - 
CD 0.57 0.53 0.43 - 0.36 0.38 0.27 - 
DF - 0.73 0.47 0.48 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.92 
DKP 0.14 - - - - - - - 
EL - 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10 
FOLKB - 0.10 - 0.27 - - - - 
FP 0.97 0.89 0.88 - 0.89 0.90 0.96 - 
G 0.32 - - -     
JUNIB - 0.20 - 0.28     
KF 0.79 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.63 0.69 0.77 0.76 
KRF 0.62 0.57 0.45 - 0.43 0.42 0.40 - 
RV 0.61 0.53 0.49 0.58 0.25 0.26 0.18 0.24 
SD 0.43 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.53 0.55 0.66 
SF 0.30 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.20 
V 0.86 0.77 0.73 0.66 0.63 0.75 0.74 0.76 
VS 0.13 - - - - - - - 
 
Figure A.4. Danish bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.5. Expert survey party positions: Finland. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
DA 0.14 - - - - - - - 
EKA - 0.57 - - - - - - 
FPDL 0.18 - - - - - - - 
IKL - - - - 0.87 0.92 - - 
KESK 0.54 0.54 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.57 0.59 0.57 
KIPU - 0.45 - - - - - - 
KOK 0.70 0.82 0.78 0.74 0.52 0.59 0.62 0.50 
LPP 0.63 - - - - - - - 
P 0.57 - - - - - - - 
REM - 0.58 - - - - - - 
SDP 0.26 0.34 0.39 0.30 0.29 0.35 0.36 0.48 
SFP 0.72 0.70 0.63 0.71 - - - - 
SKL/KD 0.67 0.56 0.39 0.50 0.53 0.62 0.55 0.51 
SMP/PS 0.50 0.54 0.44 0.48 0.72 0.73 0.94 0.81 
VAS - 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.31 
VIHR 0.34 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.16 
VSL - - - - 0.71 0.71 - - 
 
Figure A.5. Finnish bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.6. Expert survey party positions: France. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
CPNT - 0.73 - - - - - - 
D - 0.90 - - - - - - 
DL - 0.74 - - - - - - 
FN 0.89 0.87 0.83 0.66 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.86 
LO-LCR - 0.02 - - - - - - 
MEI - 0.50 - - - - - - 
MN - 0.86 - - - - - - 
MPF - - 0.77 0.75 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.79 
PCF 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.20 0.19 0.25 0.19 
PRG 0.41 0.51 - 0.39 - - - - 
PS 0.30 0.36 0.32 0.21 0.31 0.37 0.28 0.43 
RPF - 0.74 0.68 - - - - - 
RPR 0.68 0.64 0.70 - 0.78 0.74 0.60 - 
UDF 0.66 0.63 0.68 0.58 0.69 0.67 0.50 0.59 
UMP - - - 0.70 - - - 0.76 
VERTS 0.34 0.40 0.19 0.29 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.10 
 
Figure A.6. French bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.7. Expert survey party positions: Germany. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
CDU 0.66 0.57 0.71 0.68 0.65 0.68 0.72 0.77 
CSU - 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.76 0.79 0.72 0.87 
DKP - - 0.04 - - - - - 
DVU - 0.72 -0.02 - 0.98 0.98 0.97 - 
FDP 0.77 0.73 0.93 0.86 0.44 0.46 0.36 0.47 
GRÜNEN 0.22 0.35 0.53 0.40 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.19 
NDP 0.64 - 0.42 - - - - - 
PDS/DL - 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.32 
REP - 0.72 0.52 - 0.94 0.94 0.97 - 
SCHIL - - 0.69 - - - 0.91 - 
SPD 0.29 0.41 0.44 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.35 0.54 
 
Figure A.7. German bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.8. Expert survey party positions: Greece. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
DIKKI - 0.29 - 0.08 - 0.55 - - 
EM     0.88 0.96 - - 
KKE 0.08 0.09 0.18 0.01 0.29 0.31 0.41 0.36 
KKEES 0.36 - - - - - - - 
LAOS - - - 0.53 - - - 0.98 
ND 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.69 0.53 0.69 0.72 0.61 
PASOK 0.36 0.54 0.52 0.42 0.51 0.49 0.44 0.30 
POLA - 0.67 - - 0.75 0.75 - - 
SYN - 0.36 0.29 0.11 0.30 0.34 0.13 0.07 
 
Figure A.8. Greek bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.9. Expert survey party positions: Ireland. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
DSP 0.20 - - - - - - - 
FF 0.67 0.53 0.67 0.63 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.55 
FG 0.72 0.63 0.61 0.69 0.67 0.61 0.63 0.55 
GP - 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.31 
LAB 0.29 0.37 0.29 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.30 0.44 
NPI - - - - 0.80 0.85 - - 
PD 0.85 0.82 0.86 0.85 0.68 0.56 0.69 0.63 
SF 0.28 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.52 0.42 0.40 0.37 
SP - 0.15 - - - - - - 
WP 0.18 - - - - - - - 
 
Figure A.9. Irish bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.10. Expert survey party positions: Italy. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
AN - 0.43 0.48 0.54 0.86 0.79 0.77 0.70 
CCD - 0.50 - - 0.55 0.59 - - 
CDU - 0.50 - - - - - - 
DC 0.53 - - - - - - - 
DEM/DL - 0.43 0.39 0.44 - - 0.23 0.32 
DP 0.02 - - - - - - - 
FI - 0.73 0.87 0.77 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.67 
IDV - - 0.40 0.46 - - 0.36 - 
LN - 0.88 0.74 0.81 0.94 0.90 0.96 0.82 
MRE - - - 0.48 - - - 0.63 
MSFT - 0.52 0.30 - - 0.91 0.89 - 
MSI 0.71 - - - 0.90 - - - 
NPSI - - - 0.57 - - - 0.63 
PCI 0.11 - - - 0.21 - - - 
PDCI - - 0.15 0.03 - - 0.13 0.20 
PDS/DS - 0.33 0.30 0.30 - 0.30 0.18 0.30 
PdUP - 0.10 - - - - - - 
PLI 0.80 - - - - - - - 
PP - - - 0.45 - - - 0.57 
PPI - 0.40 - - 0.32 0.36 - - 
PR 0.37 0.82 0.75 0.67 - - 0.22 0.52 
PRI 0.68 0.58 - - - - - - 
PsDA - 0.37 - - - - - - 
PSDI 0.44 0.40 - - - - - - 
PSI 0.43 - - - - - - - 
RC - 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.20 
RI - 0.62 - - - - - - 
SDI - - 0.44 0.38 - - 0.33 0.35 
SEGNI - 0.64 - - - - - - 
SVP - 0.55 - 0.47 - - - - 
UD - 0.50 - - - - - - 
UDC - - 0.51 0.51 - - 0.42 0.58 
UDEUR - - - 0.43 - - - 0.54 
VERDI 0.28 0.38 0.21 0.30 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.18 
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Figure A.10. Italian bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.11. Expert survey party positions: Netherlands. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
CD - 0.86 - - 0.97 0.97 - - 
CDA 0.66 0.53 0.65 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.63 
CPN 0.04 - - - - - - - 
D66 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.35 0.41 0.33 0.40 
GL - 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.22 
GPV/CU 0.73 0.58 0.46 0.41 0.68 0.72 0.45 0.57 
LPF - - 0.81 - - - 0.91 0.94 
PPR 0.11 - - - - - - - 
PSP 0.06 - - - - - - - 
PvdA 0.25 0.44 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.42 0.35 0.42 
PVV - - - 0.83 - - - - 
RPF 0.80 0.60 - - 0.68 0.72 - - 
SGP 0.79 0.73 0.64 - 0.74 0.78 0.66 - 
SP - 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.54 0.54 0.42 0.53 
VVD 0.86 0.74 0.83 0.79 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.80 
 
Figure A.11. Dutch bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.12. Expert survey party positions: Portugal. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
BE - 0.25 0.22 0.12 - - 0.08 0.09 
CDS/PP 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.67 0.67 0.75 0.79 
CDU - 0.24 - 0.09 - - - 0.28 
DI 0.37 - - - - - - - 
G 0.21 - 0.22 - 0.15 0.14 0.17 - 
MDP 0.32 - - - - - - - 
PCP 0.13 - 0.16 - 0.20 0.19 0.15 - 
PDC 0.86 - - - - - - - 
PRD 0.46 - - - - - - - 
PSD 0.68 0.60 0.71 0.70 0.55 0.51 0.59 0.60 
PS 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.48 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.49 
PSR 0.16 - - - 0.08 0.06 - - 
PXXI - - - - 0.13 0.10 - - 
UDP 0.16 - - - 0.13 0.12 - - 
 
Figure A.12. Portuguese bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.13. Expert survey party positions: Spain. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
BNG - 0.30 - 0.22 - - - 0.44 
CC - 0.56 - 0.61 - - - 0.64 
CDS 0.44 - - - - - - - 
CHA - - - 0.24 - - - 0.47 
CIU 0.53 0.61 0.58 0.65 0.59 0.51 0.61 0.59 
CP 0.72 - - - - - - - 
EA - 0.47 - 0.48 - - - 0.48 
EAJ-PNV 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.63 0.56 
ERC - 0.35 - 0.24 - - - 0.53 
FE-JONS - - - - 0.93 0.93 - - 
HB 0.30 0.18 - - - - - - 
IC - 0.33 - - - - - - 
IU 0.12 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.35 
MUC 0.07 - - - - - - - 
PAR - 0.63 - - - - - - 
PP - 0.66 0.83 0.79 0.72 0.69 0.82 0.68 
PRD 0.63 - - - - - - - 
PSC - 0.42 - - - - - - 
PSOE 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.39 0.47 0.37 0.34 0.43 
UV - 0.57 - - - - - - 
VERDE - 0.24 - - - - - - 
 
Figure A.13. Spanish bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.14. Expert survey party positions: Sweden. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
CDU/KD 0.59 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.50 0.52 0.45 0.50 
COM/V 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.19 
C 0.52 0.57 0.55 0.72 0.56 0.59 0.47 0.56 
FPL 0.66 0.76 0.66 0.74 0.31 0.34 0.26 0.58 
JL - - - 0.59 - - - 0.57 
M 0.84 0.83 0.88 0.79 0.60 0.65 0.53 0.57 
MP 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.23 
NyD - 0.80 - - 0.93 0.93 - - 
SAP 0.35 0.41 0.32 0.32 0.46 0.51 0.34 0.48 
SD - - - - 0.97 0.97 - - 
 
Figure A.14. Swedish bi-dimensional space. 
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Table A.15. Expert survey party positions: United Kingdom. 
 Economy Immigration 
Party 
1992 
(I) 
1999 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
1990 
(I) 
2000 
(II) 
2003 
(III) 
2006 
(IV) 
BNP - - - - 0.98 0.98 - - 
CONS 0.85 0.77 0.75 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.67 0.80 
GREENS - 0.19 - 0.29 0.24 0.22 - 0.36 
LAB 0.23 0.49 0.37 0.44 0.45 0.55 0.42 0.65 
LIBDEMS 0.38 0.38 0.25 0.43 0.39 0.38 0.26 0.38 
PC 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.28 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.43 
SNP 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.39 0.37 0.45 0.38 0.46 
UKIP - 0.78 - 0.84 - - - 0.96 
 
Figure A.15. British bi-dimensional space. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table A2.1. List of items within the ESS ‘D’ module in 2002. 
D1 IMGETN "MOST IMMIGRANTS TO COUNTRY OF SAME RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS MAJORITY" 
D2 EIMGRPC "IMMIGRANTS FROM EUROPE: MOST FROM RICH/POOR COUNTRIES" 
D3 IMGRPC "IMMIGRANTS FROM OUTSIDE EUROPE: FROM RICH/POOR COUNTRIES" 
D4 IMSMETN "ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS OF SAME RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS MAJORITY" 
D5 IMDFETN "ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS OF DIFFERENT RACE/ETHNIC GROUP FROM MAJORITY" 
D6 EIMRCNT "ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS FROM RICHER COUNTRIES IN EUROPE" 
D7 EIMPCNT "ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS FROM POORER COUNTRIES IN EUROPE" 
D8 IMRCNTR "ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS FROM RICHER COUNTRIES OUTSIDE EUROPE" 
D9 IMPCNTR "ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS FROM POORER COUNTRIES OUTSIDE EUROPE" 
D10 QFIMEDU "QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: GOOD EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS" 
D11 QFIMFML "QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: CLOSE FAMILY LIVING HERE" 
D12 QFIMLNG "QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: SPEAK COUNTRY'S OFFICIAL LANGUAGE" 
D13 QFIMCHR "QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: CHRISTIAN BACKGROUND" 
D14 QFIMWHT "QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: BE WHITE" 
D15 QFIMWLT "QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: BE WEALTHY" 
D16 QFIMWSK "QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: WORK SKILLS NEEDED IN COUNTRY" 
D17 QFIMCMT "QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: COMMITTED TO WAY OF LIFE IN COUNTRY" 
D18 IMWGDWN "AVERAGE WAGES/SALARIES GENERALLY BROUGHT DOWN BY IMMIGRANTS" 
D19 IMHECOP "IMMIGRANTS HARM ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF THE POOR MORE THAN THE RICH" 
D20 IMFLJOB "IMMIGRANTS HELP TO FILL JOBS WHERE THERE ARE SHORTAGE OF WORKERS" 
D21 IMUNPLV "IF IMMIGRANTS ARE LONG TERM UNEMPLOYED THEY SHOULD BE MADE TO LEAVE" 
D22 IMSMRGT "IMMIGRANTS SHOULD BE GIVEN SAME RIGHTS AS EVERYONE ELSE" 
D23 IMSCRLV "IF IMMIGRANTS COMMIT SERIOUS CRIME THEY SHOULD BE MADE TO LEAVE" 
D24 IMACRLV "IF IMMIGRANTS COMMIT ANY CRIME THEY SHOULD BE MADE TO LEAVE" 
D25 IMTCJOB "IMMIGRANTS TAKE JOBS AWAY IN COUNTRY OR CREATE NEW JOBS" 
D26 IMBLECO "TAXES AND SERVICES: IMMIGRANTS TAKE OUT MORE THAN THEY PUT IN OR LESS" 
D27 IMBGECO "IMMIGRATION BAD OR GOOD FOR COUNTRY'S ECONOMY" 
D28 IMUECLT "COUNTRY'S CULTURAL LIFE UNDERMINED OR ENRICHED BY IMMIGRANTS" 
D29 IMWBCNT "IMMIGRANTS MAKE COUNTRY WORSE OR BETTER PLACE TO LIVE" 
D30 IMWBCRM "IMMIGRANTS MAKE COUNTRY'S CRIME PROBLEMS WORSE OR BETTER" 
D31 IMBGHCT "IMMIGRATION TO COUNTRY BAD OR GOOD FOR HOME COUNTRIES IN THE LONG RUN" 
D32 CTBFSMV "ALL COUNTRIES BENEFIT IF PEOPLE CAN MOVE WHERE THEIR SKILLS NEEDED" 
D33 IMRSPRC "RICHER COUNTRIES RESPONSIBLE TO ACCEPT PEOPLE FROM POORER COUNTRIES" 
D34 IMSETBS "IMMIGRANT SAME RACE/ETHNIC GROUP MAJORITY: YOURBOSS" 
D35 IMSETMR "IMMIGRANT SAME RACE/ETHNIC GROUP MAJORITY: MARRIED CLOSE RELATIVE" 
D36 IMDETBS "IMMIGRANT DIFFERENT RACE/ETHNIC GROUP MAJORITY: YOUR BOSS" 
D37 IMDETMR "IMMIGRANT DIFFERENT RACE/ETHNIC GROUP MAJORITY: MARRIED CLOSE RELATIVE" 
D38 IDETALV "PEOPLE OF MINORITY RACE/ETHNIC GROUP IN IDEAL LIVING AREA" 
D39 ACETALV "PEOPLE OF MINORITY RACE/ETHNIC GROUP IN CURRENT LIVING AREA" 
D40 PPLSTRD "BETTER FOR A COUNTRY IF ALMOST EVERYONE SHARE CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS" 
D41 VRTRLG "BETTER FOR A COUNTRY IF A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT RELIGIONS" 
D42 COMNLNG "BETTER FOR A COUNTRY IF ALMOST EVERYONE SPEAK ONE COMMON LANGUAGE" 
D43 ALWSPSC "IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES SHOULD BE ALLOWED SEPARATE SCHOOLS" 
D44 STIMRDT "IF A COUNTRY WANTS TO REDUCE TENSION IT SHOULD STOP IMMIGRATION" 
D45 LWDSCWP "LAW AGAINST ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION IN WORKPLACE GOOD/BAD FOR A COUNTRY" 
D46 LWPETH "LAW AGAINST PROMOTING RACIAL OR ETHNIC HATRED GOOD/BAD FOR A COUNTRY" 
D47 IMGFRND "ANY IMMIGRANT FRIENDS" 
D48 IMGCLG "ANY IMMIGRANT COLLEAGUES" 
D49 SHRRFG "COUNTRY HAS MORE THAN ITS FAIR SHARE OF PEOPLE APPLYING REFUGEE STATUS" 
D50 RFGAWRK "PEOPLE APPLYING REFUGEE STATUS ALLOWED TO WORK WHILE CASES CONSIDERED" 
D51 GVRFGAP "GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE GENEROUS JUDGING APPLICATIONS FOR REFUGEE STATUS" 
D52 RFGFRPC "MOST REFUGEE APPLICANTS NOT IN REAL FEAR OF PERSECUTION OWN COUNTRIES" 
D53 RFGDTCN "REFUGEE APPLICANTS KEPT IN DETENTION CENTRES WHILE CASES CONSIDERED" 
D54 RFGGVFN "FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO REFUGEE APPLICANTS WHILE CASES CONSIDERED" 
D55 RFGBFML "GRANTED REFUGEES SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO BRING CLOSE FAMILY MEMBERS" 
D56 NOIMBRO "OF EVERY 100 PEOPLE IN COUNTRY HOW MANY BORN OUTSIDE COUNTRY" 
D57 CPIMPOP "COUNTRY'S NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS COMPARED TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SAME SIZE" 
D58 BLNCMIG "NUMBER OF PEOPLE LEAVING COUNTRY COMPARED TO COMING IN” 
Source: ESS-1 2002 Documentation Report. 
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Table A2.2. Twenty-three simplifying assumptions. 
nativ*xeno*resent*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV + 
nativ*xeno*resentELSYS*e_conv*i_conv + 
nativ*xeno*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV + 
nativ*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv + 
nativ*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV +  
nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*e_conv*i_conv + 
nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV + 
nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV + 
nativ*XENO*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv + 
nativ*XENO*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV + 
nativ*XENO*RESENT*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV + 
nativ*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV + 
NATIV*xeno*resent*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV + 
NATIV*xeno*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv + 
NATIV*xeno*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV + 
NATIV*xeno*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV + 
NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv + 
NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV + 
NATIV*XENO*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv + 
NATIV*XENO*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV + 
NATIV*XENO*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV + 
NATIV*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv + 
NATIV*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV 
Note: conditions in capital characters are present [1], while in small characters are absent [0]. 
Table A2.3. Twenty-eight simplifying assumptions. 
nativ*xeno*resent*elsys*e_conv*i_conv + 
nativ*xeno*resent*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv + 
nativ*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv + 
nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*e_conv*i_conv + 
nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV + 
nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv + 
nativ*XENO*resent*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv + 
nativ*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv + 
NATIV*xeno*resent*elsys*e_conv*i_conv + 
NATIV*xeno*resent*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV + 
NATIV*xeno*resent*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv +  
NATIV*xeno*resent*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv + 
NATIV*xeno*RESENT*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV + 
NATIV*xeno*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv + 
NATIV*xeno*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV + 
NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv + 
NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV + 
NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv + 
NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*E_CONV*I_CONV + 
NATIV*XENO*resent*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV + 
NATIV*XENO*resent*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv + 
NATIV*XENO*resent*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv + 
NATIV*XENO*RESENT*elsys*e_conv*i_conv + 
NATIV*XENO*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv + 
NATIV*XENO*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV + 
NATIV*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv + 
NATIV*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV + 
NATIV*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv 
Note: conditions in capital characters are present [1], while in small characters are absent [0]. 
 216 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abedi, A. 2002. Challenges to Established Parties: The Effects Of Party Systems 
Features on the Electoral Fortunes of Anti-Political-Establishment Parties. 
European Journal of Political Research 41, no. 4: 551-583. 
Adorno, T. W., E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford. 1969. The 
Authoritarian Personality. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Almond, G., and G. B. Powell Jr. 1988. Politica comparata : sistemi, processi e 
politiche. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Altemeyer, B. 1981. Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Winnipeg: The University of 
Manitoba Press. 
Amenta, E., and J. D. Poulsen. 1994. Where to Begin: A Survey of Five 
Approaches to Selecting Independent Variables for Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis. Sociological Methods & Research 23, no. 1: 22-53. 
Art, D. 2007. Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria. 
Party Politics 13, no. 3: 331-349. 
Arzheimer, K. 2009. Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western 
Europe 1980-2002. American Political Science Review 53, no. 2: 259-275. 
Arzheimer, K., and E. Carter. 2003. Explaining Variation in the Extreme Right 
Vote: The Individual and the Political Environment. Keele European Parties 
Research Unit (KEPRU). Working Paper 19. 
———. 2006. Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party 
success. European Journal of Political Research 45: 419-443. 
Baldini, G., and A. Pappalardo. 2004. Sistemi elettorali e partiti nelle democrazie 
contemporanee. Editori Laterza. 
Bale, T. 2003. Cinderella and her ugly sisters: the mainstream and extreme right in 
Europe’s bipolarising party systems. West European Politics 26, no. 3: 67-90. 
Ball, T. 1999. From “core” to “sore” concepts: ideological innovation and 
conceptual change. Journal of Political Ideologies 4, no. 3: 391-6. 
Bartolini, S. 1984. Political Mobilization of the European Left 1860-1990. The 
Stabilisation of European Electorates, 1885-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
———. 1996. Cosa è «competizione» in politica e come va studiata. Rivista 
Italiana di Scienza Politica XXVI, no. 2. 
Bartolini, S., and P. Mair. 1990. Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: 
The Stabilisation of European electorates, 1885-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Baumgartl, B., ed. 1995. New Xenophobia in Europe. London; Boston: Kluwer 
Law International. 
Bell, D. 1963. The Radical Right. New York: Doubleday. 
———. 1973. The coming of post-industrial society. New York: Basic Books. 
Bell, D., ed. 1955. The New American Right. New York: Criterion Books. 
Benoit, K., and M. Laver. 2006. Party policy in modern democracies. Routledge 
research in comparative politics; 19. London ; New York: Routledge. 
 217 
Betz, H. G. 1993a. The New Politics of Resentment. Radical Right-Wing Populist 
Parties in Western Europe. Comparative Politcs 25, no. 4: 413-27. 
———. 1993b. The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western 
Europe. The Revue of Politics 55, no. 4: 663-685. 
Betz, H. G., and S. Immerfall, eds. 1998. The new politics of the Right. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press. 
Bobbio, N. 1994. Destra e sinistra: ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica. 
Donzelli. Roma. 
Bosetti, G., and N. Bobbio. 1993. Sinistra punto zero. Donzelli Editore. 
Budge, I., H. D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. L. Bara, and E. Tanenbaum. 2001. 
Mapping policy preferences : estimates for parties, electors, and governments, 
1945-1998. Oxford ;  New York: Oxford University Press. 
Caciagli, M., and S. Bolgherini. 2008. La politica comparata : strategie e ricerche. 
Firenze: Le Lettere. 
Caramani, D. 2008. Comparative politics. Oxford ;  New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
———. 2009. Introduction to the Comparative Method with Boolean Algebra. 
Beverly Hills, California: Sage. 
———. 2010. Of Difference and Similarities: Is the Explanation of Variation a 
Limitation to (or of) Comparative Analysis? European Political Science: 34-
48. 
Carter, E. 2002. Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing 
Extremist Parties. West European Politics 25, no. 3: 125-146. 
———. 2005. The Extreme Right in Western Europe. Success or Failure? 
Mancherster University Press. 
Castles, and P. Mair. 1984. Left-Right Political Space: Some “Expert” Judgments. 
European Journal of Political Research 12: 73-88. 
Chiarini, R. 1995. Destra italiana: dall’Unità d’Italia a Alleanza nazionale. 
Venezia: Marsilio. 
Chiarini, R., and M. Maraffi, eds. 2001. La destra allo specchio: la cultura politica 
di Alleanza nazionale. Venezia: Marsilio. 
Coffé, H., B. Heyndels, and J. Vermeir. 2007. Fertile grounds for the extreme right-
wing parties: Explaining the Vlaams Blok’s electoral success. Electoral Studies 
26: 142-155. 
Cofrancesco, D. 1984. Destra e sinistra: per un uso critico dei due termini-chiave. 
Verona: Bertani Editore. 
Cole, A. 2005. Old right and new right? The ideological positioning of parties of 
the far right. European Journal of Political Research 44: 203-230. 
Collier, D. 1993. The Comparative Method. In Political Science: The State of the 
Discipline II. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association. 
Collier, D., and J. E. Mahon Jr. 1993. Conceptual “stretching” revisited: adapting 
categories in comparative analysis. American Political Science Review 87, no. 
4: 845-55. 
Colomer, J. M., ed. 1999. La politica in Europa: introduzione alle istituzioni di 15 
paesi. Roma: Laterza. 
Crewe, I., and D. Denver. 1985. Electoral change in Western democracies: patterns 
and sources of electoral volatility. London: Sydney. 
 218 
Cronqvist, L. 2011. Tosmana - Tool for Small-N Analysis. Trier. 
http://www.tosmana.net. 
Dalton, R., S. Flanagan, and P. Beck. 1984. Electoral Change In Advanced 
Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
De Lange, S. L. 2007. A New Winning Formula?: The Programmatic Appeal of the 
Radical Right. Party Politics 13, no. 4: 411-435. 
———. 2008. In search of the radical, the right, and the populist: an evaluation of 
estimates of radical right-wing populist party positions. In , 1-34. Boston, 
Massachusetts. 
De Vries, C. E., and E. E. Edwards. 2009. Taking Europe To Its Extremes: 
Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism. Party Politics 15, no. 1: 5-28. 
Della Porta, D., and I. Mény. 1997. Democracy and Corruption in Europe. New 
York: Pinter. 
Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper&Row. 
Duverger, M. 1958. L’influenza dei sistemi elettorali sulla vita politica. Roma: Ed. 
5 Lune. 
Eatwell, R. 1989a. The Rise of “Left-Right” Terminology: The Confusion of Social 
Science. In The Nature of the Right. European and American Politics and 
Political Thought since 1789, ed. R. Eatwell and N. O’Sullivan, 32-46. Pinter 
Publishers. London. 
———. 1989b. The Nature of the Right, 1: Is There an “Essentialist” Philosophical 
Core? In The Nature of the Right. European and American Politics and 
Political Thought since 1789, ed. R. Eatwell and N. O’Sullivan, 47-61. Pinter 
Publishers. London. 
———. 1989c. The Nature of the Right, 2: The Right as a Variety of  ’Styles of 
Thought". In The Nature of the Right. European and American Politics and 
Political Thought since 1789, ed. R. Eatwell and N. O’Sullivan, 62-76. Pinter 
Publishers. London. 
———. 1989d. Right or Rights? The Rise of the “New Right.” In The Nature of the 
Right. European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789, ed. 
R. Eatwell and N. O’Sullivan, 3-17. Pinter Publishers. London. 
———. 2003. Ten theories of the extreme right. In Right-Wing Extremism in the 
Twenty-First Century, by P. H. Merkl and L. Weinberg. London: Frank Cass. 
Ellinas, A. A. 2008. Parties after Success: Why some radical right parties persist 
and others collapse. In , 1-23. Boston, Massachusetts. 
Fasano, L. M., and N. Pasini. 2004. Nuovi cleavages e competizione partitica nel 
sistema politico italiano. In Le trasformazioni dei partiti politici, by F. Raniolo, 
5-26. 2004th ed. Soneria Mannelli: Rubettino. 
Flanagan, R., and R. Inglehart. 1987. Value Change in Industrial Society. American 
Political Science Review 81, no. 4: 1289-1319. 
Flanagan, S. C., and A.R. Lee. 2003. The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the 
Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. 
Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 3: 235-270. 
Franklin, M. N., T. T. Mackie, and H. Valen. 1992. Electoral change : responses to 
evolving social and attitudinal structures in western countries. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 219 
Freeden, M. 1996. Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fukuyama, F. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Gallagher, M. 2005. Ireland: The Discreet Charm of PR-STV. In The Politics of 
Electoral Systems, ed. M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell, 511-532. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Gerring, J. 2001. Social science methodology : a criterial framework. Cambridge ; 
New York : Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Golder, M. 2003. Explaining Variation In The Success Of Extreme Right Parties In 
Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies 36: 432. 
Gruppi, L. 1972. Il concetto di egemonia in Gramsci. Roma: Editori riuniti, Istituto 
Gramsci. 
Hainsworth, P. 2008. The extreme right in Western Europe. London ;  New York: 
Routledge. 
Hainsworth, P., ed. 1992. The Extreme Right in Europe and the United States. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Harris, G. 1994. The dark side of Europe: The extreme right today. London: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Held, D. 2007. Modelli di democrazia. 3rd ed. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Hooghe, L., R. Bakker, A. Brigevich, C. De Vries, E. Edwards, G. Marks, J. 
Rovny, and M. Steenbergen. 2010. Reliability and Validity of Measuring Party 
Positions: The Chapel Hill Expert Surveys of 2002 and 2006. European 
Journal of Political Research. 
Huber, J., and R. Inglehart. 1995. Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party 
Locations in 42 Societies. Party Politics 1, no. 1: 73-111. 
Ignazi, P. 1992a. The silent counter-revolution. Hypothesis on the emergence of 
extreme right-wing parties in Europe. European Journal of Political Research 
22: 3-34. 
———. 1992b. New and old extreme right parties. The French Front National and 
the Italian Movimento Sociale. European Journal of Political Research 22: 
101-121. 
———. 1996. The intellectual basis of right-wing anti-partyism. European Journal 
of Political Research 29: 279-296. 
———. 2000. L’estrema destra in Europa. Contemporanea. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Inglehart, R. 1977. The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles 
Among Western Publics. N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
———. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Ivarsflaten, E. 2005. The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic 
realignment fuelling their electoral success. European Journal of Political 
Research 44: 465-492. 
———. 2008. What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-
examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases. 
Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 1: 3-23. 
King, G., R. O. Keohane, and S. Verba. 1994. Designing social inquiry: scientific 
inference in qualitative research. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 220 
Kirchheimer, O. 1966. The Vanishing Opposition. In Political Opposition in 
Western Democracies, ed. R. Dahl, 237-259. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press. 
Kitschelt, H. P. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1995. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
———. 2004. Diversificación y reconfiguración de los sistemas de partidos de las 
democracias postindustriales. Revista Española de Ciencia Política 4, no. 10: 
9-51. 
———. 2007. Growth and Persistence of the Radical Right in Postindustrial 
Democracies: Advances and Challenges in Comparative Research. West 
European Politics 30, no. 5: 1176-1206. 
Klingemann, H. D., A. Volkens, J. L Bara, I. Budge, and M. McDonald. 2006. 
Mapping policy preferences II: estimates for parties, electors, and 
governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990-2003. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Knutsen, O. 1998. Expert judgements of the left-right location of political parties: 
A comparative longitudinal study. West European Politics 2: 63-94. 
Kriesi, H. 1998. Il cambiamento dei cleavages politici in Europa. Rivista Italiana di 
Scienza Politica 28, no. 1: 55-80. 
Kriesi, H., E. Grande, R. Lachat, M. Dolezal, S. Bornschier, and T. Frey. 2006. 
Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six 
European countries compared. European Journal of Political Research 45: 
921-956. 
Lane, J. E., and S. O. Ersson. 1999. Politics and Society in Western Europe. 4th ed. 
London: Sage. 
Laponce, J. A. 1981. Left and right : the topography of political perceptions. 
Toronto ; Buffalo : University of Toronto Press. 
Laver, M. 2001. Estimating the policy positions of political actors. London; New 
York: Routledge. 
Laver, M., and B. Hunt. 1992. Policy and party competition. New York: Routledge. 
Lijphart, A. 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. American 
Political Science Review 65, no. 3: 682-693. 
———. 1994. Electoral systems and party systems. A study of twenty-seven 
democracies, 1945-1990. New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2001. Le democrazie contemporanee. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Lipset, S., and S. Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-
national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. 
Lubbers, M. 2000. Expert Judgment Survey of Western-European Political Parties 
2000. Nijmegem, the Netherlands: NWO, Department of Sociology, University 
of Nijmegen. 
Lubbers, M., M. Gijsberts, and P. Scheepers. 2002. Extreme right-wing voting in 
Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research 41: 345-378. 
Mackie, J. L. 1974. The cement of the universe: a study of causation. Oxford: 
Clarendon press. 
Mair, P. 1984. Party Politics in Contemporary Europe: A Challenge to Party. West 
European Politics 7: 170-183. 
 221 
Mair, P., ed. 1990. The West European Party System. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Marradi, A. 1981. Concetti e metodo per la ricerca sociale. Firenze: La Giuntina. 
Martelli, P. 1999. Elezioni e democrazia rappresentativa: un’introduzione teorica. 
Roma: GLF editori Laterza. 
Martinelli, A., M. Salvati, and S. Veca. 2009. Progetto 89 : tre saggi su libertà, 
eguaglianza, fraternità. Milano: Il Saggiatore. 
Maslow, A. H. 1970. Motivation and personality. New York: Harper&Row. 
Maurras, C. 1973. Oeuvres capitales : essais politiques. Paris: Fiammarion. 
Meguid, B. M. 2005. Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream 
Party Strategy in Niche Party Success. American Political Science Review 99, 
no. 3: 347-359. 
Merkl, P. H., and L. Weinberg, eds. 2003. Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-
First Century. Frank Class Publishers. London; Portland, OR. 
Mill, J. S. 1851. A system of logic. Parker. 
Morlino, L., and M. Tarchi, eds. 2006. Partiti e caso italiano. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Mudde, C. 1996. The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family. 
West European Politics 19, no. 2: 225-248. 
———. 1999. The single-issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the 
immigration issue. West European Politics 22, no. 3: 182-197. 
———. 2000. The Ideology of the Extreme Right. Mancherster University Press. 
Manchester. 
———. 2007. Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Müller, W. C. 2005. Austria: A Complex Electoral System with Subtle Effects. In 
The Politics of Electoral Systems, ed. M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell, 397-416. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Norris, P. 2005. Radical right: voters and parties in the electoral market. 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Norwegian Social Science Data Archives, Bergen. 2002. ESS Round 1: European 
Social Survey: ESS-1 2002 Documentation Report. Data Archive and 
distributor of ESS data. Data Services. 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway. 2002. ESS Round 1: European 
Social Survey Round 1 Data. Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. Data 
file edition 6.2. 
———. 2004. ESS Round 2: European Social Survey Round 2 Data. Data Archive 
and distributor of ESS data. Data file edition 3.2. 
———. 2006. ESS Round 3: European Social Survey Round 3 Data. Data Archive 
and distributor of ESS data. Data file edition 3.3. 
———. 2008. ESS Round 4: European Social Survey Round 4 Data. Data Archive 
and distributor of ESS data. Data file edition 4.0. 
OECD, Statextracts. 2005. Public social expenditure in percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (1980-2005). http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx. 
———. 2007. Inflow of foreign population by nationality (1998-2007). 
Panebianco, A. 1989. Modelli di partito: organizzazione e potere nei partiti politici. 
Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Pasquino, G. 1982. Degenerazioni dei partiti e riforme istituzionali. Roma: Laterza. 
 222 
Pedersen, M. 1982. Towards a New Typology of Party Lifespans and Minor 
Parties. Scandinavian Political Studies 5, no. 1: 1-16. 
Peters, B. G. 2001. Politica comparata. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Pickles, W. 1964. Left and right. In A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, ed. J. 
Gould and W. L. Kolbs. London: Tavistock. 
Przeworski, A., and H. Teune. 1977. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. 
New York: Wiley-Interscience. 
Ragin, C. C. 1987. The comparative method: moving beyond qualitative and 
quantitative strategies. Berkeley: University of California press. 
———. 2000. Fuzzy-set Social Science. Chicago, London: University of Chicago 
Press. 
———. 2008. Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Raunio, T. 2005. Finland: One Hundred Years of Quietitude. In The Politics of 
Electoral Systems, ed. M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell, 473-490. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Reinecke, W. H. 1998. Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government? 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Rémond, R. 1966. The Right Wing in France. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Rihoux, B., and C. C. Ragin. 2009. Configurational comparative methods: 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques. Los Angeles: 
Sage. 
Riker, W. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. Greenwood: Westport. 
Rokkan, S. 1982. Cittadini, elezioni, partiti. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Rose, R., and D. Urwin. 1970. Persistence and change in western party systems 
since 1945. Political Studies 18: 287-319. 
Rydgren, J., ed. 2005. Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism in 
the Western World. New York: Nova Science Publisher. 
Saalfeld, T. 2005. Germany: Stability and Strategy in a Mixed-Member 
Proportional System. In The Politics of Electoral Systems, ed. M. Gallagher 
and P. Mitchell, 209-229. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Sailer, D. 1980. Parties et familles politiques. Paris: PUF. 
Salvati, M. 1995. Sinistra o cara. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Sartori, G. 1970. Concept misformation in comparative politics. American Political 
Science Review 64, no. 4: 1033-53. 
———. 1976. Parties and party systems : a framework for analysis. I vols. 
Cambridge [Eng.]; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1982. Teoria dei partiti e caso italiano. Milano: SugarCo. 
———. 2004. Ingegneria Costituzionale Comparata. Il Mulino. Bologna. 
Schattschneider, E. E. 1942. Party Government. New York: Farrar and Rinehart. 
Schmitt, C. 1998. Le categorie del «Politico». Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Schneider, C. Q., and C. Wagemann. 2006. Reducing complexity in Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA): Remote and proximate factors and the 
consolidation of democracy. European Journal of Political Research 45: 751-
786. 
Scruton, R. 1982. A Dictionary of Political Thought. London: Pan. 
 223 
Steenbergen, M., and G. Marks. 2007. Evaluating Expert Surveys. European 
Journal of Political Research 46, no. 3: 347-366. 
Torcal, M., and J. R. Montero, eds. 2006. Political disaffection in contemporary 
democracies : social capital, institutions and politics. London ;  New York: 
Routledge. 
Tronconi, F. 2005. Identità etnica e competizione politica. Un’analisi del voto ai 
partiti etnoregionalisti in Europa Occidentale. Rivista Italiana di Scienza 
Politica XXXV: 77-106. 
Vassallo, S., ed. 2005. Sistemi politici comparati. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Veneziani, M. 1995. Sinistra e destra. Risposta a Norberto Bobbio. Firenze: 
Vallecchi Editore. 
Veugelers, J. W. P. 2000. Right-Wing Extremism in Contemporary France: A 
“Silent Counterrevolution”? The Sociological Quarterly 41, no. 1: 19-40. 
Veugelers, J., and A. Magnan. 2005. Conditions of far-right strength in 
contemporary Western Europe: an application of Kitschelt’s theory. European 
Journal of Political Research 44: 837-860. 
Von Beyme, K. 1988. Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe. West European 
Politics 11, no. 2: 1-18. 
Wagemann, C. 2007. QCA e “fuzzy set analysis”. Che cosa è e che cosa non è. 
Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica XXXVII, no. 3: 385-410. 
Weber, M. 1995. Economia e società. Milano: Edizioni di Comunità. 
Wren, A., and K. M. McElwain. 2007. Voters and Parties. In The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Politics, ed. C. Boix and S. C. Stokes, 555-581. Oxford ;  New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
